分歧的认知意义是什么?

Q2 Arts and Humanities

Logos and Episteme Pub Date : 2019-01-01 DOI:10.5840/logos-episteme201910326

N. Martin

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引用次数: 1

摘要

在过去的十年里，对认识论上重要的分歧的关注集中在谁的分歧有资格成为重要的问题上，但忽视了另一个基本问题:分歧的认识论意义是什么?虽然认识论家认为，只有当分歧表明一个人自己的信念是错误的确定可能性时，分歧才有意义，因此，只有与认识论同伴的分歧才有意义，但他们忽略了一个更微妙、更基本的意义，这个意义属于所有分歧，无论他们与谁在一起——对方是错的。认识到分歧的基本意义是很重要的，因为它解释了对分歧的所有理性反应，包括评估可能的认知同伴和反对对手的争论，而不管他们的认知是否合适。

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What Is the Epistemic Significance of Disagreement?

Over the past decade, attention to epistemically significant disagreement has centered on the question of whose disagreement qualifies as significant, but ignored another fundamental question: what is the epistemic significance of disagreement? While epistemologists have assumed that disagreement is only significant when it indicates a determinate likelihood that one’s own belief is false, and therefore that only disagreements with epistemic peers are significant at all, they have ignored a more subtle and more basic significance that belongs to all disagreements, regardless of who they are with—that the opposing party is wrong. It is important to recognize the basic significance of disagreement since it is what explains all manners of rational responses to disagreement, including assessing possible epistemic peers and arguing against opponents regardless of their epistemic fitness.

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来源期刊

Logos and Episteme Arts and Humanities-Philosophy

CiteScore

0.40

自引率

0.00%

发文量

审稿时长

20 weeks

期刊介绍： the journal publishes articles, reviews or discussion notes focused as well on problems concerning the general theory of knowledge, as on problems specific to the philosophy, methodology and ethics of science, philosophical logic, metaphilosophy, moral epistemology, epistemology of art, epistemology of religion, social or political epistemology, epistemology of communication. Studies in the history of science and of the philosophy of knowledge, or studies in the sociology of knowledge, cognitive psychology, and cognitive science are also welcome.