{"title":"Institutional Trap","authors":"Quy-Toan Do","doi":"10.1596/1813-9450-3291","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-3291","url":null,"abstract":"The author studies the persistence of inequality and inefficient governance in a physical capital accumulation model with perfect information, missing credit markets, and endogenous barriers to entry. When access to investment opportunities is regulated, rent-seeking entrepreneurs form coalitions of potentially varying size to bribe a regulator to restrict entry. Small coalitions run short of resources, while large coalitions suffer more severe free-rider problems. The distribution of wealth thus determines the equilibrium coalition structure of the economy and consequently the level of regulatory capture. A dynamic analysis supports the persistence of inefficiencies in the long run. Initial conditions determine whether the economy converges to a steady state characterized by efficient governance and low levels of inequality, or a path toward an institutional trap where regulatory capture and wealth inequality reinforce each other. This paper - a product of the Poverty Team, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the determinants of institutions.","PeriodicalId":377605,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Governance (Management) (Topic)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116028825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Corporate Governance, Innovation, and Uncertainty: The Case of Start-up Companies in Biopharmaceuticals (Gouvernement d'entreprise, innovation et incertitude: Le cas des PME innovantes de la biopharmacie)","authors":"A. Hamdouch, Marc-Hubert Depret","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1207483","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1207483","url":null,"abstract":"While numerous research works on Corporate Governance have been undertaken during the last fifteen years only very few attention has been devoted to the study of the way that contemporary economic and technological dynamics have affected governance issues, especially when innovation activities are involved. The aim of this paper is precisely to contribute to the necessary renewal of corporate governance analysis by attempting to highlight some crucial features and issues related to governance problems within industries witnessing radical and non reversible changes. The paper is organised as follows.","PeriodicalId":377605,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Governance (Management) (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122091576","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"State Street Corporation: Evolving it Governance","authors":"Peter Weill, Richard Woodham","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.317140","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.317140","url":null,"abstract":"State Street, a world leader in financial services, has more than 20 entrepreneurial business units which continually identify customer needs and create new products and services, usually heavily IT dependent, often leading their industry in time to market. To enable these businesses, State Street invests between 20 and 25% of total operating expenses in technology and technologists. To maximize the business value from these IT investments requires the creation of an IT governance framework that harmonizes all IT governance mechanisms (e.g., committees, IT organization structure, approval processes) to maximize return from the IT investment. This case explores how State Street redesigned its IT governance to enable a major change in the firm's strategy.","PeriodicalId":377605,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Governance (Management) (Topic)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131696460","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Pay Distribution in the Top Executive Team","authors":"L. Bebchuk, M. Cremers, U. Peyer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.964303","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.964303","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the distribution of pay in the top executive team in public companies. In particular, we study the CEO's pay slice (CPS), defined as the fraction of the aggregate top-five total compensation paid to the CEO. The level of a firm's CPS might reflect the relative centrality of the CEO in the top executive team in terms of ability, contribution to the firm, or power.We find that CPS has been going up over the past decade. During this period, CEOs have increased their fraction of both equity-based compensation and non-equity compensation. The level of CPS is associated with various characteristics of the top team and the firm's governance arrangements. Among other things, CPS is high when the CEO has long tenure; when the CEO chairs the board; when few other executives are members of the board; and when the firm has more entrenching provisions.High CPS is associated with lower firm value as measured by Tobin's Q. Using a simultaneous equations approach yields findings consistent with the possibility that this negative correlation is at least partly due to high CPS, or the relative CEO centrality it might reflect, bringing about a lower Tobin's Q. Consistent with the negative correlation between high CPS and Q, high CPS is associated with a less favorable market reaction, and a higher likelihood of a negative market reaction, to acquisitions announced by the firm. We also find that high CPS is associated with lower variability of stock returns over time. Overall, our results indicate that the distribution of compensation in the top executive team is an aspect of pay arrangements and corporate governance that deserves researchers' attention.","PeriodicalId":377605,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Governance (Management) (Topic)","volume":"104 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132044424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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