Logos and EpistemePub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme202112213
B. Madison
{"title":"Reliabilists Should Still Fear the Demon","authors":"B. Madison","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme202112213","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202112213","url":null,"abstract":"In its most basic form, Simple Reliabilism states that: a belief is justified iff it is formed as the result of a reliable belief-forming process. But so-called New Evil Demon (NED) cases have been given as counterexamples. A common response has been to complicate reliabilism from its simplest form to accommodate the basic reliabilist position, while at the same time granting the force of NED intuitions. But what if despite initial appearances, Simple Reliabilism, without qualification, is compatible with the NED intuition? What we can call the Dispositionalist Response to the New Evil Demon problem is fascinating because it contends just that: Simple Reliabilism is fully compatible with the NED intuition. It is claimed that all we need to do to recognize their compatibility is appreciate that reliability is a dispositional property. In this paper I shall critically evaluate the Dispositionalist proposal.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83525956","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Logos and EpistemePub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.5840/LOGOS-EPISTEME20211216
Noah Gordon
{"title":"The Poss-Ability Principle, G-cases, and Fitch Propositions","authors":"Noah Gordon","doi":"10.5840/LOGOS-EPISTEME20211216","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/LOGOS-EPISTEME20211216","url":null,"abstract":"There is a very plausible principle linking abilities and possibilities: If S is able to Φ, then it is metaphysically possible that S Φ’s. Jack Spencer recently proposed a class of counterexamples to this principle involving the ability to know certain propositions. I renew an argument against these counterexamples based on the unknowability of Fitch propositions. In doing so, I provide a new argument for the unknowability of Fitch propositions and show that Spencer’s counterexamples are in tension with a principle weaker than the one linking abilities and possibilities.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86915283","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Logos and EpistemePub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.5840/LOGOS-EPISTEME20211211
C. Field
{"title":"Giving Up the Enkratic Principle","authors":"C. Field","doi":"10.5840/LOGOS-EPISTEME20211211","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/LOGOS-EPISTEME20211211","url":null,"abstract":"The Enkratic Principle enjoys something of a protected status as a requirement of rationality. I argue that this status is undeserved, at least in the epistemic domain. Compliance with the principle should not be thought of as a requirement of epistemic rationality, but rather as defeasible indication of epistemic blamelessness. To show this, I present the Puzzle of Inconsistent Requirements, and argue that the best way to solve it is to distinguish two kinds of epistemic evaluation – requirement evaluations and appraisal evaluations. This allows us to solve the puzzle while accommodating traditional motivations for thinking of the Enkratic Principle as a requirement of rationality.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83991764","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Logos and EpistemePub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.5840/LOGOS-EPISTEME20211213
Ron Wilburn
{"title":"Linguistic Evidence and Substantive Epistemic Contextualism","authors":"Ron Wilburn","doi":"10.5840/LOGOS-EPISTEME20211213","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/LOGOS-EPISTEME20211213","url":null,"abstract":"Epistemic contextualism (EC) is the thesis that the standards that must be met by a knowledge claimant vary with (especially conversational) contexts of utterance. Thus construed, EC may concern only knowledge claims (“Semantic EC”), or else the knowledge relation itself (“Substantive EC”). Herein, my concern is with “Substantive EC.” Let’s call the claim that the sorts of linguistic evidence commonly cited in support of Semantic EC also imply or support Substantive EC the “Implication Thesis” (IP). IP is a view about which some epistemologists have equivocated. Keith DeRose is a case in point. Herein I argue that IP is false, and that it is false for interesting reasons. To this end, I consider two other terms which DeRose investigates, “free will” and “potency” in his efforts to demonstrate the alleged inability of distinctly philosophical or skeptical doubts to infect ordinary epistemic discourse. I describe how and why these two examples speak against, rather than for, DeRose’s recommendation of Substantive EC.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72898378","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Logos and EpistemePub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme202112433
T. Ho
{"title":"Evidentialists’ Internalist Argument for Pragmatism","authors":"T. Ho","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme202112433","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202112433","url":null,"abstract":"A popular evidentialist argument against pragmatism is based on reason internalism: the view that a normative reason for one to φ must be able to guide one in normative deliberation whether to φ. In the case of belief, this argument maintains that, when deliberating whether to believe p, one must deliberate whether p is true. Since pragmatic considerations cannot weigh in our deliberation whether p, the argument concludes that pragmatism is false. I argue that evidentialists fail to recognize that the question whether to φ is essentially the question whether one should φ. Furthermore, the question of whether one should believe p can be answered on pragmatic grounds. The internalist argument turns out to favor pragmatism.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85991895","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Logos and EpistemePub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme202112434
Shane Ryan
{"title":"A Virtue Theoretic Ethics of Intellectual Agency","authors":"Shane Ryan","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme202112434","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202112434","url":null,"abstract":"There is a well-established literature on the ethics of belief. Our beliefs, however, are just one aspect of our intellectual lives with which epistemology should be concerned. I make the case that epistemologists should be concerned with an ethics of intellectual agency rather than the narrower category of ethics of belief. Various species of normativity, epistemic, moral, and so on, that may be relevant to the ethics of belief are laid out. An account adapted from virtue ethics for an ethics that goes beyond the ethics of belief is defended. The main claim advanced here is that we should act as the virtuous agent would characteristically act in the circumstances. This claim is supported with reference to a number of examples, as well as considerations informing virtue ethics. An acknowledged feature of this account is that it provides limited guidance regarding right action in intellectual agency. While the account draws on virtue responsibilism to offer guidance, the case is made that it’s a mistake to think that an account in this area can provide a successful decision procedure.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81280001","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Logos and EpistemePub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme202112432
Steven Diggin
{"title":"Everything is Self-Evident","authors":"Steven Diggin","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme202112432","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202112432","url":null,"abstract":"Plausible probabilistic accounts of evidential support entail that every true proposition is evidence for itself. This paper defends this surprising principle against a series of recent objections from Jessica Brown. Specifically, the paper argues that: (i) explanationist accounts of evidential support convergently entail that every true proposition is self-evident, and (ii) it is often felicitous to cite a true proposition as evidence for itself, just not under that description. The paper also develops an objection involving the apparent impossibility of believing P on the evidential basis of P itself, but gives a reason not to be too worried about this objection. Establishing that every true proposition is self-evident saves probabilistic accounts of evidential support from absurdity, paves the way for a non-sceptical infallibilist theory of knowledge and has distinctive practical consequences.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88483192","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Logos and EpistemePub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme202112430
Miguel López‐Astorga
{"title":"Reduction, Intuition, and Cognitive Effort in Scientific Language","authors":"Miguel López‐Astorga","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme202112430","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202112430","url":null,"abstract":"In his search for a better scientific language, Carnap offered a number of definitions, ideas, and arguments. This paper is devoted to one of his definitions in this regard. In particular, it addresses a definition providing rules to add new properties to the descriptions of objects or beings by taking into account other properties of those very objects or beings that are already known. The main point that this paper tries to make is that, if a current cognitive theory such as the theory of mental models is assumed, it can be said that those rules are easy to use by scientists and philosophers of science. This is because, following the essential theses of this last theory, the rules do not demand excessive cognitive effort to be applied. On the contrary, they are simple rules that make researchers’ work harder in no way.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85825786","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Logos and EpistemePub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme202112435
Peter Baumann
{"title":"True Knowledge","authors":"Peter Baumann","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme202112435","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202112435","url":null,"abstract":"That knowledge is factive, that is, that knowledge that p requires that p, has for a long time typically been treated as a truism. Recently, however, some authors have raised doubts about and arguments against this claim. In a recent paper in this journal, Michael Shaffer presents new arguments against the denial of the factivity of knowledge. This article discusses one of Shaffer’s objections: the one from “inconsistency and explosion.” I discuss two potential replies to Shaffer’s problem: dialetheism plus paraconsistency and epistemic pluralism. This is not to be understood so much as a criticism of Shaffer’s view but rather as a request to develop his very promising objection from inconsistency and explosion further.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84713742","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Logos and EpistemePub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme202112326
Jakob Koscholke
{"title":"Conjunction Closure without Factivity","authors":"Jakob Koscholke","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme202112326","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202112326","url":null,"abstract":"Francesco Praolini has recently put pressure on the view that justified believability is closed under conjunction introduction. Based on what he calls ‘the hybrid paradox,’ he argues that accepting the principle of conjunction closure for justified believability, quite surprisingly, entails that one must also accept the principle of factivity for justified believability, i.e. that there are no propositions that are justifiably believable and false at the same time. But proponents of conjunction closure can do without factivity, as I argue in this short note. A less demanding principle is available.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73145285","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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