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Why Military Conditioning Violates the Human Dignity of Soldiers 为什么军事训练侵犯了士兵的人格尊严？
IF 0.6
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2024-01-09 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2023-0015
Regina Sibylle Surber
{"title":"Why Military Conditioning Violates the Human Dignity of Soldiers","authors":"Regina Sibylle Surber","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2023-0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2023-0015","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article argues that military conditioning (MC) systematically violates the human dignity of soldiers. The argument relies on an absolute deontologist account of human dignity understood as a claim-right to live in self-respect, which is a right to decide on one’s own behalf about, and to be in control of, essential aspects of one’s own life. The article claims that MC violates soldiers’ dignity so understood because the largely automatic physical killing reflex that MC instills aims to remove their freedom of choice to kill or not to kill, while the MC practices that rationalize the killing of opponents aim to subvert soldiers’ moral deliberation in relation to this behavior. MC thus aims to take away soldiers’ control over a very essential aspect of human life: the decision whether to take life in war. Thereby, MC systematically violates their human dignity. The article concludes with a proposal for an amendment to international law that would allow legal institutions to do more justice to soldiers’ dignity.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":"47 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139380095","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Moral Reasoning in the Climate Crisis: A Personal Guide 气候危机中的道德推理：个人指南
IF 0.6
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2024-01-01 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2023-0076
Arthur R. Obst
{"title":"Moral Reasoning in the Climate Crisis: A Personal Guide","authors":"Arthur R. Obst","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2023-0076","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2023-0076","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article substantiates the common intuition that it is wrong to contribute to dangerous climate change for no significant reason. To advance this claim, I first propose a basic principle that one has the moral obligation to act in accordance with the weight of moral reasons. I further claim that there are significant moral reasons for individuals not to emit greenhouse gases, as many other climate ethicists have already argued. Then, I assert that there are often no significant moral (or excusing) reasons to emit greenhouse gases. In any such trivial-cost – but not necessarily trivial-impact – cases, the individual then has an obligation to refrain. Finally, I apply the moral weighing principle to everyday situations of emitting and establish two surprisingly substantial implications: the relevance of virtues to the interpersonal assessment of environmentally harmful actions and the extensive individual ethical obligations that exist short of moral purity.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":"45 17","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139129323","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Applying Different Concepts and Conceptions of Legitimacy to the International Level: Service, Free Group Agents, and Autonomy 在国际层面上运用不同的合法性概念和概念:服务、自由群体代理和自治
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2023-11-06 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2022-0046
Antoinette Scherz
{"title":"Applying Different Concepts and Conceptions of Legitimacy to the International Level: Service, Free Group Agents, and Autonomy","authors":"Antoinette Scherz","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2022-0046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2022-0046","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract International institutions are facing increasing criticism of the legitimacy of their authority. But what does it mean for an international institution to be legitimate? Arthur Applbaum’s latest book provides a convincing new concept of legitimacy, namely, the power-liability view, and a new normative conception, the free group agent account. However, it is not clear how they can be applied to the international level. First, this paper examines how different concepts of legitimacy can be applied to international institutions. Second, it assesses three different conceptions of legitimacy, namely, the service conception, Applbaum’s free group agent account and the autonomy-based conception for the international level. It outlines how on the last conception, international institutions’ legitimacy depends on three different aspects required to protect autonomy: the political power of the institution; its purpose; and its relation to other institutions. Finally, the paper argues that the creation of an international institution should be seen as part of relational legitimacy and that state consent plays an important role to protect the political autonomy of peoples.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":"100 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135636211","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Hybrid Ethical Theory and Cohen’s Critique of Rawls’s Egalitarian Liberalism 混合伦理理论与科恩对罗尔斯平等主义自由主义的批判
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2023-10-24 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2023-0009
Jamie Buckland
{"title":"Hybrid Ethical Theory and Cohen’s Critique of Rawls’s Egalitarian Liberalism","authors":"Jamie Buckland","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2023-0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2023-0009","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article examines G. A. Cohen’s endorsement of a hybrid ethical theory and its relationship to his critique of John Rawls’s egalitarian liberalism. Cohen claimed that Rawls’s appeal to special incentives was a distortion of his own difference principle. I argue that Cohen’s acceptance of a personal prerogative (the central element of Samuel Scheffler’s version of a hybrid ethical theory) has several untoward consequences. First, it illuminates how any reasonable challenge to Rawls’s liberalism must recognise Thomas Nagel’s arguments concerning the problems that arise when one attempts to implement a political theory analogous to a hybrid theory of ethics. Second, it undermines Cohen’s critique of Rawls. Third, it undermines the plausibility of Cohen’s ethos-driven social egalitarianism. The article concludes that, despite Nagel’s concerns, the most plausible form of egalitarianism—one that can accommodate the requirements of a hybrid ethical theory—will be Rawlsian, rather than Cohen’s ethos-based system.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":"103 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135220573","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Ideal Theory and Real Politics: The Politics in Political Liberalism 理想理论与现实政治:政治自由主义中的政治
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2023-10-13 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2022-0050
Darren Cheng
{"title":"Ideal Theory and Real Politics: The Politics in Political Liberalism","authors":"Darren Cheng","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2022-0050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2022-0050","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Realist thinkers in political philosophy often criticize ideal theorists for neglecting or eliminating the fact of politics in their work. This is supposed to be problematic because we should never expect to overcome politics. Any theory that attempts to do so is said to be unrealistic, naïve, and impractical. Although much has been said in the dispute between realists and ideal theorists in recent years, this particular line of criticism, which should be distinguished from other criticisms of ideal theory, has not been clearly or explicitly addressed by ideal theorists in the literature. I deal with this issue by examining the ideal theory of John Rawls, which has been a prominent target of realist criticisms. My aim is to see where politics exists, or might exist, in Rawls’s theory, and whether this politics satisfactorily answers to the various aspects of the realist’s critique. My analysis suggests that there may be no inherent or necessary conflict between ideal theory and real politics, after all.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135804784","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Frontmatter 头版头条
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2023-10-01 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2023-frontmatter2
{"title":"Frontmatter","authors":"","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2023-frontmatter2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2023-frontmatter2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135706074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Replies to Critics 对批评的回复
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2023-10-01 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2022-0051
Dave Estlund
{"title":"Replies to Critics","authors":"Dave Estlund","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2022-0051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2022-0051","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I reply to several pieces of commentary on my recent book.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135707649","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Introduction to the MOPP Symposium on David Estlund’s Utopophobia 关于大卫·埃斯特伦德乌托邦恐惧症的MOPP研讨会简介
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2023-10-01 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2023-0072
Philipp Schink, Achim Vesper
{"title":"Introduction to the MOPP Symposium on David Estlund’s <i>Utopophobia</i>","authors":"Philipp Schink, Achim Vesper","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2023-0072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2023-0072","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134934843","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Deliberative Duty and Other Individual Antidiscrimination Duties in the Dating Sphere 约会领域的协商义务和其他个人反歧视义务
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2023-09-22 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2023-0012
Simone Sommer Degn
{"title":"The Deliberative Duty and Other Individual Antidiscrimination Duties in the Dating Sphere","authors":"Simone Sommer Degn","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2023-0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2023-0012","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract What does morality require of individuals in their dating and sex life? In this article I challenge recent outlines of antidiscrimination duties in the dating sphere and present a plausible alternative: the deliberative duty. This duty avoids the risks and limitations of earlier outlines: it is time-sensitive regarding the malleability of intimate preferences, it avoids being too demanding on the duty-bearer and minimizes the risk of generating mere dutiful attraction behavior towards right-holders. In addition, it is better suited for universal action guidance in the dating sphere than earlier outlines of individual antidiscrimination duties.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136011698","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Are Radical Realists Hypocrites about Intuition-Dependence? 激进的现实主义者是直觉依赖的伪君子吗?
IF 0.6
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2023-06-15 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2022-0062
Ben Cross
{"title":"Are Radical Realists Hypocrites about Intuition-Dependence?","authors":"Ben Cross","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2022-0062","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2022-0062","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Radical realists criticise the role that moral intuitions play in moralist political philosophy. However, radical realists may also rely on certain epistemic intuitions when making use of their theories of ideology critique. Hence, one might wonder whether radical realists’ criticism of moralists’ intuition-dependence is hypocritical. Call this the intuition asymmetry objection. My aim in this article is to show that the intuition asymmetry objection fails. After examining the basis of objections by radical realists to the role of moral intuitions in moralist political philosophy, I show that the presence of intuitions in radical realist theories of ideology critique is consistent with their criticism of moralism.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85884347","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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