Commitments and Speech Acts

Abstract

The utterance of a se ntence in a context is not sufficient for the performance of a speech act. Theories of speech acts can be o rganized in ter ms of what must be added. Roughly Austinian theories add rules (or conventions) which govern an utterance in the performance of a speech act, and are shared by hearers in communication. Roughly Gricean theories add the expression of intentional states of speakers, and their recognition in communication by hearers. Gricean and Austinian theories have their respective strengths and weaknesses. Recently, Alston has proposed an inte resting variant in the Austinan tradition, a theory which emphasizes the “normative stance” taken by a speaker with respect to t he utterance of the sentence. Alst on thinks that this notion can replace the expression of intentional states of the Gricean tradition. At least three explications of such a normative stance have been offered, including Alston's. Only one of these is promising and it is possible to argue that on that construal, expressing an inte ntional state in uttering something and taking a normative stance i n ut tering something, are equivalent notions. The really hard work is determining what undertaking a comm itment or resp onsibility amounts to. That we must leave to another occasion.