{"title":"Introduction to the Special Issue: Towards Foolproof Democracy: Improving Public Debate and Political Decision-Making","authors":"David Lanius, Ioannis Votsis","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2019-2025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2019-2025","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":"10 1","pages":"203 - 209"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2019-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87555689","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Are Referendums and Parliamentary Elections Reconcilable? The Implications of Three Voting Paradoxes","authors":"S. Bloks","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2018-0055","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2018-0055","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In representative democracies, referendum voting and parliamentary elections provide two fundamentally different methods for determining the majority opinion. We use three mathematical paradoxes – so-called majority voting paradoxes – to show that referendum voting can reverse the outcome of a parliamentary election, even if the same group of voters have expressed the same preferences on the issues considered in the referendums and the parliamentary election. This insight about the systemic contrarieties between referendum voting and parliamentary elections sheds a new light on the debate about the supplementary value of referendums in representative democracies. Using this insight, we will suggest legal conditions for the implementation of referendums in representative democracies that can pre-empt the conflict between the two methods for determining the majority opinion.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":"22 1","pages":"281 - 311"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2019-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83929892","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Political Machines: Ethical Governance in the Age of AI","authors":"Fiona J. McEvoy","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2019-0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2019-0004","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Policymakers are responsible for key decisions about political governance. Usually, they are selected or elected based on experience and then supported in their decision-making by the additional counsel of subject experts. Those satisfied with this system believe these individuals – generally speaking – will have the right intuitions about the best types of action. This is important because political decisions have ethical implications; they affect how we all live in society. Nevertheless, there is a wealth of research that cautions against trusting human judgment as it can be severely flawed. This paper will look at the root causes of the most common errors of human judgment before arguing – contra the instincts of many – that future AI systems could take a range of political decisions more reliably. I will argue that, if/when engineers establish ethically robust systems, governments will have a moral obligation to refer to them as a part of decision-making.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":"10 1","pages":"337 - 356"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2019-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81988722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Deliberating about Climate Change: The Case for ‘Thinking and Nudging’","authors":"Dominic Lenzi","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2018-0034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2018-0034","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Proponents of deliberative democracy believe deliberation provides the best chance of finding effective and legitimate climate policies. However, in many societies there is substantial evidence of biased cognition and polarisation about climate change. Further, many appear unable to distinguish reliable scientific information from false claims or misinformation. While deliberation significantly reduces polarisation about climate change, and can even increase the provision of reliable beliefs, these benefits are difficult to scale up, and are slow to affect whole societies. In response, I propose a combined strategy of ‘thinking and nudging’. While deliberative theorists tend to view nudging askance, combining deliberation with nudges promises to be a timelier and more effective response to climate change than deliberation alone. I outline several proposals to improve societal deliberative capacity while reducing climate risks, including media reform, strategic communication and framing of debates, incentivising pro-climate behaviour change, and better education about science.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":"2 1","pages":"313 - 336"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2019-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80911120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Solidarity as Social Involvement","authors":"Roberto Frega","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2019-0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2019-0008","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper reclaims the concept of solidarity for democratic theory. It does this by proposing a theory of solidarity as social involvement that is construed through the integration of three better known conceptions of solidarity that have played an influential role in the political thought of the last two centuries. The paper begins by explaining why solidarity should receive more sustained attention from political theorists with an interest in democracy, and proceeds by presenting two indispensability arguments. Section three outlines the three rival conceptions of solidarity and contends that whilst individually incomplete, each provides an important insight, so that a fuller and more satisfying conception of solidarity can be developed by weaving together some features of these three conceptions. This task is undertaken in section four, which introduces the theory of solidarity as social involvement, defining solidarity in terms of acting-for and acting-with. Section five briefly discusses some of its potential implications for democratic theory, before bringing the article to a close.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":"5 1","pages":"179 - 208"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2019-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81167617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Everybody to Count for One? Inclusion and Exclusion in Welfare-Consequentialist Public Policy","authors":"N. Semple","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3392370","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3392370","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Which individuals should count in a welfare-consequentialist analysis of public policy? Some answers to this question are parochial, and others are more inclusive. The most inclusive possible answer is ‘everybody to count for one.’ In other words, all individuals who are capable of having welfare – including foreigners, the unborn, and non-human animals – should be weighed equally. This article argues that ‘who should count’ is a question that requires a two-level answer. On the first level, a specification of welfare-consequentialism serves as an ethical ideal, a claim about the attributes that the ideal policy would have. ‘Everybody to count for one’ might succeed on this level. However, on the second level is the welfare-consequentialist analysis procedure used by human analysts to give advice on real policy questions. For epistemic reasons, the analysis procedure should be more parochial than ‘everybody to count for one.’","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":"10 10 1","pages":"293 - 322"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2019-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81783670","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Disengagement in the Digital Age: A Virtue Ethical Approach to Epistemic Sorting on Social Media","authors":"K. Worden","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2018-0066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2018-0066","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Using the Aristotelian virtue of friendship and concept of practical wisdom, this paper argues that engaging in political discourse with friends on social media is conducive to the pursuit of the good life because it facilitates the acquisition of the socio-political information and understanding necessary to live well. Previous work on social media, the virtues, and friendship focuses on the initiation and maintenance of the highest form of friendship (Aristotle’s ‘ideal friendship’) online. I argue that the information necessary to live well can come from non-ideal, civic friends in addition to ideal friends. In order to acquire this information successfully via social media, users should practice inclusive engagement, self-control, discretion, and audience-sensitivity in their cyber interactions. This argument is salient given the current concerns about ‘echo chambers’ or ‘filter bubbles’, in which users ignore or block out friends and news sources that support political perspectives different from one’s own.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":"61 1","pages":"235 - 259"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2019-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81397776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Decriminalizing People Smuggling","authors":"M. Gerver","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2018-0054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2018-0054","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Since 2015 millions of migrants have paid smugglers to take them across borders. In response, states have increasingly arrested smugglers, hoping to morally condemn smuggling, and to decrease the rate of inward migration. This article argues that, even if a state is justified in morally condemning smuggling, and justified in decreasing inward migration, arresting smugglers is a disproportionate response for reaching these ends.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":"126 1","pages":"131 - 153"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2019-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74485246","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}