{"title":"战略互动vs.监管公用事业中的法规遵从:瑞典水务部门","authors":"E. Lundin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2401747","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This study provides the first empirical test of strategic interactions in the pricing decisions of regulated utilities. Since publicly owned water utilities in Sweden are governed by a cost-of-service regulation, prices in neighboring municipalities should not affect the own price other than through spatially correlated cost factors. In contrast, spatial dependence is pronounced. This behavior can be explained in terms of an informal yardstick competition: When consumers use neighboring utilities' prices as benchmarks for costs or as behaviorally based reference prices, utilities will face the risk of consumer complaints and successive regulatory reviews if deviating too much from neighbors' prices.","PeriodicalId":382921,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Strategic Interaction vs. Regulatory Compliance Among Regulated Utilities: The Swedish Water Sector\",\"authors\":\"E. Lundin\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2401747\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This study provides the first empirical test of strategic interactions in the pricing decisions of regulated utilities. Since publicly owned water utilities in Sweden are governed by a cost-of-service regulation, prices in neighboring municipalities should not affect the own price other than through spatially correlated cost factors. In contrast, spatial dependence is pronounced. This behavior can be explained in terms of an informal yardstick competition: When consumers use neighboring utilities' prices as benchmarks for costs or as behaviorally based reference prices, utilities will face the risk of consumer complaints and successive regulatory reviews if deviating too much from neighbors' prices.\",\"PeriodicalId\":382921,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"24 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2013-12-17\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2401747\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2401747","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Strategic Interaction vs. Regulatory Compliance Among Regulated Utilities: The Swedish Water Sector
This study provides the first empirical test of strategic interactions in the pricing decisions of regulated utilities. Since publicly owned water utilities in Sweden are governed by a cost-of-service regulation, prices in neighboring municipalities should not affect the own price other than through spatially correlated cost factors. In contrast, spatial dependence is pronounced. This behavior can be explained in terms of an informal yardstick competition: When consumers use neighboring utilities' prices as benchmarks for costs or as behaviorally based reference prices, utilities will face the risk of consumer complaints and successive regulatory reviews if deviating too much from neighbors' prices.