Achieving a Roaming Free Europe

T. Shortall
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Abstract

European roaming rates are not set by market forces because when a competitive market did not evolve in Europe, European legislators stepped in to set rates by legislative fiat. This paper argues that legislators’ tendency to set rates cautiously led to high wholesale prices that undermined smaller operators’ ability to put roaming-free offers into the market. Operators with larger footprints are less constrained by wholesale pricing since more roaming traffic is kept on-net. In this context, the outright abolition of retail roaming charges without wholesale backstops bestows a competitive advantage on larger operators. The paper notes the experience of the US where roaming persists for all operators but retail customers can avoid roaming charges subject to significant cut off limits. The effective wholesale roaming rate in the US is estimated at just above 1 eurocent per minute for voice while rates are observable for national roaming in Europe of 1 eurocent for voice, and 0.2 eurocent for data and 0.2 eurocent for SMS events. It is proposed that such rates would be appropriate for wholesale roaming in Europe and that these rates would facilitate pan-EU retail offers such as those observable in the US. Unlike the US, European operators charge each other termination rates to carry calls from other networks. This creates another barrier to pan-EU retail offers and creates tensions (and transfers) from low cost termination markets to high cost termination markets. This inconsistency of approach must be addressed if the elimination of intra-EU roaming is to be possible. It is suggested that low but consistent termination rates would be required to go with the low wholesale roaming rates and that these rates would need the speed and consistency of application delivered through a Regulation. The extension of retail caps to international calls and SMS is unwarranted and may have adverse effects on network valuation. Such a major policy initiative would benefit from a public consultation.
实现自由漫游的欧洲
欧洲的漫游费率不是由市场力量决定的,因为当欧洲没有形成竞争市场时,欧洲立法者就会通过立法命令来设定费率。这篇论文认为,立法者倾向于谨慎地设定费率,导致批发价格高企,这削弱了小型运营商向市场提供免费漫游服务的能力。由于更多的漫游流量保持在网络上,拥有较大足迹的运营商较少受到批发定价的限制。在这种情况下,完全取消零售漫游费而不附带批发支持,会给大型运营商带来竞争优势。该报告提到了美国的经验,在美国,所有运营商都可以继续漫游,但零售客户可以避免漫游费用受到严重的切断限制。据估计,美国话音的有效批发漫游费率略高于每分钟1欧分,而欧洲国家话音漫游费率为1欧分,数据漫游费率为0.2欧分,短信漫游费率为0.2欧分。有人建议,这样的费率将适用于欧洲的批发漫游,并且这些费率将促进泛欧零售优惠,例如在美国可观察到的优惠。与美国不同的是,欧洲运营商向对方收取从其他网络拨打电话的终止费。这为泛欧盟零售报价创造了另一个障碍,并造成了从低成本终端市场到高成本终端市场的紧张(和转移)。如果要消除欧盟内部漫游成为可能,这种方法的不一致性必须得到解决。建议采用低但一致的终止费率,以配合低批发漫游费率,而这些费率将需要通过法规提供的应用程序的速度和一致性。将零售上限扩展到国际电话和短信是没有根据的,可能会对网络估值产生不利影响。这样一项重大的政策倡议将受益于公众咨询。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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