{"title":"Ontology and Methodology in Contemporary Philosophy of Social Science: Status Quaestionis.","authors":"Jeroen Van Bouwel","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82235","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82235","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89529069","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Emergence and Analytical Dualism.","authors":"Shaun Le Boutillier","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82238","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82238","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91182930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Dual Nature View of Thought Experiments.","authors":"Tim DE MEY","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82231","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82231","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80878300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Personal Identity and its Boundaries: Philosophical Thought Experiments.","authors":"Farah Foucquaert","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82234","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82234","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90109359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Thought Experiments in Mathematics: Anything but Proof.","authors":"J. P. Bendegem","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82229","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82229","url":null,"abstract":"It is apparently not an easy task to understand what thought experiments (TEs) could be, what they are, how they function, and so on. There are many, quite different definitions around that seem to be in conflict with one another (as the contributions to this volume will no doubt illustrate). Usually all examples of TEs come from the natural and, more exceptionally, the social sciences: Galileo' s falling bodies experiment, Newton's bucket, Einstein's light ray, Maxwell's Demon, are the prototypical cases. Occasionally, authors talk about mathematical thought experiments (MTEs). There the situation becomes even more complex: first, few authors actually believe that there are such things as MTEs and those that do believe so, put forward nearly contradictory definitions. Nevertheless, the aim of this paper is to suggest that, first, MTEs do exist, second that there is a wide class of such MTEs, and finally, that is necessary. to have MTEs in order to understand a major part of mathematical practice. The core thesis of this paper is this: if it is so that what mathematicians are searching for are proofs within the framework of a mathematical theory, then any consideration that (a) in the case where the","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81644623","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Realistic Models? Critical Realism and Statistical Models in the Social Sciences.","authors":"J. Pratschke","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82236","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82236","url":null,"abstract":"My aim in this paper is to question the scepticism of critical realist philosophers of science in relation to the use of statistical methods in social science research. By arguing that statistical analysis is inevitably 'deductivist' in nature (Bhaskar, 1998a; Lawson, 1997, 1998, 2001; Pratten, 1999), I believe that critical realists merely reinforce the influence of empiricism!. Moreover, by confining their criticism of statistics to the social sciences, these writers ·adopt an unwarranted antinaturalist stance. In contrast, I will argue that critical realism can help to resolve a number of 'philosophical problems in relation to the specification, assessment and interpretation of statistical models. Social scientists are increasingly aware of these issues (Cliff, 1983; Hayduk, 1987, 1996; Hedstrom & Swedberg, 1998; McKim & Turner, 1997; Mulaik, 2001), and it is therefore timely to reconsider how their concerns might be addressed from within the framework of critical realism. I am","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74987667","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Thought Experiments Rhetoric and Possible Worlds.","authors":"Benoît DE BAERE","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82233","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82233","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84119826","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"When Unveiling the Epistemic Fallacy Ends with Committing the Ontological Fallacy. On the Contribution of Critical Realism to the Social Scientific Explanatory Practice.","authors":"Jeroen Van Bouwel","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82239","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82239","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83866657","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Exemplifying an Internal Realist Model of Truth.","authors":"Mark Weinstein","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82248","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82248","url":null,"abstract":"From early on, Hilary Putnam's efforts reflected a deeply foundational result, the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem, that formalized the central intuition that governed much of his thinking. This metamathematical result supports the indeterminacy of the reference relation between theories and their models. 1 As this intuition, captured in many ways, was used to support his many and varied philosophical interests, his concern with formal languages and formal models of, particularly, scientific theories and explanations decreased. 2 In place of metamathematics, Putnam offered various informal and quasi-formal arguments and constructions showing the limits of logical models as a challenge to, among other things, metaphysical realIsm. This yielded his notion of internal realism. 3","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78635533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Moral Analogies in Print: Emblematic Thinking in the Making of Early Modern Books.","authors":"P. Gehl","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82246","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82246","url":null,"abstract":"It is a commonplace in the history of the scientific revolution that ancient and medieval notions of reasoning by analogy, which united all of creation in layered realities observable in the puzzle of the world, were swept away by the triumph first of empiricism and skepticism and then of the romantic insistence on the uniqueness of the individual. Recent work shows conclusively that this development was not linear, and that the culture of print so important in the diffusion of early modern science depended on the persistence of moralizing analogy in academies and classrooms and in printing houses and bookshops. This paper offers a look at the persistence of moral, emblematic thought\" in the publishing industry of early \"modern Europe. I contend that book workers -from authors and editors to typesetters and printers -embraced emblematic thinking as a way of bridging the ethical distance between commerce and science. Their habits of translating moral analogy into print can be seen most\" clearly and unambiguously in the ways book folk devised emblematic printer's marks and shop signs to label and advertise their work on the book market. An historical case study, this paper describes practices that bear directly on our present debates over the mechanics and ethics of technological innovation and the challenge technology poses to intellectual freedom, enterprise, and the exchange of information. The paper concludes with a reflection on the ways in which contemporary design reasoning is analogous to traditional emblematic thought. Ancient and medieval notions of reasoning by analogy united all of creation in layered realities observable in the puzzle of the world and described in ebullient, cascading metaphors (Rhodes 2000; Stafford 1999; Gentner and Jeziorski 1994) . A typical medieval treatise on natural history, science, or morals was called a Speculum or mirror, and presupposed that the author and reader would find themselves fully","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89255241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}