Logos and Episteme最新文献_第2页

What is the Relation between Semantic and Substantive Epistemic Contextualism? 语义认知语境主义与实体认知语境主义的关系是什么?

Logos and Episteme Pub Date : 2021-09-28 DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme202112325

Ron Wilburn

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引用次数: 2

Make Information in Science Meaningful Again 让科学信息重新有意义

Logos and Episteme Pub Date : 2021-09-28 DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme202112321

Javier Anta

引用次数: 0

Consistency and Shifts in Gettier Cases 在Gettier情况下的一致性和移位

Logos and Episteme Pub Date : 2021-09-28 DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme202112324

Andreas Stephens

引用次数: 0

Alleged Counterexamples to Uniqueness 所谓的独特性反例

Logos and Episteme Pub Date : 2021-06-30 DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme202112214

Ryan Ross

引用次数: 1

A Modified Supervaluationist Framework for Decision-Making 一个修正的超估值主义决策框架

Logos and Episteme Pub Date : 2021-06-30 DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme202112212

J. Karge

引用次数: 1

Can Knowledge Really be Non-factive? 知识真的是非能动的吗?

Logos and Episteme Pub Date : 2021-06-30 DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme202112215

M. Shaffer

引用次数: 6

A Functional Approach to Characterize Values in the Context of ‘Values in Science’ Debates 在“科学价值”辩论的背景下，一种功能方法来表征价值

Logos and Episteme Pub Date : 2021-06-30 DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme202112216

Joby Varghese

{"title":"A Functional Approach to Characterize Values in the Context of ‘Values in Science’ Debates","authors":"Joby Varghese","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme202112216","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202112216","url":null,"abstract":"This paper proposes a functional approach to characterize epistemic and nonepistemic values. The paper argues that epistemic values are functionally homogeneous since (i) they act as criteria to evaluate the epistemic virtues a hypothesis ought to possess, and (ii) they validate scientific knowledge claims objectively. Conversely, non-epistemic values are functionally heterogeneous since they may promote multiple and sometimes conflicting aims in different research contexts. An incentive of espousing the functional approach is that it helps us understand how values can operate in appropriate and inappropriate ways in scientific research and inappropriate influences can eventually be prevented. The idea is to argue that since non-epistemic values are functionally heterogeneous, they cannot provide objective reasons for the acceptance of a hypothesis. However, their involvement is necessary in certain research contexts and the problem is the involvement of these need not be always legitimate. By analyzing a case from chemical research, I demonstrate that how non-epistemic values might influence scientific research and, then, I go on to demonstrate that how a proper understanding of the functions of different kinds of values might promote the attainment of multiple goals of a particular research in a legitimate and socially relevant way.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81884947","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Wright on McKinsey One More Time 莱特再谈一次麦肯锡

Logos and Episteme Pub Date : 2021-03-25 DOI: 10.5840/LOGOS-EPISTEME20211215

S. Dierig

引用次数: 0

Kirk Lougheed, The Epistemic Benefits of Disagreement Kirk Lougheed，《分歧的认识论益处

Logos and Episteme Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme202112437

O. García

引用次数: 0

Inference and Self-Knowledge 推理与自知

Logos and Episteme Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.5840/LOGOS-EPISTEME20211214

Benjamin Winokur

引用次数: 1