Argumenta Philosophica最新文献_第9页

Pragmatist Pragmatics: the Functional Context of Utterances 语用学:话语的功能语境

Argumenta Philosophica Pub Date : 2005-01-02 DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82211

J. Collier, K. Talmont-kaminski

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引用次数: 7

What is the importance of Descartes’s meditation six? 笛卡尔冥想的重要性是什么?

Argumenta Philosophica Pub Date : 2005-01-02 DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82204

Catherine Wilson

引用次数: 3

Brandom and Davidsom: What Do We Need to Account for Thinking and Agency? 布兰登和戴维森:我们需要怎样解释思维和能动性?

Argumenta Philosophica Pub Date : 2005-01-02 DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82210

J. Peregrin

引用次数: 1

Law Truth and Presupposition 真理与预设

Argumenta Philosophica Pub Date : 2005-01-02 DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82212

A. Grobler

引用次数: 1

Commitments and Speech Acts 承诺与言语行为

Argumenta Philosophica Pub Date : 2005-01-02 DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82209

R. Harnish

{"title":"Commitments and Speech Acts","authors":"R. Harnish","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82209","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82209","url":null,"abstract":"The utterance of a se ntence in a context is not sufficient for the performance of a speech act. Theories of speech acts can be o rganized in ter ms of what must be added. Roughly Austinian theories add rules (or conventions) which govern an utterance in the performance of a speech act, and are shared by hearers in communication. Roughly Gricean theories add the expression of intentional states of speakers, and their recognition in communication by hearers. Gricean and Austinian theories have their respective strengths and weaknesses. Recently, Alston has proposed an inte resting variant in the Austinan tradition, a theory which emphasizes the “normative stance” taken by a speaker with respect to t he utterance of the sentence. Alst on thinks that this notion can replace the expression of intentional states of the Gricean tradition. At least three explications of such a normative stance have been offered, including Alston's. Only one of these is promising and it is possible to argue that on that construal, expressing an inte ntional state in uttering something and taking a normative stance i n ut tering something, are equivalent notions. The really hard work is determining what undertaking a comm itment or resp onsibility amounts to. That we must leave to another occasion.","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87419319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 36

Thought Experiments in Science Studies. 科学研究中的思维实验。

Argumenta Philosophica Pub Date : 2003-01-02 DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82230

P. Ylikoski

引用次数: 2

The Roles of One Thought Experiment in Interpreting Quantum Mechanics. Werner Heisenberg Meets Thomas Kuhn. 一个思想实验在解释量子力学中的作用。维尔纳·海森堡遇见托马斯·库恩。

Argumenta Philosophica Pub Date : 2003-01-02 DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82232

Maarten Van Dyck

引用次数: 0

A Metaphysics for Explanatory Ecumenism. 解释性普世主义的形而上学。

Argumenta Philosophica Pub Date : 2003-01-02 DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82240

T. Demeter