ERPN: Governance (Management) (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Social Networks: The Impact on Firms’ Information Environment and Corporate Communication","authors":"Joanne Horton, George Serafeim, A. I. Tuna","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1466063","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1466063","url":null,"abstract":"We construct an interlocking-directorship network and we use social network and graph theory to identify firms that have access to a wider diversity of information, early access to that information and more control over information diffusion. We examine whether, as predicted by the theory, these firms have higher information asymmetry, and if they communicate the information they possess through mandatory and voluntary accounting methods. Our results are consistent with firms that have a brokerage position in the network exhibiting higher information asymmetry but communicating their proprietary information through discretionary accruals and voluntary disclosure.","PeriodicalId":377605,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Governance (Management) (Topic)","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134482439","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Disclosure Factors of Executive Managers Remuneration: A Probit Model","authors":"T. Lazarides, Electra Pitoska","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1409410","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1409410","url":null,"abstract":"Executive managers’ remuneration has been an issue of debate for the last 30 years. Practitioners and academics are arguing for the mechanisms, mix, level, time horizon and goal. Disclosure or not of information regarding these issues preoccupies regulating, legislative authorities as well as capital market participants. The issue of remuneration is considered to be closely connected with financial performance (positively), firm size (positively), the organizational structure (negatively) and corporate governance mechanisms (negatively). Furthermore, a connection of ownership structure and executives’ remuneration has been well established (theoretically and empirically) in the literature (agency theory). The paper, using a Probit regression analysis, examines whether these relationships are valid in Greece. Greece hasn’t the characteristics of an Anglo-Saxon country. Overall the study has shown that remuneration levels in Greece are defined by a different set of factors than the ones that are prominent in an Anglo-Saxon country. The major factors that affect the disclosure of information about the remuneration levels are the adoption of mergers and acquisitions as the method to expand firm’s size, the investments risks that the firm is willing to take, stock market capitalization, board of directors size, capital to sales ratio, number of independent member of the board of directors dismissals, and the quality of corporate governance. These factors indicate that Greek firms are disclosing information about the remuneration levels when the investment effort and the quality level of corporate governance are high.","PeriodicalId":377605,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Governance (Management) (Topic)","volume":"179 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116009701","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Agency Problem and the Role of Corporate Governance Revisited","authors":"Md. Hamid Ullah Bhuiyan, P. Biswas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1287185","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1287185","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is an attempt to identify various agency relationships that exist in the economic and business life and the related problems that often arise due to such relationships. It also identifies the role of various corporate governance mechanisms in mitigating the agency problems. Though no individual corporate governance mechanism is a perfect one, a careful selection of individual and/or combination of these is likely to serve a better purpose when factors like level of capital market development, legal system of a country are simultaneously considered.","PeriodicalId":377605,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Governance (Management) (Topic)","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125156571","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Determinants of the Use of Management Control Systems in Companies Operating Under Turbulent Conditions","authors":"Marcela Porporato","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1195316","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1195316","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the role that management control systems (MCS) play in the performance of the organizations operating under turbulent conditions. Two sets of companies are studied as turbulent conditions: international joint ventures (JVs) in the auto and motor industry and manufacturing companies located in a regional economy of a less developed country (LDC). Two surveys gathered data of 35 JVs and 45 industries in Cordoba (Argentina) that allowed testing a contingent framework. The results are concordant with the literature that holds that MCS helps to reduce uncertainty when the factors that generate it can be affected by the managerial decisions (Galbraith, 1973; Davila, 2000). Uncertainty is reduced by an appropriate use of MCS that implies a more intense use and a use orientated to coordinate rather than to control that in turn positively affects the organizational performance. Companies operating under turbulent conditions show that the use of MCS information improves their performance and is completely independent from factors not controllable by managers. The empirical study showed a clear association between previous exposure to a factor perceived as manageably and a high intensity of use of MCS with purposes of coordination to reduce the uncertainty understood as the difference between the information available and information needed to perform the task. The major limitations of this study are the lack of literature focused on the topic, testing of an ad-hoc contingent model, the small sample sizes and the measurement of latent variables through questionnaires based on perceptions.","PeriodicalId":377605,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Governance (Management) (Topic)","volume":"922 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126992795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Private Equity vs. PLC Boards in the U.K.: A Comparison of Practices and Effectiveness","authors":"V. Acharya, Conor Kehoe, Michael J. Reyner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1324019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1324019","url":null,"abstract":"The consistently higher returns generated by the most successful private equity firms have been attributed in part to their willingness to take on high levels of debt and their ability to exit from their investments at attractive multiples. But recent research suggests that the largest contributor to the superior performance of the best PE firms has been their ability to improve the operating performance of the companies they buy. And as the authors of this article argue, a key source of such improvements are fundamental differences in the way boards function in the public and private realm. Using in‐depth interviews with 20 executives who have served on both PE and plc boards of relatively large U.K. companies, the authors provide a number of suggestive insights into such differences: Perhaps the most visible of these differences is the “single‐minded” focus of PE boards on “value creation,” as contrasted with the focus of plc boards on issues of “governance” and “compliance.” Whereas PE boards view their role as “leading” the strategy of the firm and overseeing its execution by top management, plc boards are described as “monitoring” or “accompanying” strategies that are proposed and executed by management. Whereas PE boards report near‐complete alignment of objectives between executive and non‐executive directors, plc boards are described as having multiple commitments to and priorities that are divided among multiple stakeholders. Finally, whereas PE board members undergo an intensive “due diligence” process when joining boards, have frequent ongoing contacts with management, and focus heavily on the cash‐generating capacity of the business, initiations of plc board members are much more formal and ceremonial, their dealings with operating management are few and limited, and the information provided them has an “accounting” orientation and covers a broad range of subjects and corporate “responsibilities.”","PeriodicalId":377605,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Governance (Management) (Topic)","volume":"136 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122257283","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Social Structure of Organization: Coordination in a Large, Multi-Business Firm","authors":"Adam M. Kleinbaum","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1356704","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1356704","url":null,"abstract":"In my dissertation, I examine intraorganizational social networks and their antecedents and consequences. The first paper, jointly authored with Michael Tushman, is a theoretical discussion of the role of social networks in inter-divisional coordination. Most large organizations fail to develop new businesses that combine resources from disparate parts of the firm. I define and explore a brand of corporate entrepreneurship based on interdependent innovation - the deliberate creation of interdependence between autonomous divisions of multi-business firms to create new products. I argue that interdependent innovation is difficult because the social structures that promote exploration of new possibilities are inconsistent with the social structures needed to successfully execute interdependent innovation; I suggest that senior leadership plays a crucial role in transitioning the organization between different network structures.Empirically, there are at least two methodological hurdles to researching the complex interaction between formal structure and social structure in contributing to organizational outcomes. First, the kind and quality of data that have typically been collected to conduct network analysis are inadequate; and second, there is a paucity of research that accounts for the embeddedness of the informal structure in the formal. In the second dissertation paper, I begin to resolve these two issues. I argue for data collection methods relying on electronic communication archives (e.g., e-mail) for network analysis. I also empirically develop novel measures that use this data to quantify the social structural relationships between formal divisions; in doing so, I explicitly embed informal structure within formal structure in novel ways.The third dissertation paper, jointly authored with Toby Stuart and Michael Tushman, is an empirical study of the pattern of communications - and, by extension, the coordination that it enables - in a modern organization. We analyze a dataset with more than 100 million electronic mail messages, calendar meetings and teleconferences for a sample of more than 30,000 employees of a single, multidivisional firm. In dyad-level models of the probability that pairs of individuals communicate, we find very large effects of spatial proximity and formal organizational structure on the rate of communication; homophily effects based on gender, organizational tenure, and salary levels are much weaker.","PeriodicalId":377605,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Governance (Management) (Topic)","volume":"PP 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126354394","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Can Governments Signal Commitment in Privatization Sales?","authors":"B. Viani","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1127893","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1127893","url":null,"abstract":"The literature on staggered privatization sales suggests that governments can effectively signal commitment to not expropriate the future rents of privatized firms. The privatization of telephone firms around the world provides an excellent opportunity to test this theory. Using a sample of repeated privatization sales I test whether governments can effectively signal commitment by selling ownership gradually and transferring managerial control immediately. The use of panel data with fixed-effects provides consistent estimates when commitment is not observed and time-invariant. Unobserved commitment is rendered time-invariant by using repeated sales within a government administration, typically within two years. The results cast doubt on the ability of governments to effectively signal commitment and increase the market value of firms in privatization sales. These results hold for several signals tested.","PeriodicalId":377605,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Governance (Management) (Topic)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128591242","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Imperative and Benefits of Introducing Outcome Based Privatized Co-Regulation","authors":"S. Turnbull","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1089913","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1089913","url":null,"abstract":"Recent turmoil in the financial markets can be explained by the science of governance used by engineers to design the regulatory systems of devices operating in unknown, dynamic environments. Turmoil is the result of insufficient supplementary co-regulators. The laws of governance \"absolutely prohibits any direct and simple magnification but does not prohibit supplementation\" of regulation. This law creates an imperative for regulators to require that their regulatees establish a requisite variety of co-regulators. It is the stakeholders of regulatees that can provide the requisite variety of co-regulation required to avoid regulatory failure. Many stakeholders would typically include those individuals or organizations that government regulators are created to protect. The introduction of bottom up outcome based co-regulation by relevant stakeholders would result in the partial privatization of regulation. The resulting flexibility would allow regulatees to reduce compliance costs and obtain operating and competitive advantages. The paper identifies how bottom up private sector co-regulation by stakeholders could be introduced on an incremental basis. An example is presented on how a company efficiently raised new equity through changes in its constitution that also allowed the regulator to exempt it from the compliance processes and costs of changing auditors. A requirement for stakeholders to be effective co-regulators to reduce elements of public sector regulation is that they obtain the: (i) information, (ii) will and (iii) capability to act independently of regulatees to protect their own interests and that of the financial system as may be relevant. The role of government and its regulators would change from defining practices and processes to defining outcomes of the stakeholder and system protection required. An outcome based regime would introduce flexibility for regulatees to develop the most efficient and effective practices and process in their particular business to achieve the desired outcomes. A co-regulatory strategy would also reduce the cost to government as stakeholders complemented the monitoring role of regulators and reduced the need for regulators and the courts to take corrective action.","PeriodicalId":377605,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Governance (Management) (Topic)","volume":"107 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134463592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Is It Still Pizza, Spaghetti and Mandolino? Effect of Governance Reforms on Corporate Ownership in Italy","authors":"Stefano Mengoli, Federica Pazzaglia, E. Sapienza","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.966085","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.966085","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the effect of corporate governance reforms on the balance between ownership and control in a country characterized by poor investor protection. We use the example of Italy, where major reforms were passed in 1998 to protect minority shareholders from the risks of expropriation on account of the exercise of high voting rights (or high control) by the ultimate owner despite low cash flow rights (or low ownership). Using a two-stage longitudinal research design incorporating both quantitative and qualitative analyses (1995-2005), we find that reforms led to improved disclosure and greater representation of minority shareholders. In turn, this led to a decline in the risk of expropriation of minority shareholders. The reforms had a greater effect on firms where an institutional investor was present. We also find that while reforms led to an increase in the cash flow rights of the ultimate owner, they did not lead to a decrease in voting rights. This paper highlights the importance of studying the mechanisms by which the content of reforms affects actual business practices through the use of longitudinal research designs and the crucial role played by institutional investors in improving governance practices of firms. This paper also suggests that corporate governance reforms are more likely to be successful when regulatory coercion is accompanied by provisions that facilitate market-based control mechanisms.","PeriodicalId":377605,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Governance (Management) (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125981570","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Corporate Governance, Business Cycles & Networks","authors":"S. Dow, J. McGuire","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.959271","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.959271","url":null,"abstract":"Japan is characterized by three distinct kinds of economic organization: the horizontal keiretsu, the vertical keiretsu, and firms unaffiliated with either type of keiretsu. We find that the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance varies depending upon the nature of the network ties and the stage of the business cycle. While we find strengthening evidence of positive ownership effects in vertical keiretsu and unaffiliated firms; among horizontal keiretsu we provide evidence that powerful owners exhibit entrenchment propensities. Moreover, entrenchment by powerful keiretsu owners occurs during recessionary times. Thus are study supports other work which hypothesizes that relationship-based economies are most vulnerable during periods of economic downturn. Our results demonstrate that regardless of the institutional context (sophisticated or developing), or ownership identity (family versus non-family), diversified business groups seem to act in a predictable way during periods of economic downturn - whatever benefits that may be associated with group affiliation seem to dissipate when they are most needed by member firms (as well as the economy in general). These results lead us to concur with Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) - business groups should be dismantled. The tendency for powerful owners to engage in tunnelling during economic downturn is not restricted to emerging market contexts.","PeriodicalId":377605,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Governance (Management) (Topic)","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125660972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}