Knowledge Doesn’t Require Epistemic Certainty

Q2 Arts and Humanities

Logos and Episteme Pub Date : 2019-01-01 DOI:10.5840/logos-episteme201910441

J. Simpson

引用次数: 0

Abstract

In a recent discussion note in this journal, Moti Mizrahi offers us the following argument for the conclusion that knowledge requires epistemic certainty:1) If S knows that p on the grounds that e, then p cannot be false given e.2) If p cannot be false given e, then e makes p epistemically certain.3) Therefore, if S knows that p on the grounds that e, then e makes p epistemically certain.I’ll argue that (2) of Mizrahi’s argument is false, and so, Mizrahi’s argument is unsound.

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知识不需要认知的确定性

在本刊最近的一篇讨论笔记中，Moti Mizrahi为知识需要认识确定性的结论提供了以下论证:1)如果S根据e知道p，那么在给定e的情况下p不可能是假的2)如果p在给定e的情况下不可能是假的，那么e使p在认识上是确定的3)因此，如果S根据e知道p，那么e使p在认识上是确定的。我认为米兹拉希的论点(2)是错误的，因此，米兹拉希的论点是不可靠的。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Logos and Episteme Arts and Humanities-Philosophy

CiteScore

0.40

自引率

0.00%

发文量

审稿时长

20 weeks

期刊介绍： the journal publishes articles, reviews or discussion notes focused as well on problems concerning the general theory of knowledge, as on problems specific to the philosophy, methodology and ethics of science, philosophical logic, metaphilosophy, moral epistemology, epistemology of art, epistemology of religion, social or political epistemology, epistemology of communication. Studies in the history of science and of the philosophy of knowledge, or studies in the sociology of knowledge, cognitive psychology, and cognitive science are also welcome.