Argumenta Philosophica最新文献_第8页

Causation, Pluralism and Responsibility 因果、多元与责任

Argumenta Philosophica Pub Date : 2006-01-02 DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82197

Francis Longworth

{"title":"Causation, Pluralism and Responsibility","authors":"Francis Longworth","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82197","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82197","url":null,"abstract":"Counterfactual theories of causation have had difficulty in delivering the intuitively correct verdicts for cases of causation involving preemption, without generating further counterexamples. Hall (2004) has offered a pluralistic theory of causatio n, accor ding to which there are two concepts of causation: counterfactual dependence and production. Hall’s theory does deliver the correct verdicts for many of the problematic kinds of preemption. It also dea ls succ essfully with cases of causation by omission, which ha ve proved stubborn counterexamples to physical process theories of causation. Hall’s theory therefore appears to be a significant improvement on extant univocal theories of causation, both physical and counterfactual. In this paper I present a serie s of countere xamples to Hall’s theory. I also describe cases in which our causal judgments appear to be sensitive to moral considerations. It does not seem likely that conventional theories of causation, which attempt to situate causation in an ob jective metaphysical pictu re of the world, will ever accord with our intuitions in such cases. Finally, the notion of responsibility is considered, but rejected as an illuminating primitive for analyzing causation.","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74768424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 15

Martians and Meetings: Against Burge’s Neo-Kantian Apriorism about Testimony 火星人与会议:反对伯格关于证言的新康德先验主义

Argumenta Philosophica Pub Date : 2006-01-02 DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82192

Elizabeth Fricker

引用次数: 2

Testimony as an a Priori Basis of Acceptance: Problems and Prospects 证言作为接受的先验基础:问题与展望

Argumenta Philosophica Pub Date : 2006-01-02 DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82193

R. Audi

{"title":"Testimony as an a Priori Basis of Acceptance: Problems and Prospects","authors":"R. Audi","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82193","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82193","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the possibility that testimony is an a priori source, even if not a basic source, of rational support for certain kinds of cognitions, particularly for a kind of acceptance that it is natural to call presumption. The inquiry is conducted in the light of two impor tant distinctions and the relation between them. One distinction is between belief and acceptance, the other between justification and rationality. Cognitive acceptance is also distinguished from behavioral acceptance, and their normative status is shown to be governed by quite different principles. A major focus in the paper is the question of how the epistemic authority of testimony for cognitive acceptance of its content may depend on normative elements implicit in the kind of language learning and social coordination that are normal for at least the majority of human beings. The importance of testimony in the development of human knowledge is clear. But there remains disagreement about its epistemic significance, particularly concerning its ability to confer non-inferential justification or the status of non-inferential knowledge on testimony-based beliefs. I have argued that it can do both, but is nonetheless not on a par with such basic sources of justification and knowledge as perception and reflection. A source need not be basic, however, to be a priori, and a","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88368850","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Can Testimony Generate Knowledge? 证言能产生知识吗?

Argumenta Philosophica Pub Date : 2006-01-02 DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82194

P. Graham

{"title":"Can Testimony Generate Knowledge?","authors":"P. Graham","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82194","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82194","url":null,"abstract":"Orthodoxy in epistemology maintains that some sources of belief, e.g. perception and introspection, generate knowledge, while others, e.g. testimony and m emory, preserve knowledge. An exam ple from Jennifer Lackey – the Schoolteacher case – purports to show that testimony can generate knowledge. It is argued that Lackey’s case fails to subvert the orthodox view, for the case does not involve the generation of knowledge by testimony. A modified version of the case does. Lackey’s example illustrates the orthodox view; the revised case refutes it. The theoretical explanation of knowledge from testimony as information transmission explains how testimony transfers knowledge and why it can generate knowledge. It also revea ls the real difference between so-called “generative” and so-called “preservative” sources. The former extract information; the latter transmit information. Perception provides knowledge of the world, introspection knowledge of our selves, and mindreading knowledge of other minds. Reasoning extends knowledge beyond things we already know. Perception, introspection, mindreading, and reasoning are all ways of generating new knowledge, generating knowledge of events, facts, and states of affairs not known before. Memory differs. Memory preserves knowledge of things we already know. If I knew something at an earlier time, say on the basis of perception, and then I remember it now, then I know it now, but only because I knew it before. Testimony (the process of forming beliefs on the basis of understanding what other people say) looks like memory. If someone else knows something and tells me what they know, and I accept what they say, then I come to know it too. But I only acquire knowledge from accepting what they say if they know it already. Testimony, like memory, doesn’t generate knowledge where there was no knowledge before; testimony preserves knowledge.","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86236396","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 56

Truth and Conversation 真理与对话

Argumenta Philosophica Pub Date : 2005-01-02 DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82213

M. Witek

引用次数: 0

On the origin of modern naturalism: the significance of Berkeley’s response to a Newtonian indispensibility argument 论现代自然主义的起源:柏克莱回应牛顿不可或缺论的意义

Argumenta Philosophica Pub Date : 2005-01-02 DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82203

E. Schliesser

引用次数: 4

Berkeley’s assessment of Locke’s epistemology 伯克利对洛克认识论的评价

Argumenta Philosophica Pub Date : 2005-01-02 DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82205

G. Pappas

引用次数: 0

Knowing causes: Descartes on the world of matter 认识原因:笛卡儿论物质世界

Argumenta Philosophica Pub Date : 2005-01-02 DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82202

P. Machamer, J. Mcguire, J. Sytsma

{"title":"Knowing causes: Descartes on the world of matter","authors":"P. Machamer, J. Mcguire, J. Sytsma","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82202","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82202","url":null,"abstract":"In this essay, we discuss how Descartes arrive s a t his mature vi ew of material caus ation. Descartes’ position changes over time in some very radical ways. The last section spells out his final position as to how causation works in the world of material objects. When considering Descartes’ causal theories, it is useful to distinguish between ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ causation. The vertical perspective addresses God’s relation to creation. God is essential being, and every being other than God depends upon God in order to exist and to continue in existence .Thus, from the vertical perspective, the act of creating and fact of coming into existence are co-extensive notions. This metaphy sical/theological framework is the basis of Descartes’ commitment to three interrelated notions: that genuine causes and effects occur simultaneously; that causing is appropriately the case only when the cause is acting; and the view that God is the efficient, total, and continuous cause of everything that exists and every action that occurs. So from the vertical perspective, things are nothing without God’s continuous creation, and there is a problem in articulating how they are said to have independent being and causal efficacy. It is in terms of these commitments that Descartes’ views on horizontal, or material, causation must be approached. We will make apparent the radical extent to which his account of intra-worldly causation abandons his earlier and more traditional views about material causation. To this end we discuss Desca rtes’ jou rney to his mature position by emphasizing the gr owing epistemic limitations of his philosophy, which culminate in wh at we call his epistemic stance.","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77129786","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Modularity. Understanding the Development and Evolution of Natural Complex Systems. Werner Callebaut & Diego Rasskin-Gutman (eds.) 模块化。理解自然复杂系统的发展和进化。沃纳·卡利伯特和迭戈·拉斯金-古特曼(编)

Argumenta Philosophica Pub Date : 2005-01-02 DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82207

Linda Van Speybroeck

引用次数: 1

Bacon’s idea and Newton’s practice of induction 培根的思想和牛顿的归纳法

Argumenta Philosophica Pub Date : 2005-01-02 DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82206

S. Ducheyne

引用次数: 9