Logos and EpistemePub Date : 2019-04-05DOI: 10.5840/LOGOS-EPISTEME20191016
Dani Larkin
{"title":"A Gift from the Gods","authors":"Dani Larkin","doi":"10.5840/LOGOS-EPISTEME20191016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/LOGOS-EPISTEME20191016","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80844279","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Logos and EpistemePub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme201910329
H. Sankey
{"title":"Factivity or Grounds? Comment on Mizrahi","authors":"H. Sankey","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme201910329","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme201910329","url":null,"abstract":"This note is a comment on a recent paper in this journal by Moti Mizrahi. Mizrahi claims that the factivity of knowledge entails that knowledge requires epistemic certainty. But the argument that Mizrahi presents does not proceed from factivity to certainty. Instead, it proceeds from a premise about the relationship between grounds and knowledge to the conclusion about certainty.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":"222 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90489044","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Logos and EpistemePub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme201910219
G. Forrai
{"title":"Gettiered Beliefs are Genuine Beliefs","authors":"G. Forrai","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme201910219","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme201910219","url":null,"abstract":"In recent articles in this journal Benoit Gaultier and John Biro have argued that the original Gettier cases and the ones closely modelled on them fail, and the reason for the failure is that the subject in these cases does not actually have the belief that would serve as a counterexample to the justified-true-belief analysis of knowledge. They claim that if our evidence pertains to a particular individual (as in the first case) or to the truth of one of the disjuncts (as in the second case), we do not genuinely believe the existential generalization or the disjunction which logically follows. I will challenge their arguments and suggest that our unwillingness to assert the existential generalization or the disjunction under these conditions does not stem from lack of belief but from pragmatic principles.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73120219","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Logos and EpistemePub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme201910327
J. Reyes
{"title":"Bridging the Intellectualist Divide","authors":"J. Reyes","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme201910327","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme201910327","url":null,"abstract":"Gilbert Ryle famously denied that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that, a thesis that has been contested by so-called “intellectualists.” I begin by proposing a rearrangement of some of the concepts of this debate, and then I focus on Jason Stanley’s reading of Ryle’s position. I show that Ryle has been seriously misconstrued in this discussion, and then revise Ryle’s original arguments in order to show that the confrontation between intellectualists and anti-intellectualists may not be as insurmountable as it seems, at least in the case of Stanley, given that both contenders are motivated by their discontent with a conception of intelligent performances as the effect of intellectual hidden powers detached from practice.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76038424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Logos and EpistemePub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme201910439
Moti Mizrahi
{"title":"Factivity and Epistemic Certainty","authors":"Moti Mizrahi","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme201910439","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme201910439","url":null,"abstract":"This is a reply to Howard Sankey’s comment (“Factivity or Grounds? Comment on Mizrahi”) on my paper, “You Can’t Handle the Truth: Knowledge = Epistemic Certainty,” in which I present an argument from the factivity of knowledge for the conclusion that knowledge is epistemic certainty. While Sankey is right that factivity does not entail epistemic certainty, the factivity of knowledge does entail that knowledge is epistemic certainty.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":"57 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74850440","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Logos and EpistemePub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme201910328
J. Biro
{"title":"Reply to Forrai: No Reprieve for Gettier “Beliefs”","authors":"J. Biro","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme201910328","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme201910328","url":null,"abstract":"In a recent paper in this journal, Gabor Forrai offers ways to resist my argument that in so-called Gettier cases the belief condition is not, as is commonly assumed, satisfied. He argues that I am mistaken in taking someone's reluctance to assert a proposition he knows follows from a justified belief on finding the latter false as evidence that he does not believe it, as such reluctance may be explained in other ways. While this may be true, I show that it does not affect my central claim which does not turn on considerations special to assertion.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78880942","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Logos and EpistemePub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme201910440
H. Sankey
{"title":"Why Must Justification Guarantee Truth?","authors":"H. Sankey","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme201910440","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme201910440","url":null,"abstract":"This reply provides further grounds to doubt Mizrahi’s argument for an infallibilist theory of knowledge. It is pointed out that the fact that knowledge requires both truth and justification does not entail that the level of justification required for knowledge be sufficient to guarantee truth. In addition, an argument presented by Mizrahi appears to equivocate with respect to the interpretation of the phrase “p cannot be false”.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":"73 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/logos-episteme201910440","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72484539","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Logos and EpistemePub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme201910441
J. Simpson
{"title":"Knowledge Doesn’t Require Epistemic Certainty","authors":"J. Simpson","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme201910441","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme201910441","url":null,"abstract":"In a recent discussion note in this journal, Moti Mizrahi offers us the following argument for the conclusion that knowledge requires epistemic certainty:1) If S knows that p on the grounds that e, then p cannot be false given e.2) If p cannot be false given e, then e makes p epistemically certain.3) Therefore, if S knows that p on the grounds that e, then e makes p epistemically certain.I’ll argue that (2) of Mizrahi’s argument is false, and so, Mizrahi’s argument is unsound.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":"36 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81148527","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Logos and EpistemePub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.5840/LOGOS-EPISTEME201910217
Giovanni Rolla
{"title":"Knowing How One Knows","authors":"Giovanni Rolla","doi":"10.5840/LOGOS-EPISTEME201910217","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/LOGOS-EPISTEME201910217","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I argue that knowledge is dimly luminous. That is: if a person knows that p, she knows how she knows that p. The argument depends on a safety-based account of propositional knowledge, which is salient in Williamson’s critique of the ‘KK’ principle. I combine that account with non-intellectualism about knowledge-how – according to which, if a person knows how to φ, then in nearly all (if not all) nearby possible worlds in which she φes in the same way as in the actual world, she only φes successfully. Thus, the possession of first-order propositional knowledge implies secondorder practical knowledge, and this can be iterated. Because of the assumed nonintellectualism about know-how, dim luminosity does not imply bright luminosity about knowledge, which is expressed by the traditional KK principle. I conclude by considering some potential counterexamples to the view that knowledge is dimly luminous.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83538723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Logos and EpistemePub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme201910326
N. Martin
{"title":"What Is the Epistemic Significance of Disagreement?","authors":"N. Martin","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme201910326","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme201910326","url":null,"abstract":"Over the past decade, attention to epistemically significant disagreement has centered on the question of whose disagreement qualifies as significant, but ignored another fundamental question: what is the epistemic significance of disagreement? While epistemologists have assumed that disagreement is only significant when it indicates a determinate likelihood that one’s own belief is false, and therefore that only disagreements with epistemic peers are significant at all, they have ignored a more subtle and more basic significance that belongs to all disagreements, regardless of who they are with—that the opposing party is wrong. It is important to recognize the basic significance of disagreement since it is what explains all manners of rational responses to disagreement, including assessing possible epistemic peers and arguing against opponents regardless of their epistemic fitness.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":"08 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79972692","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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