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Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal最新文献

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The Necklace View of the Self 自我的项链观
Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal Pub Date : 2019-09-25 DOI: 10.33043/s.12.1.96-105
Yifeng Xu
{"title":"The Necklace View of the Self","authors":"Yifeng Xu","doi":"10.33043/s.12.1.96-105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33043/s.12.1.96-105","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I provide a framework for accounting for the self, based on a reconstruction of Galen Strawson’s “theory of SESMETs,” or the Pearl view, with Barry Dainton’s continuous consciousness thesis. I argue that the framework I provide adequately accounts for the self and is preferable to solely adopting either Strawson’s or Dainton’s theory. I call my reconstruction the “Necklace” view of the self.","PeriodicalId":375047,"journal":{"name":"Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131598504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Mary Does Not Learn Anything New 玛丽没有学到任何新东西
Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal Pub Date : 2019-09-25 DOI: 10.33043/s.12.1.44-55
A. Khayat
{"title":"Mary Does Not Learn Anything New","authors":"A. Khayat","doi":"10.33043/s.12.1.44-55","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33043/s.12.1.44-55","url":null,"abstract":"Within the discourse surrounding mind-body interaction, mental causation is intimately associated with non-reductive physicalism. However, such a theory holds two opposing views: that all causal properties and relations can be explicated by physics and that special sciences have an explanatory role. Jaegwon Kim attempts to deconstruct this problematic contradiction by arguing that it is untenable for non-reductive physicalists to explain human behavior by appeal to mental properties. In combination, Kim’s critique of mental causation and the phenomenal concept strategy serves as an effectual response to the anti-physicalist stance enclosed within the Knowledge Argument and the Zombie Thought Experiment.","PeriodicalId":375047,"journal":{"name":"Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal","volume":"123 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130656056","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Productive Citizen 富有成效的公民
Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal Pub Date : 2019-09-11 DOI: 10.33043/s.7.1.51-58
L. Pass
{"title":"The Productive Citizen","authors":"L. Pass","doi":"10.33043/s.7.1.51-58","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33043/s.7.1.51-58","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues for analyzing the systematic invisibility of persons living with disabilities by temporalizing their oppression within a framework of “productive time,” which I posit as a normative sense of time by which cultural products and practices appear within capitalist economies. I argue that productive time is employed in cultural evaluations of actions that render persons with disabilities as “non-productive agents” who cannot partake in historical processes. My hope is that a theory of productive time will assist social justice efforts in analyzing the oppression of particular minority groups by identifying and combating harmful social values.","PeriodicalId":375047,"journal":{"name":"Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121646129","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Rusbridger’s “The Snowden Leaks and the Public” and Mill’s Utilitarianism 拉斯布里杰的《斯诺登泄密与公众》和密尔的《功利主义》
Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal Pub Date : 2019-09-11 DOI: 10.33043/s.7.1.29-40
Casey Hladik
{"title":"Rusbridger’s “The Snowden Leaks and the Public” and Mill’s Utilitarianism","authors":"Casey Hladik","doi":"10.33043/s.7.1.29-40","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33043/s.7.1.29-40","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: In the wake of the controversial Snowden leaks, Alan Rusbridger observes that the National Security Administration [NSA] and Government Communications Headquarters [GCHQ] maintain that their mass spying is justified because it prevents the world from “going dark.” This paper will explore the meaning and philosophical significance of “going dark” and argue that the NSA and GCHQ’s claim appeals—wittingly or unwittingly—to J.S. Mill’s ethical principle of utility. This paper will therefore critique this argument within Mill’s utilitarian framework to demonstrate that its appeal to utility is illegitimate. Finally, this paper will argue that utility dictates that this mass surveillance is unjustifiable and should be terminated.","PeriodicalId":375047,"journal":{"name":"Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116896253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Multi-Causal Approach To Synchronicity 同步性的多原因方法
Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal Pub Date : 2019-09-11 DOI: 10.5840/stance201145
Z. Stinson
{"title":"A Multi-Causal Approach To Synchronicity","authors":"Z. Stinson","doi":"10.5840/stance201145","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/stance201145","url":null,"abstract":"Synchronicity has long been described as an ‘acausal’ connecting principle. However, the use of this descriptor is not only misleading, but also outright false on any seriously considered picture of synchronicity due to admissions of multiple types of causes. Furthermore, previous attempts to clarify the ‘acausal’ label have served only to further muddy the waters of discussion. A ‘multi-causal’ conception of synchronicity is proposed to ease and encourage future discussion in many disciplines.","PeriodicalId":375047,"journal":{"name":"Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal","volume":"128 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133577208","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Critical Assessment of George Klosko’s Version of the Principle of Fair Play 乔治·克洛斯科关于公平竞争原则的评析
Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal Pub Date : 2019-09-11 DOI: 10.5840/stance201146
Leonardo Moauro
{"title":"A Critical Assessment of George Klosko’s Version of the Principle of Fair Play","authors":"Leonardo Moauro","doi":"10.5840/stance201146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/stance201146","url":null,"abstract":"The nature of our obligation to obey the law has consistently been an important object of philosophical dispute. Fair play based theories of obligation purport to show that it is unfair for us to benefit from anorganizational scheme (such as the state) without contributing our fair share to the provision of goods. George Klosko is a major proponent of this approach. I develop his particular version of the argument from fair play into a defensible theory of citizens’ obligation to obey the laws of their state.","PeriodicalId":375047,"journal":{"name":"Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129498856","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Gettiering Goldman
Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal Pub Date : 2019-09-11 DOI: 10.33043/s.4.1.69-78
Ken Stalkfleet
{"title":"Gettiering Goldman","authors":"Ken Stalkfleet","doi":"10.33043/s.4.1.69-78","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33043/s.4.1.69-78","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the causal theory of knowledge put forth by Alvin Goldman in his 1967 paper “A Causal Theory of Knowing.” Goldman contends that a justified, true belief is knowledge if and only ifit is causally connected to the fact that makes it true. This paper provides examples, however, of justified, true beliefs with such causal connections that are clearly not knowledge. The paper further shows that attempts to salvage the causal theory are unsatisfactory.","PeriodicalId":375047,"journal":{"name":"Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal","volume":"78 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124454495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How We Are Moral 我们是如何道德的
Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal Pub Date : 2019-09-11 DOI: 10.33043/s.4.1.27-38
Jenna Kreyche
{"title":"How We Are Moral","authors":"Jenna Kreyche","doi":"10.33043/s.4.1.27-38","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33043/s.4.1.27-38","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I reconstruct Hobbes’ theory of self-love. I then examine Hume’s arguments that (i) self-love does not properly account for moral behavior and (ii) self-love is unnecessary for moral theory. I argue that Hobbesian self-love can account for both of Hume’s objections. Further, I use an analysis of Hobbes’ Deliberation to show, contra Hume, that self-love does not entail a lack of intention in moral action.","PeriodicalId":375047,"journal":{"name":"Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122288674","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Ruminations on Intermittent Existence 关于间歇存在的反思
Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal Pub Date : 2019-09-11 DOI: 10.5840/stance201144
A. Adrian
{"title":"Ruminations on Intermittent Existence","authors":"A. Adrian","doi":"10.5840/stance201144","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/stance201144","url":null,"abstract":"Can objects exist, cease to exist, and then exist once more? I lay out three ways to think about intermittent existence (IE). The first section is based on intuitions. The second section will show that the intuitions are bolstered by the concept of supervenience. The final section will argue that the strongest way to think about IE, and about supervenience, is in terms of mereology, the theory of parts and wholes.","PeriodicalId":375047,"journal":{"name":"Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal","volume":"36 12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132692785","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Resolving the Paradox of Fiction 解决小说的悖论
Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal Pub Date : 2019-09-11 DOI: 10.33043/s.7.1.41-50
Anna Brinkerhoff
{"title":"Resolving the Paradox of Fiction","authors":"Anna Brinkerhoff","doi":"10.33043/s.7.1.41-50","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33043/s.7.1.41-50","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I examine the Paradox of Fiction: (1) in order for us to have genuine and rational emotional responses to a character or situation, we must believe that the character or situation is not purely fictional, (2) we believe that fictional characters and situations are purely fictional, and (3) we have genuine and rational emotional responses to fictional characters and situations. After defending (1) and (2) against formidable objections and considering the plausibility of ~(3) in isolation of (1) and (2), I conclude that we should resolve the Paradox of Fiction by rejecting (3).","PeriodicalId":375047,"journal":{"name":"Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal","volume":"304 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121082865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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