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Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2023-03-29 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2023-frontmatter1
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引用次数: 0
Torture and Trolleys: Accepting the Nearly Absolute Wrongness of Philanthropic Torture of a Perpetrator 酷刑和电车:接受施暴者的慈善酷刑近乎绝对的错误
IF 0.6
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2023-02-28 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2022-0060
David D. Jensen
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引用次数: 0
The Democratic Virtues of Randomized Trials 随机试验的民主优点
IF 0.6
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2023-02-17 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2022-0039
Ana Tanasoca, A. Leigh
{"title":"The Democratic Virtues of Randomized Trials","authors":"Ana Tanasoca, A. Leigh","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2022-0039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2022-0039","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Democratic alternation in power involves uncontrolled policy experiments. One party is elected on one policy platform that it then implements. Things may go well or badly. When another party is elected in its place, it implements a different policy. In imposing policies on the whole community, parties in effect conduct non-randomized trials without control groups. In this paper, we endorse the general idea of policy experimentation but we also argue that it can be done better by deploying in policymaking randomized controlled trials. We focus primarily on the democratic benefits of using randomized trials in policymaking and on how they can enhance the democratic legitimacy of policy. We argue that randomized trials resonate well with three key democratic principles: non-arbitrariness, revisability and public justification. Randomized trials’ contribution to non-arbitrariness and revisability is not unique; other types of evidence can advance these democratic principles as well. But through their peculiar democratic scrutability, randomized trials are well-equipped to contribute to the public justifiability of policy.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87797521","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The Irrationality of Stand Your Ground: Game Theory on Self-Defense 坚守阵地的不合理性:关于自卫的博弈论
IF 0.6
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2022-11-29 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2022-0007
C. Santana, Adam C. Smith, Kathryn Petrozzo, Derek Halm
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引用次数: 0
Bad Facts and Principles: Finding the Right Kind of Fact-Insensitivity 坏的事实和原则:找到正确的事实不敏感
IF 0.6
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2022-08-02 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2021-0054
Jochen Bojanowski
{"title":"Bad Facts and Principles: Finding the Right Kind of Fact-Insensitivity","authors":"Jochen Bojanowski","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2021-0054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2021-0054","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract David Estlund holds that ultimate normative principles are insensitive to bad facts. This is a deliberately twisted appropriation of Jerry Cohen’s famous dictum that ultimate normative principles are fact-insensitive. In this paper, I will show why Estlund’s twist misses the point of Cohen’s argument. The fact-insensitivity claim is not a requirement to eliminate all facts from our normative theories because facts necessarily make these theories concessive. Instead, it may help us to locate the true origin of these concessions. In normative theorizing, we have not explained why a fact supports a principle if we fail to articulate the higher-order principle in light of which that fact is normatively significant.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80932465","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
A Defence of Robust Idealism in Political Philosophy 为政治哲学中强有力的唯心主义辩护
IF 0.6
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2022-06-29 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2021-0035
Stefano Bertea
{"title":"A Defence of Robust Idealism in Political Philosophy","authors":"Stefano Bertea","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2021-0035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2021-0035","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this contribution, I defend a robust model of political idealism, making the case for such an approach to both the theory and practice of politics. On this view, not only in framing a political philosophy but also in putting forward policy proposals and institutional designs, we need not think about feasibility as an overriding, make-or-break criterion for evaluating the soundness of that theory or proposal, neither of which loses its point simply because it is deemed to be unlikely to be implemented. Feasibility, in other terms, cannot be taken as the only standard, or even as the main standard, on which basis to assess the practical worth of a political strategy.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81905605","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Refugee-based Reasons in Refugee Resettlement – The Case of LGBTIQ+ 难民安置中的难民原因——以LGBTIQ+为例
IF 0.6
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2022-06-28 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2021-0069
A. Vitikainen
{"title":"Refugee-based Reasons in Refugee Resettlement – The Case of LGBTIQ+","authors":"A. Vitikainen","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2021-0069","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2021-0069","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper discusses a recent turn in the ethics of refugee resettlement which involves taking the interests of refugees themselves into account in the distribution of refugees among potential refugee receiving countries. It argues that there is an important category of interest that does not align with the two commonly held views on what is owed to refugees: ‘safety’ or ‘conditions of a good life’. This category, focussing on the refugees’ interests in not being subjected to a variety of non-asylum-grounding injustices, should, by default, take precedence in the assessment of the refugee-based reasons in refugee resettlement. The normative salience of this category – not being subjected to injustice – is illustrated with the help of the case of LGBTIQ+ refugees, and the kinds of injustices they may be subject to in countries that provide them with asylum.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75007450","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Introduction to the Symposium on Ethics and Artificial Intelligence 伦理与人工智能研讨会导言
IF 0.6
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2022-06-28 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2022-0025
Mathias Risse
{"title":"Introduction to the Symposium on Ethics and Artificial Intelligence","authors":"Mathias Risse","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2022-0025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2022-0025","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76452680","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How Do You Like Your Justice, Bent or Unbent? 你喜欢你的正义吗，弯曲还是不弯曲?
IF 0.6
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2022-06-21 eCollection Date: 2023-10-01 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2021-0072
Lars J K Moen
{"title":"How Do You Like Your Justice, Bent or Unbent?","authors":"Lars J K Moen","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2021-0072","DOIUrl":"10.1515/mopp-2021-0072","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Principles of justice, David Estlund argues, cannot be falsified by people's unwillingness to satisfy them. In his <i>Utopophobia</i>, Estlund rejects the view that justice must bend to human motivation to deliver practical implications for how institutions ought to function. In this paper, I argue that a substantive argument against such bending of justice principles must challenge the reasons for making these principles sensitive to motivational limitations. Estlund, however, provides no such challenge. His dispute with benders of justice is therefore a verbal one over the true meaning of justice, which need not worry those with the intuition that justice should perform a function that requires bending. By focusing on John Rawls's reasons for bending his justice principles, I point towards a substantive critique of bent justice.</p>","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10568981/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75453890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
A More Liberal Public Reason Liberalism 一个更自由的公共理性自由主义
IF 0.6
Moral Philosophy and Politics Pub Date : 2022-06-20 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2021-0068
Roberto Fumagalli
{"title":"A More Liberal Public Reason Liberalism","authors":"Roberto Fumagalli","doi":"10.1515/mopp-2021-0068","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2021-0068","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In recent years, leading public reason liberals have argued that publicly justifying coercive laws and policies requires that citizens offer both adequate secular justificatory reasons and adequate secular motivating reasons for these laws and policies. In this paper, I provide a critical assessment of these two requirements and argue for two main claims concerning such requirements. First, only some qualified versions of the requirement that citizens offer adequate secular justificatory reasons for coercive laws and policies may be justifiably regarded as plausible liberal principles of public justification. And second, the requirement that citizens offer adequate secular motivating reasons for coercive laws and policies is untenable on multiple grounds. Public reason liberals should focus on assessing the justificatory reasons offered for and against coercive laws and policies rather than requiring citizens to offer adequate secular motivating reasons for such laws and policies.","PeriodicalId":37108,"journal":{"name":"Moral Philosophy and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81400904","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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