英国私募股权与PLC董事会:实践与效果的比较

V. Acharya, Conor Kehoe, Michael J. Reyner
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引用次数: 56

摘要

最成功的私人股本公司之所以产生持续较高的回报,部分原因在于它们愿意承担高额债务,并有能力以具有吸引力的倍数退出投资。但最近的研究表明,最优秀的私募股权公司之所以表现出众,最大的原因是它们改善所收购公司经营业绩的能力。正如本文作者所言,这些改进的一个关键来源是董事会在公共领域和私人领域运作方式的根本差异。通过对20位曾在相对较大的英国公司的私募股权和plc董事会任职的高管进行深入访谈,作者提供了一些关于这种差异的暗示性见解:也许这些差异中最明显的是私募股权董事会“单一”地关注“价值创造”,而plc董事会则关注“治理”和“合规”问题。PE董事会认为他们的角色是“领导”公司的战略并监督最高管理层的执行,而plc董事会被描述为“监督”或“陪同”管理层提出和执行的战略。PE董事会报告执行董事和非执行董事之间的目标接近完全一致,plc董事会被描述为对多个利益相关者有多个承诺和优先事项。最后,尽管PE董事会成员在加入董事会时经历了密集的“尽职调查”过程,与管理层进行频繁的持续接触,并高度关注业务的现金生成能力,但plc董事会成员的初始化更加正式和礼仪,他们与运营管理层的交易很少且有限,并且提供给他们的信息具有“会计”导向,涵盖了广泛的主题和公司“责任”。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Private Equity vs. PLC Boards in the U.K.: A Comparison of Practices and Effectiveness
The consistently higher returns generated by the most successful private equity firms have been attributed in part to their willingness to take on high levels of debt and their ability to exit from their investments at attractive multiples. But recent research suggests that the largest contributor to the superior performance of the best PE firms has been their ability to improve the operating performance of the companies they buy. And as the authors of this article argue, a key source of such improvements are fundamental differences in the way boards function in the public and private realm. Using in‐depth interviews with 20 executives who have served on both PE and plc boards of relatively large U.K. companies, the authors provide a number of suggestive insights into such differences: Perhaps the most visible of these differences is the “single‐minded” focus of PE boards on “value creation,” as contrasted with the focus of plc boards on issues of “governance” and “compliance.” Whereas PE boards view their role as “leading” the strategy of the firm and overseeing its execution by top management, plc boards are described as “monitoring” or “accompanying” strategies that are proposed and executed by management. Whereas PE boards report near‐complete alignment of objectives between executive and non‐executive directors, plc boards are described as having multiple commitments to and priorities that are divided among multiple stakeholders. Finally, whereas PE board members undergo an intensive “due diligence” process when joining boards, have frequent ongoing contacts with management, and focus heavily on the cash‐generating capacity of the business, initiations of plc board members are much more formal and ceremonial, their dealings with operating management are few and limited, and the information provided them has an “accounting” orientation and covers a broad range of subjects and corporate “responsibilities.”
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