发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

Moral Philosophy and Politics最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Does the Free Group Agency Account of Legitimacy Require Democracy? 自由群体代理的合法性解释需要民主吗?
IF 0.6
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2023-06-09 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2022-0044
Palle Bech-Pedersen, Finn Haberkost
{"title":"Does the Free Group Agency Account of Legitimacy Require Democracy?","authors":"Palle Bech-Pedersen, Finn Haberkost","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2022-0044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2022-0044","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this critical comment, we argue that nondemocratic, but decent regimes fail to constitute legitimate governance under Applbaum’s free group agency account. To make this case, we first introduce the three principles of liberty, equality and agency that Applbaum takes to flow directly from his free agency conception of legitimacy. Against this backdrop, we discuss Applbaum’s claim that a nondemocratic regime along the lines of a Rawlsian decent consultation hierarchy could meet the threshold of legitimacy. Contrary to this suggestion, we argue that nondemocratic, but decent regimes cannot claim legitimacy under Applbaum’s account because they are constitutively inegalitarian, thus failing to adequately grant citizens the equal normative power without which legitimacy is unattainable under the free group agency account.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":"57 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89491804","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Political Legitimacy: What’s Wrong with the Power-Liability View? 政治合法性:权力-责任观错在哪里?
IF 0.6
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2023-06-07 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2023-0030
K. Mikalsen
{"title":"Political Legitimacy: What’s Wrong with the Power-Liability View?","authors":"K. Mikalsen","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2023-0030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2023-0030","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, I take issue with Arthur Isak Applbaum’s power-liability view of political legitimacy. In contrast to the traditional view that legitimate rule entails a moral duty to obey, here called the right-duty view, Applbaum argues that political legitimacy is a moral power that entails moral liability for the subjects of political rule. According to Applbaum, the power-liability view helps us explain how responsible citizens in some cases can act contrary to law while still recognizing the claims of law. Against Applbaum’s attempt at establishing the power-liability view through conceptual analysis, I argue that we cannot specify the moral implications of de jure legitimacy without considering the moral argument that justifies the right to rule. I further argue that Applbaum’s normative account of political legitimacy implies commitment to a normative idea that forms the basis of a strong case in favor of the right-duty view. Finally, I argue that the present defense of the right-duty view has resources to account for the moral phenomena that prompt Applbaum’s advocacy of the power-liability view.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":"29 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90847352","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Persons, Agents and Wantons 人员、代理人和恶棍
IF 0.6
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2023-06-05 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2022-0037
M. Lampert
{"title":"Persons, Agents and Wantons","authors":"M. Lampert","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2022-0037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2022-0037","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this essay, I argue that any competent group agent must be a wanton. The impetus for this claim is an argument Arthur Applbaum makes in Legitimacy: The Right to Rule in a Wanton World that a formal institution (in this case, a government) can, under the right conditions, function as a free moral group agent. I begin by explaining Harry Frankfurt’s classic account of wantonism—not just for the benefit of readers who might not be familiar with the concept, but also to emphasize aspects of the concept relevant for the consideration of group agency. I then draw on the contemporary literature on group agency to argue that any successful group agent will be a wanton. I then turn to Applbaum’s account of group agency to argue that his proposed mechanisms for free moral group agency do not successfully overcome the challenge of wantonism. I close the essay by briefly addressing some of the ramifications of my argument for Applbaum’s larger project in Legitimacy. I argue that, after rejecting the flawed account of free moral group agency, we can productively recover some of Applbaum’s key insights within a revised account of political legitimacy.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73236242","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Self-Respect and the Importance of Basic Liberties 自尊和基本自由的重要性
IF 0.6
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2023-05-18 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2022-0022
Vegard Stensen
{"title":"Self-Respect and the Importance of Basic Liberties","authors":"Vegard Stensen","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2022-0022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2022-0022","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article discusses the self-respect argument for basic liberties, which is that self-respect is an important good, best supported by basic liberties, and that this yields a reason for the traditional liberty principle. I concentrate on versions of it that contend that self-respect is best supported by basic liberties for reasons related to the recognition that such liberties convey. I first discuss the two standard approaches loosely associated with John Rawls and Axel Honneth. Here self-respect pertains to traits and conduct (Rawls) or to one’s personhood (Honneth). It is argued that these approaches fail to show why self-respect is better supported by the liberty principle than certain alternatives worth taking seriously – unless (in the case of personhood self-respect) self-respect is construed in such a narrow way that it is not a condition for autonomy or welfare in any plausible sense. I then identify a self-attitude that I call “a sense of competence”, which at least shows that the liberty principle is more important to autonomy than what we might otherwise have reasons to believe.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":"79 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77791070","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Situating the Moral Basis for Secession in Territorial Rights: A Dualist and Nonalienation Account 在领土权利中定位分离的道德基础:一个二元和非异化的解释
IF 0.6
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2023-05-15 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2022-0035
Chia-Hung Huang
{"title":"Situating the Moral Basis for Secession in Territorial Rights: A Dualist and Nonalienation Account","authors":"Chia-Hung Huang","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2022-0035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2022-0035","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article grounds the morality of secession on two forms of collective self-determination: one manifests the communal goods of secessionists and the other the value of shared political institutions. Secession is morally valuable when the two are incompatible such that the claimant confronts persistent alienation. For remedial rights theories, only ‘strict violations’ permit secession. For primary rights theories, ‘broad violations’ grant secession as a last resort, and so this thesis, ‘collective self-determination as nonalienation’, should be accepted regardless. First, as the two collective forms of self-determination develop two forms of territorial rights, it supplements cogent accounts of territorial justification for, and claims to, secession. Second, as persistent alienation can have both strict and broad interpretations, it also provides moral grounds shared by remedial and primary rights theories if they concede the value of collective self-determination. The strict sense refers to persistent coercion that violates personal autonomy and nullifies state legitimacy. The broad interpretation denotes long-term political frustration caused by unreasonable prevention of greater collective autonomy that even legitimate states may achieve. Third, to verify whether this amounts to long-term political frustration and to address persistent alienation, secession should be regarded as a last resort, despite its support from the primary rights account.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":"33 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78119224","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Is It Wrong to Benefit from Injustice? 从不公正中获益是错的吗?
IF 0.6
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2023-04-27 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2022-0034
Katerina Psaroudaki
{"title":"Is It Wrong to Benefit from Injustice?","authors":"Katerina Psaroudaki","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2022-0034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2022-0034","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract According to the beneficiary-pays principle, the involuntary beneficiaries of injustice ought to disgorge their unjustly obtained benefits in order to compensate the victims of injustice. The paper explores the effectiveness of the above principle in establishing a robust and unique normative connection between the rectificatory duties of the beneficiaries and the rectificatory rights of the victims of injustice. I discuss three accounts of the beneficiary-pays principle according to which the rectificatory duty of the beneficiaries towards the victims is grounded in (a) their duty to oppose injustice and mitigate its effects, (b) their duty to give up benefits that are causally linked to an act of wrongdoing, or (c) their duty to not sustain wrongful harm against the victims. By criticizing these accounts, I intend to highlight the complexities of articulating a distinct rectificatory duty that applies uniquely to the beneficiaries of injustice qua beneficiaries. I conclude that, while it may seem complicated to defend the beneficiary-pays principle as an independent moral principle, it is more plausible to think of it as being derivative of more general principles such as the principle of fair play.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":"139 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76112447","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Climate Justice and the Duty of Restitution. 气候正义与赔偿义务。
IF 0.6
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2023-04-25 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2021-0071
Santiago Truccone-Borgogno
{"title":"Climate Justice and the Duty of Restitution.","authors":"Santiago Truccone-Borgogno","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2021-0071","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2021-0071","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Much of the climate justice discussion revolves around how the remaining carbon budget should be globally allocated. Some authors defend the unjust enrichment interpretation of the beneficiary pays principle (BPP). According to this principle, those states unjustly enriched from historical emissions should pay. I argue that if the BPP is to be constructed along the lines of the unjust enrichment doctrine, countervailing reasons that might be able to block the existence of a duty of restitution should be assessed. One might think that the duty to provide restitution no longer has moral weight if many benefits were already consumed, if the particular benefits obtained from historical emissions cannot be transferred from one country to another, or if present members of developed countries framed their life plans based upon the expectation of continued possession of those benefits. I show that none of these reasons negate the duty to provide restitution.</p>","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":"10 1","pages":"203-224"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10042626/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9602888","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Does a State’s Right to Control Borders Justify Harming Refugees? 一个国家控制边界的权利是否可以证明伤害难民是正当的?
IF 0.6
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2023-04-20 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2022-0036
Bradley Hillier-Smith
{"title":"Does a State’s Right to Control Borders Justify Harming Refugees?","authors":"Bradley Hillier-Smith","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2022-0036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2022-0036","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Certain states in the Global North have responded to refugees seeking safety on their territories through harmful practices of border violence, detention, encampment and containment that serve to prevent and deter refugee arrivals. These practices are ostensibly justified through an appeal to a right to control borders. This paper therefore assesses whether these harmful practices can indeed be morally justified by a state’s right to control borders. It analyses whether Christopher Heath Wellman’s account of a state’s right to freedom of association, which represents the most restrictive account of a state’s right to control borders available in the literature, can extend to justify current harmful practices against refugees. If not, then no available justification will be able to do so, and thus contemporary harmful practices used against refugees cannot be justified by a state’s right to control borders.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88913945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Do Promises Towards Fossil Fuel Owners Matter? 对化石燃料所有者的承诺重要吗?
IF 0.6
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2023-04-14 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2023-0001
Rutger Lazou
{"title":"Do Promises Towards Fossil Fuel Owners Matter?","authors":"Rutger Lazou","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2023-0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2023-0001","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract While the energy transition is needed more than ever, for some agents it brings significant losses. This article investigates whether fossil fuel owners could refer to promises to avoid having their assets stranded. It explains how authors, in the context of just transitions, have argued for the normative relevance of Rawlsian legitimate expectations, which refer to promissory entitlements. However, it argues that the normative relevance of promises towards fossil fuel owners is limited, because there are only few promises about what will be permissible in the future and because these promises should be just before they can lead to entitlements.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":"224 1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86190112","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Frontmatter 头版头条
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2023-03-29 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2023-frontmatter1
{"title":"Frontmatter","authors":"","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2023-frontmatter1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2023-frontmatter1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135469340","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
首页 上一页 下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信