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Gestationalism and the Rights of Adolescent Mothers 妊娠和青少年母亲的权利
IF 0.6
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2020-05-28 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2019-0045
T. Baron
{"title":"Gestationalism and the Rights of Adolescent Mothers","authors":"T. Baron","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2019-0045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2019-0045","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, I explore the ways in which consideration of adolescent parents forces us to confront and question common presuppositions about parental rights. In particular, I argue that recognising the right of adolescent mothers not to be forcibly separated from their newborn children justifies rejecting the notion that parental rights are (a) all acquired in the same manner and (b) acquired as a ‘bundle’ of concomitant moral rights. I conclude that children and adolescents who conceive and give birth have some parental rights concerning their newborn children – in particular, the right not to be forcibly separated from those children – even if they do not have the ‘full complement’ of parental rights as we generally characterise these.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":"84 1","pages":"239 - 254"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86573233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Equality, Self-Government, and Disenfranchising Kids: A Reply to Yaffe 平等、自治和剥夺孩子的公民权:对雅菲的回答
IF 0.6
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2020-05-15 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2019-0043
M. Cholbi
{"title":"Equality, Self-Government, and Disenfranchising Kids: A Reply to Yaffe","authors":"M. Cholbi","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2019-0043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2019-0043","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Gideon Yaffe has recently argued that children should be subject to lower standards of criminal liability because, unlike adults, they ought to be disenfranchised. Because of their disenfranchisement, they lack the legal reasons enfranchised adults have to comply with the law. I critically consider Yaffe’s argument for such disenfranchisement, which holds that disenfranchisement balances children’s interest in self-government with adults’ interest in having an equal say over lawmaking. I argue that Yaffe does not succeed in showing that these two values need to be balanced, nor that disenfranchising children is a justifiable method of achieving this balance. In my conclusion, I sketch an alternative contractualist approach to disenfranchising children that, like Yaffe’s, appeals to the implications that enfranchisement has for political relations among citizens, but, unlike Yaffe’s, rests on empirical claims about the influence of parents on children’s voting patterns rather than on a priori claims regarding who has a rightful say over lawmaking.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":"16 1","pages":"281 - 297"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87322297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Luck, Nature and Institutions 运气、自然和制度
IF 0.6
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2020-05-14 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2019-0018
Cynthia A. Stark
{"title":"Luck, Nature and Institutions","authors":"Cynthia A. Stark","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2019-0018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2019-0018","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In addition to having an institutional site or scope, a theory of distributive justice might also have an institutional ‘reach’ or currency. It has the first when it applies to only social (and not natural) phenomena. It has the second when it distributes only socially produced (and not naturally occurring) goods. One objection to luck egalitarianism is that it has absurd implications. In response, Tan has defended a luck egalitarian account that has a strictly institutional reach. I argue, first, that Tan’s view contains two fatal ambiguities and, second, that, to be sound, it requires an institutional currency. This second argument implies that virtually all extant luck egalitarian currencies are incompatible with his approach. I argue, third, that the alleged absurd implications often have little to do with the extent of luck egalitarianism’s reach.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":"13 1","pages":"235 - 260"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80005637","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Did the NSA and GCHQ Diminish Our Privacy? What the Control Account Should Say 美国国家安全局和GCHQ侵犯了我们的隐私吗?控制账户应该说什么
IF 0.6
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2020-04-01 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2019-0063
Leonhard Menges
{"title":"Did the NSA and GCHQ Diminish Our Privacy? What the Control Account Should Say","authors":"Leonhard Menges","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2019-0063","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2019-0063","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A standard account of privacy says that it is essentially a kind of control over personal information. Many privacy scholars have argued against this claim by relying on so-called threatened loss cases. In these cases, personal information about an agent is easily available to another person, but not accessed. Critics contend that control accounts have the implausible implication that the privacy of the relevant agent is diminished in threatened loss cases. Recently, threatened loss cases have become important because Edward Snowden’s revelation of how the NSA and GCHQ collected Internet and mobile phone data presents us with a gigantic, real-life threatened loss case. In this paper, I will defend the control account of privacy against the argument that is based on threatened loss cases. I will do so by developing a new version of the control account that implies that the agents’ privacy is not diminished in threatened loss cases.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":"76 1","pages":"29 - 48"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88543503","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Privacy, the Internet of Things and State Surveillance: Handling Personal Information within an Inhuman System 隐私，物联网和国家监控:在不人道的系统中处理个人信息
IF 0.6
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2020-04-01 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2019-0056
Adam Henschke
{"title":"Privacy, the Internet of Things and State Surveillance: Handling Personal Information within an Inhuman System","authors":"Adam Henschke","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2019-0056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2019-0056","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The Internet of Things (IoT) is, in part, an information handling system that can remove humans from the information handling process. The particular problem explored is how we are to understand privacy when considering informational systems that handle personal information in ways that impact people’s lives when there is no human operator in direct contact with that personal information. I argue that these new technologies need to take concepts like privacy into account, but also, that we ought also to take these technologies into account to reconsider and perhaps reconceptualise privacy. This paper argues that while an inhuman system like the IoT does not necessarily violate the interpersonal privacy of people, if the IoT is used as part of a state surveillance program, a political notion of privacy may be violated.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":"3 1","pages":"123 - 149"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82498778","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
The Ethics of Police Body-Worn Cameras 警察随身摄像机的道德规范
IF 0.6
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2020-04-01 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2019-0027
F. Thomsen
{"title":"The Ethics of Police Body-Worn Cameras","authors":"F. Thomsen","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2019-0027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2019-0027","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Over the past decade, police departments in many countries have experimented with and increasingly adopted the use of police body-worn cameras (PBWCs). This article aims to examine the moral issues raised by the use of PBWCs, and to provide an overall assessment of the conditions under which the use of PBWCs is morally permissible. It first reviews the current evidence for the effects of using PBWCs. On the basis of this review the article sets out a teleological argument for the use of PBWCs. The final two sections of the article review two deontological objections to the use of PBWCs: the idea that use of PBWCs is based on or expresses disrespectful mistrust, and the idea that the use of PBWCs violates a right to privacy. The article argues that neither of these objections is persuasive, and concludes that we should conditionally accept and support the use of PBWCs.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":"14 1","pages":"97 - 121"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75330579","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Frontmatter
IF 0.6
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2020-04-01 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2020-frontmatter1
{"title":"Frontmatter","authors":"","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2020-frontmatter1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2020-frontmatter1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":"282 4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86584815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Economic Exceptionalism? Justice and the Liberal Conception of Rights 经济例外论?正义与自由主义权利观
IF 0.6
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2020-04-01 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2018-0047
H. Sauer
{"title":"Economic Exceptionalism? Justice and the Liberal Conception of Rights","authors":"H. Sauer","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2018-0047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2018-0047","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Are political and economic rights equally basic? This is one of the main issues liberal egalitarians and classical liberals disagree about. The former think political rights should be more strongly protected than economic ones; classical liberals thus accuse them of an unjustified and politically biased ‘economic exceptionalism’. Recently, John Tomasi has developed a special version of this challenge, which is targeted against Murphy and Nagel’s account of the relationship between property rights and just taxation. In this paper, I analyze this challenge, and provide an account of its limitations. Tomasi’s strategy to drive Murphy and Nagel’s account into an overgeneralization problem brings to light that liberals weren’t guilty of any kind of economic exceptionalism in the first place. However, this also shows that classical liberalism and libertarians do not disagree as much as it might seem.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":"13 1","pages":"151 - 167"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75223099","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Neo-Republican Theory of Just State Surveillance 公正国家监督的新共和主义理论
IF 0.6
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2020-04-01 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2019-0032
P. Smith
{"title":"A Neo-Republican Theory of Just State Surveillance","authors":"P. Smith","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2019-0032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2019-0032","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper develops a novel, neo-republican account of just state surveillance in the information age. The goal of state surveillance should be to avoid and prevent domination, both public and private. In light of that conception of justice, the paper makes three substantive points. First, it argues that modern state surveillance based upon information technology and predicated upon a close partnership with the tech sector gives the state significant power and represents a serious potential source of domination. Second, it argues that, nonetheless, state surveillance can serve legitimate republican ends and so unilateral and private technological attempts to block it may be wrongful. Third, it argues that, despite the serious normative failings of current institutions, state surveillance can be justly regulated and made accountable through a legal liability regime that incentivizes tech company intermediaries to ally with civil society groups in order to safeguard the privacy rights of potential subjects of state surveillance.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":"319 1","pages":"49 - 71"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77133496","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Telic Priority: Prioritarianism’s Impersonal Value 终极优先:优先主义的客观价值
IF 0.6
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2020-04-01 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2017-0034
C. Hanisch
{"title":"Telic Priority: Prioritarianism’s Impersonal Value","authors":"C. Hanisch","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2017-0034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2017-0034","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I develop the recent claim that prioritarianism, and not only its egalitarian competitors, must be committed to an impersonal outcome value (i. e. a value that makes a distribution better even if this does not affect anyone’s welfare). This value, that I label telic priority and that consists in the goodness of benefits going to the worst off recipients, implies implausible judgments that more than compete with ‘pure’ (Parfit) egalitarianism’s applause in leveling down scenarios. ‘Pure prioritarianism’, an axiological theory that would consist in an unqualified commitment to telic priority only, must therefore be developed into a pluralist version of the priority view. Contra Parfit, prioritarianism and egalitarianism are on a par concerning the relationship between their pure (and implausible) formulations and their pluralist (and plausible) versions. The final section explains why telic priority always assigns preference to the worst-off (and not merely to the worse-off).","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":"24 1","pages":"169 - 189"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87058767","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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