气候危机中的道德推理:个人指南

Pub Date : 2024-01-01 DOI:10.1515/mopp-2023-0076
Arthur R. Obst
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摘要

摘要 本文论证了一种普遍的直觉,即在没有重大理由的情况下助长危险的气候变化是错误的。为了推进这一主张,我首先提出了一个基本原则,即一个人有道德义务根据道德理由的重要性行事。我进一步声称,正如许多其他气候伦理学家已经论证的那样,个人不排放温室气体是有重要道德理由的。然后,我断言,排放温室气体往往没有重要的道德(或开脱)理由。在这种成本微不足道--但不一定影响微不足道--的情况下,个人就有义务克制。最后,我将道德权衡原则应用于日常排放情况,并确立了两个令人惊讶的实质性影响:美德与人际评估有害环境行为的相关性,以及在道德纯洁性之外存在的广泛的个人道德义务。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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Moral Reasoning in the Climate Crisis: A Personal Guide
Abstract This article substantiates the common intuition that it is wrong to contribute to dangerous climate change for no significant reason. To advance this claim, I first propose a basic principle that one has the moral obligation to act in accordance with the weight of moral reasons. I further claim that there are significant moral reasons for individuals not to emit greenhouse gases, as many other climate ethicists have already argued. Then, I assert that there are often no significant moral (or excusing) reasons to emit greenhouse gases. In any such trivial-cost – but not necessarily trivial-impact – cases, the individual then has an obligation to refrain. Finally, I apply the moral weighing principle to everyday situations of emitting and establish two surprisingly substantial implications: the relevance of virtues to the interpersonal assessment of environmentally harmful actions and the extensive individual ethical obligations that exist short of moral purity.
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