制度与道德要求

IF 0.9 Q3 ETHICS
J. Belic
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引用次数: 0

摘要

为了别人,我们应该牺牲多少?一些人赞成做出重大牺牲,而另一些人则认为,道德对个人的要求不能太高。最近,这场辩论出现了新的转折,焦点集中在许多人的基本利益受到挫折的非理想条件下的道德要求上。在这种情况下,一些人认为,道德理论必须要求极端的道德要求,因为任何极端的道德要求都与平等考虑每个人的利益不相容。然而,坚持道德要求的极端化是以对非理想条件的简单化解释为前提的,这种非理想条件的主要特征是许多个人的不服从。非理想条件还具有制度不服从的特征,即制度经常不做他们应该做的事情。制度的不服从是重要的,因为它显著地增加了道德要求的规模,从而加剧了这些要求与受这些制度约束的个人自身利益之间的冲突。我认为,个人有一种元利益,即不经历这种内部冲突,因为这会破坏他们对自尊的肯定。元利益可以通过将促进公正制度作为最终目标来推进,因为这样的制度可以减少冲突,从而使我们过上更和谐的生活。此外,促进公正制度也使我们能够在非理想条件下肯定我们的自尊感。因为促进公正制度符合我们的自身利益,所以这不是一种极端的道德要求,而是一种适度的道德要求。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Institutions and Moral Demandingness
Abstract How much should we sacrifice for the sake of others? While some argue in favour of significant sacrifices, others contend that morality cannot demand too much from individuals. Recently, the debate has taken a new turn by focusing on moral demands under non-ideal conditions in which the essential interests of many people are set back. Under such conditions, in some views, moral theories must require extreme moral demands as anything less is incompatible with equal consideration of everyone’s interests. The insistence on the extremeness of moral demands, however, presupposes a simplistic account of non-ideal conditions as characterized mainly by the non-compliance of many individuals. Non-ideal conditions are also characterized by institutional non-compliance, whereby institutions often do not do what they ought to do. Institutional non-compliance is significant as it increases the size of moral demands significantly, thereby exacerbating the conflict between these demands and the self-interest of individuals subjected to these institutions. I argue that individuals have a meta-interest in not experiencing such internal conflicts as these can undermine their affirmation of self-respect. Meta-interest can be advanced by adopting the promotion of just institutions as an ultimate aim, as such institutions lessen the conflict and, accordingly, enable us to live more harmonious lives. Moreover, the promotion of just institutions allows us to affirm our sense of self-respect under non-ideal conditions too. Because the promotion of just institutions is in our self-interest, this is not an extreme but a moderate moral demand.
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来源期刊
Moral Philosophy and Politics
Moral Philosophy and Politics Arts and Humanities-Philosophy
CiteScore
1.70
自引率
0.00%
发文量
19
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