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A Neo-Republican Theory of Just State Surveillance 公正国家监督的新共和主义理论
IF 0.6
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2020-04-01 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2019-0032
P. Smith
{"title":"A Neo-Republican Theory of Just State Surveillance","authors":"P. Smith","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2019-0032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2019-0032","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper develops a novel, neo-republican account of just state surveillance in the information age. The goal of state surveillance should be to avoid and prevent domination, both public and private. In light of that conception of justice, the paper makes three substantive points. First, it argues that modern state surveillance based upon information technology and predicated upon a close partnership with the tech sector gives the state significant power and represents a serious potential source of domination. Second, it argues that, nonetheless, state surveillance can serve legitimate republican ends and so unilateral and private technological attempts to block it may be wrongful. Third, it argues that, despite the serious normative failings of current institutions, state surveillance can be justly regulated and made accountable through a legal liability regime that incentivizes tech company intermediaries to ally with civil society groups in order to safeguard the privacy rights of potential subjects of state surveillance.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77133496","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Telic Priority: Prioritarianism’s Impersonal Value 终极优先:优先主义的客观价值
IF 0.6
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2020-04-01 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2017-0034
C. Hanisch
{"title":"Telic Priority: Prioritarianism’s Impersonal Value","authors":"C. Hanisch","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2017-0034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2017-0034","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I develop the recent claim that prioritarianism, and not only its egalitarian competitors, must be committed to an impersonal outcome value (i. e. a value that makes a distribution better even if this does not affect anyone’s welfare). This value, that I label telic priority and that consists in the goodness of benefits going to the worst off recipients, implies implausible judgments that more than compete with ‘pure’ (Parfit) egalitarianism’s applause in leveling down scenarios. ‘Pure prioritarianism’, an axiological theory that would consist in an unqualified commitment to telic priority only, must therefore be developed into a pluralist version of the priority view. Contra Parfit, prioritarianism and egalitarianism are on a par concerning the relationship between their pure (and implausible) formulations and their pluralist (and plausible) versions. The final section explains why telic priority always assigns preference to the worst-off (and not merely to the worse-off).","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87058767","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Introduction to the Special Issue on the Ethics of State Mass Surveillance 《国家大规模监视的伦理》特刊导言
IF 0.6
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2020-04-01 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2020-0008
Peter Königs
{"title":"Introduction to the Special Issue on the Ethics of State Mass Surveillance","authors":"Peter Königs","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2020-0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2020-0008","url":null,"abstract":"Recent decades have seen an unprecedented proliferation of surveillance programs by government agencies. This development has been driven both by technological progress, which has made large scale surveillance operations relatively cheap and easy, and by the threat of terrorism, organized crime and pandemics, which supplies a ready justification for surveillance. For a long time, mass surveillance programs have been associated with autocratic regimes, most notoriously with the German Democratic Republic and the Stasi, its secret police. A more recent case in point is the efforts of the People’s Republic of China to set up a comprehensive surveillance system that assigns citizens a score reflecting their social and political conformity (Denyer 2018).","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87881347","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Privacy in Public: A Democratic Defense 公共隐私:民主的辩护
IF 0.6
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2020-03-27 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2019-0031
Titus Stahl
{"title":"Privacy in Public: A Democratic Defense","authors":"Titus Stahl","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2019-0031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2019-0031","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Traditional arguments for privacy in public suggest that intentionally public activities, such as political speech, do not deserve privacy protection. In this article, I develop a new argument for the view that surveillance of intentionally public activities should be limited to protect the specific good that this context provides, namely democratic legitimacy. Combining insights from Helen Nissenbaum’s contextualism and Jürgen Habermas’s theory of the public sphere, I argue that strategic surveillance of the public sphere can undermine the capacity of citizens to freely deliberate in public and therefore conflicts with democratic self-determination.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88153364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Mass Surveillance: A Private Affair? 大规模监控:私人事务?
IF 0.6
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2020-03-11 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2019-0025
Kevin Macnish
{"title":"Mass Surveillance: A Private Affair?","authors":"Kevin Macnish","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2019-0025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2019-0025","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Mass surveillance is a more real threat now than at any time in history. Digital communications and automated systems allow for the collection and processing of private information at a scale never seen before. Many argue that mass surveillance entails a significant loss of privacy. Others dispute that there is a loss of privacy if the information is only encountered by automated systems. This paper argues that automated mass surveillance does not involve a significant loss of privacy. Through providing a definition of informational privacy as a matter of actual access of private information by one who can understand the meaning of that information, it follows that automated systems which lack understanding cannot of themselves diminish privacy. This is not to say that mass surveillance is unproblematic, though: it is deeply problematic. It is just that privacy is not the most significant of these problems.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81496153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10
Democratic Legitimacy and the Competence Obligation 民主合法性与胜任义务
IF 0.6
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2020-03-11 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2019-0036
Finlay Malcolm
{"title":"Democratic Legitimacy and the Competence Obligation","authors":"Finlay Malcolm","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2019-0036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2019-0036","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract What obligations are there on voters? This paper argues that voters should make their electoral decision competently, and does so by developing on a recent proposal for democratic legitimacy. It then explores three problems arising from this ‘competency obligation’. First, how should voters be competent? I propose three conditions required for voter competence. Second, how competent should voters be? I argue that the competency required tracks the significance of the consequences of the vote. Third, if the electorate are unlikely to deliver a competent decision, should suffrage be restricted to the competent alone? I defend unrestricted suffrage on the grounds that restricting suffrage cannot guarantee a competently made electoral decision. Instead, obligations on voters should be minimised by political parties satisfying their obligations to be politically sound; if they are sound, then the obligation to be competent can be easily satisfied by voters.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88028081","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Should Liberal-Egalitarians Support a Basic Income? An Examination of the Effectiveness and Stability of Ideal Welfare Regimes 自由平等主义者应该支持基本收入吗?对理想福利制度的有效性和稳定性的考察
IF 0.6
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2020-03-06 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2019-0024
Jürgen Sirsch
{"title":"Should Liberal-Egalitarians Support a Basic Income? An Examination of the Effectiveness and Stability of Ideal Welfare Regimes","authors":"Jürgen Sirsch","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2019-0024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2019-0024","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The article deals with the question whether an unconditional basic income (UBI) is part of an ideal liberal-egalitarian welfare regime. Analyzing UBI from an ideal-theoretical perspective requires a comparison of the justice performance of ideal welfare regimes instead of comparing isolated institutional designs. This holistic perspective allows for a more systematic consideration of issues like institutional complementarity. I compare three potential ideal welfare regimes from a liberal-egalitarian perspective of justice: An ideal social democratic regime, a mixed regime containing a moderate UBI and a maximal UBI regime where UBI replaces most of the welfare state. These regimes are evaluated with respect to three aspects of justice performance: the scope and neutrality of opportunities provided, institutional complementarities with a dynamic, globalized economy and the policy feedback effects on the political stability of liberal-egalitarian political coalitions. I conclude that the overall performance of a mixed regime is superior to the other regimes.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73825859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Defeating Fake News: On Journalism, Knowledge, and Democracy 击败假新闻:论新闻、知识和民主
IF 0.6
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2020-01-18 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2019-0033
B. Ball
{"title":"Defeating Fake News: On Journalism, Knowledge, and Democracy","authors":"B. Ball","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2019-0033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2019-0033","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The central thesis of this paper is that fake news and related phenomena serve as defeaters for knowledge transmission via journalistic channels. This explains how they pose a threat to democracy; and it points the way to determining how to address this threat. Democracy is both intrinsically and instrumentally good provided the electorate has knowledge (however partial and distributed) of the common good and the means of achieving it. Since journalism provides such knowledge, those who value democracy have a reason to protect it. Hostile agents, however, can undermine both the effectiveness of democratic decision-making and faith in democracy itself, by deliberately promulgating fake news and hyper-partisan views; moreover, these effects can come about unintentionally on social media. I conclude that we may need to change, not just the way we process information online, but also the informational environment in which we operate.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87163821","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
In for a Penny, or: If You Disapprove of Investment Migration, Why Do You Approve of High-Skilled Migration? 如果你不赞成投资移民，为什么你赞成高技术移民?
IF 0.6
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2019-10-09 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2018-0083
L. Erez
{"title":"In for a Penny, or: If You Disapprove of Investment Migration, Why Do You Approve of High-Skilled Migration?","authors":"L. Erez","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2018-0083","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2018-0083","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract While many argue investment-based criteria for immigration are wrong or at least problematic, skill-based criteria remain relatively uncontroversial. This is normatively inconsistent. This article assesses three prominent normative objections to investment-based selection criteria for immigrants: (i) that they wrongfully discriminate between prospective immigrants (ii) that they are unfair, and (iii) that they undermine political equality among citizens. It argues that either skill-based criteria are equally susceptible to these objections, or that investment-based criteria are equally shielded from them. Indeed, in some ways investment-based criteria are less normatively problematic than skill-based criteria. Given this analysis, the resistance to investment-based migration criteria, but not to skill-based criteria, is inconsistent.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2019-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81664445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
The Two-Dimensional Analysis of Feasibility: A Restatement 可行性二维分析:重述
IF 0.6
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2019-10-01 DOI: 10.1515/MOPP-2018-0049
Renan Silva
{"title":"The Two-Dimensional Analysis of Feasibility: A Restatement","authors":"Renan Silva","doi":"10.1515/MOPP-2018-0049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/MOPP-2018-0049","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Pablo Gilabert and Holly Lawford-Smith have, both in collaboration and individually, provided a compelling account of feasibility, which states that feasibility is both ‘binary’ and ‘scalar’, and both ‘synchronic’ and ‘diachronic’. This two-dimensional analysis, however, has been the subject of four major criticisms: it has been argued that it rests upon a false distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ constraints, that it ignores the importance of intentional action, and that diachronic feasibility is incoherent and insensitive to the existence of epistemic limitations. In this paper, I will argue that such objections do not undermine the persuasiveness of Gilabert and Lawford-Smith’s analysis. Nevertheless, I will contend that the latter is susceptible to two other challenges. First, it mistakenly appeals to morality, and, second, it lacks an analysis of ability. I will maintain, however, that such criticisms can be addressed and that a revised version of the account should be adopted.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2019-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76840694","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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