Alleged Counterexamples to Uniqueness

Q2 Arts and Humanities

Logos and Episteme Pub Date : 2021-06-30 DOI:10.5840/logos-episteme202112214

Ryan Ross

引用次数: 1

Abstract

Kopec and Titelbaum collect five alleged counterexamples to Uniqueness, the thesis that it is impossible for agents who have the same total evidence to be ideally rational in having different doxastic attitudes toward the same proposition. I argue that four of the alleged counterexamples fail and that Uniqueness should be slightly modified to accommodate the fifth example.

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所谓的独特性反例

科佩克和蒂尔鲍姆收集了五个所谓的“唯一性”的反例，唯一性的论点是，拥有相同全部证据的行动者不可能在对同一命题持不同对立态度的情况下是理想理性的。我认为，所谓的反例中有四个是不成立的，唯一性应该稍加修改，以适应第五个例子。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Logos and Episteme Arts and Humanities-Philosophy

CiteScore

0.40

自引率

0.00%

发文量

审稿时长

20 weeks

期刊介绍： the journal publishes articles, reviews or discussion notes focused as well on problems concerning the general theory of knowledge, as on problems specific to the philosophy, methodology and ethics of science, philosophical logic, metaphilosophy, moral epistemology, epistemology of art, epistemology of religion, social or political epistemology, epistemology of communication. Studies in the history of science and of the philosophy of knowledge, or studies in the sociology of knowledge, cognitive psychology, and cognitive science are also welcome.