{"title":"Countering Criticism from the Third World: Switzerland’s Stance on White Minority Rule","authors":"","doi":"10.1163/9789004469617_005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004469617_005","url":null,"abstract":"In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Swiss government’s position towards Portuguese colonialism and the independence wars in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau was not fundamentally different from during the early years of the conflict. The Swiss authorities still preferred to avoid taking a stand and tried to keep the door open to both the coloniser and the colonised. This was increasingly difficult, however, as Portugal became the last European colonial power to resist decolonisation. For the authoritarian Estado Novo regime led by António de Oliveira Salazar, the colonies of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, and São Tomé e Príncipe were an integral part of the Portuguese empire. Since the early 1960s, the Portuguese authorities had been involved in costly counter-insurgency wars against African liberation movements fighting for independence.1 Initial hopes for change after Marcello Caetano took over from a hospitalised Salazar in September 1968 were soon dashed.2 As Portuguese colonialism became an anachronism, it was subsumed under the general problem of systematic racial discrimination in Southern Africa. Together with the white settler regime in Rhodesia that had, in 1965, unilaterally declared its independence from the UK, and an Apartheid South Africa that occupied Namibia, the Portuguese colonies formed part of a bastion of white minority rule in Southern Africa. The three minority regimes cooperated militarily to combat the challenge of African nationalism, notably negotiating a secret, informal military agreement called Exercise Alcora in the latter half of 1970. Although Pretoria provided some military support to Lisbon and Salisbury, each government was critical of the others’ different, but always discriminatory, way of organising their multiracial societies.3","PeriodicalId":365347,"journal":{"name":"Switzerland and Sub-Saharan Africa in the Cold War, 1967-1979","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114065374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Negotiating Foreign Policy on the Domestic Front: Non-state Actors and Portuguese Colonialism","authors":"","doi":"10.1163/9789004469617_006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004469617_006","url":null,"abstract":"In the late 1960s, as African governments began to single out Switzerland’s connections with the white minority regimes of Southern Africa, protest also grew on the domestic front. Activist groups that developed out of the ‘1968’ student movement and religious circles started to raise their voices against Portuguese colonialism and what was perceived as the Swiss government’s complicity with a racist regime involved in a violent colonial war. These actors were part of a transnational protest network. In the late 1960s, student movements in Western Europe and the US took up the issue of the unequal relations between the global North and the global South, proclaiming their solidarity with the peoples of the Third World. At the same time, some churches and religious actors, inspired by liberation theology, were increasingly engaged in political issues and started to criticise contemporary paternalistic approaches to development aid. Students, peace activists, intellectuals, radical leftist groups, and religious organisations formed a variety of solidarity movements with the Third World. The armed struggles of liberation movements in the global South motivated and sometimes radicalised these solidarity groups, and served as inspiration for a more general resistance against the capitalist system.1 In this context of growing mobilisation for Third World issues, the authoritarian Estado Novo regime, at the head of a colonial empire, was an ideal target. Influenced by student protests against the wars in Vietnam and Biafra, numerous activist groups were created in Switzerland between 1967 and 1970. Although their aims and activities differed, they were united by their moral protest against injustice in the world. In their search for the causes of the unequal development of the North and the South, most activists focused on the responsibility of their own society. They aimed to inform people in Switzerland about the situation in the Third World and convince them of the need to break with the contemporary policies of industrialised countries that created structures of dependency in the global South.2 The Swiss government’s role in the stabilisation of the Portuguese colonial empire was discussed as part of the broader critical analysis of North–South relations. This included","PeriodicalId":365347,"journal":{"name":"Switzerland and Sub-Saharan Africa in the Cold War, 1967-1979","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123900180","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Manoeuvring through the East–West and North–South Conflict: The Angolan War","authors":"","doi":"10.1163/9789004469617_014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004469617_014","url":null,"abstract":"The roots of the Angolan War are difficult to determine, as knowledge of the belligerents and their background remains limited due to the lack of internal sources. The rivalry between the three Angolan liberation movements, with their different ideological outlooks and visions for the development of Angola, was based, at least initially, on their different ethnic groups and regional strongholds. They were each led by an ambitious authoritarian leader and had entered into different international alliances, all of which had prevented the formation of a common anti-colonial front during the independence wars. Pressured by the OAU and independent African governments, the FNLA, the MPLA, and UNITA had briefly set aside their differences in early 1975 to conclude the Alvor Agreement on decolonisation with the Portuguese government. After repeated clashes in the first half of 1975, the shaky truce between the three Angolan liberation movements was shattered in July. The MPLA expelled FNLA troops from Luanda and the transitional government collapsed. FNLA leader Holden Roberto left his exile in Zaire and led his troops’ march towards Luanda. Meanwhile, UNITA fought the MPLA in central and southern Angola. Occupied with the political, economic, and social upheaval in Portugal, the colonial authorities were unable to control the decolonisation process in Angola, despite their ongoing military presence. At the same time, the three movements’ external allies stepped up their support. In midJuly 1975, the South African Prime Minister decided to support the FNLA and UNITA with weapons and equipment amounting to CHF 76 million (US$ 27.4 million). On 18 July, the US government, which had already granted limited support to the FNLA in January 1975, authorised the disbursement of US$ 6 million for IAFEATURE, a covert CIA operation aimed at preventing an MPLA victory by strengthening its two opponents. Until August, this was followed by two further payments of US$ 8 million and US$ 10.7 million. In early August, a Cuban mission arrived in Angola to determine the MPLA’s need for aid.1 The extent of Soviet and Chinese involvement in the Angolan War is less clear. The","PeriodicalId":365347,"journal":{"name":"Switzerland and Sub-Saharan Africa in the Cold War, 1967-1979","volume":"149 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121513367","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Non-colonial Power in Colonial and Postcolonial Africa","authors":"","doi":"10.1163/9789004469617_003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004469617_003","url":null,"abstract":"The connections between Switzerland and Africa are not immediately obvious. After all, this small, land-locked European country has never had colonies abroad. Nevertheless, there were and are numerous ties between Swiss and African people, organisations, and states. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, some Swiss citizens and companies were involved in the triangular slave trade.1 In the wake of the European powers, which extended their control over the continent during the last third of the nineteenth century, Swiss missionaries, farmers, and entrepreneurs settled in Africa, benefiting from the structures put in place by the colonial authorities.2 Swiss geographical societies launched expeditions to Africa.3 Back in Switzerland, missionaries and explorers contributed to the dissemination of colonial imageries and racial","PeriodicalId":365347,"journal":{"name":"Switzerland and Sub-Saharan Africa in the Cold War, 1967-1979","volume":"500 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124449911","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Attempting to Keep a Low Profile: The Revolutions in Somalia and Ethiopia","authors":"Mohammad Siad Barre","doi":"10.1163/9789004469617_009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004469617_009","url":null,"abstract":"In the mid-1970s, the military regimes that took power in Somalia in 1969 and in Ethiopia in 1974 sought to strengthen their links to the Soviet Union. Subsequently, the Horn of Africa turned into a second trouble spot for Switzerland’s foreign policy on the African continent, after Southern Africa. The 1969 military coup in Somalia had domestic causes. From 1967 onwards, Prime Minister Mohammad Egal had taken a more conciliatory, less aggressive approach to the nationalist goal of adding neighbouring territories inhabited by ethnic Somalis to the Somali state. His attempt to resolve the issue by diplomatic means caused public dissatisfaction and left the army without a raison d’être. During the March 1969 elections, violent clashes erupted between different political parties and there were widespread accusations of corruption. This further undermined confidence in the government. On 15 October 1969, while Prime Minister Egal was on a visit to the US, President Ali Shermarke was shot by one of his police guards. Six days later, the army took power in a bloodless coup. The Supreme Revolutionary Council under General Mohammad Siad Barre arrested government officials, including the returned Egal, suspended the constitution, abolished the Supreme Court, closed parliament, and renamed the state the Somali Democratic Republic. The new regime promised to fight corruption, continue the struggle for the unification of all Somali people, and work for the improvement of economic and social conditions.1 In the months after the coup, Soviet military and economic delegations visited Mogadishu.2 Nevertheless, Soviet involvement in Somalia increased moderately at first. It was only after Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat expelled all Soviet military and technical advisors in July 1972 that Somalia and its ports gained great strate-","PeriodicalId":365347,"journal":{"name":"Switzerland and Sub-Saharan Africa in the Cold War, 1967-1979","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127829749","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Conclusion","authors":"","doi":"10.1163/9789004469617_017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004469617_017","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":365347,"journal":{"name":"Switzerland and Sub-Saharan Africa in the Cold War, 1967-1979","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131694144","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Introduction to Part 1","authors":"","doi":"10.1163/9789004469617_004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004469617_004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":365347,"journal":{"name":"Switzerland and Sub-Saharan Africa in the Cold War, 1967-1979","volume":"169 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122061342","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Getting Out of a Foreign Policy Impasse: The Decolonisation of Angola and Mozambique","authors":"","doi":"10.1163/9789004469617_010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004469617_010","url":null,"abstract":"On 25 April 1974, a military coup d’état in Portugal, supported by large parts of the population, changed the dynamics of the independence wars in Southern Africa. Almost without bloodshed, the Movimento das Forças Armadas (Armed Forces Movement, MFA), constituted mainly of junior officers, toppled the Estado Novo regime. Although the coup came as a surprise to both the Portuguese leaders and international observers, growing discontent within the military had been evident for some time. At its root were the independence wars in Africa. After more than a decade of war, Portuguese defeat in Guinea-Bissau, whose independence the liberation movement PAIGC had unilaterally declared in September 1973, became increasingly likely. In February 1974, General António de Spínola, former Portuguese commander-in-chief in Guinea-Bissau, published a book in which he called for reforms in Portugal. He also argued that the solution to the wars in Africa had to be political, not military. The book quickly became a bestseller and undermined the position of Prime Minister Marcello Caetano. The junior career officers who comprised the majority of the MFA were motivated mainly by their perceived loss of status after a series of reforms improved the situation of conscripted officers. Yet, their dissent was also an expression of wide-ranging dissatisfaction with the organisational problems of the Portuguese army linked to the extensive troop demands of the African wars.1 Faced with this discontent, the Caetano regime failed to act decisively. There was next to no resistance when the MFA took control of Lisbon on 25 April 1974. General Spínola was chosen to head the Junta of National Salvation that assumed power in Portugal and later became the first provisional president. The secret police and censorship were abolished, political prisoners liberated, the army reorganised and civil governors dismissed. The MFA’s programme was deliberately vague on the question of the future of Portugal’s African colonies, in order to appeal to as great a number of people as possible. Its final version contained no commitment to the principle of selfdetermination. Instead, it argued that a negotiated solution was needed to the","PeriodicalId":365347,"journal":{"name":"Switzerland and Sub-Saharan Africa in the Cold War, 1967-1979","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122080283","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Improving Switzerland’s Image: Relations with Independent Mozambique","authors":"","doi":"10.1163/9789004469617_011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004469617_011","url":null,"abstract":"When Mozambique became independent in June 1975, Swiss–Mozambican relations were tense. Confidently looking forward to a bright future, FRELIMO’s leadership criticised Switzerland’s selective interpretation of neutrality during the independence wars and its cordial relations with the white minority regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia. The new government nationalised Swiss assets in Mozambique and numerous Swiss business people and missionaries left the country, together with many Portuguese and foreign citizens. Four years later, the situation had changed. Natural disasters, the departure of skilled workers, the loss of remittances from Mozambican mine workers in South Africa due to a change in the Rand mines’ recruitment policies, and the ruling party’s moves towards a planned economy drastically reduced Mozambique’s economic output. The security situation had also deteriorated. In retaliation for FRELIMO’s support of Rhodesian nationalist movements, the Rhodesian army started to attack targets in Mozambique. Its secret services were instrumental in the creation of the Mozambican National Resistance (MNR). While this movement did not represent a serious military challenge to the Mozambican government in the late 1970s, its guerrilla activities had a destabilising effect. In the 1980s, it became known under the name Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambican National Resistance, RENAMO) and its equipment and training were taken over by South Africa.1 Yet, by early 1979, political relations between Switzerland and FRELIMO were cordial and the two governments even planned for a courtesy visit by the Mozambican president to Bern. In October 1979, the two governments signed a bilateral trade and economic cooperation agreement. In the midto late 1970s, Mozambique was the only one of the four radical states in sub-Saharan Africa whose government developed a close bilateral relationship with Switzerland. This was mainly a result of the Swiss government’s efforts to improve its image in the former Portuguese colonies and, at the same time, strengthen links with a newly decolonised Third World state. In Bern, Mozambique mattered for several reasons. First, there were Swiss","PeriodicalId":365347,"journal":{"name":"Switzerland and Sub-Saharan Africa in the Cold War, 1967-1979","volume":"106 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131416200","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Introduction to Part 3","authors":"","doi":"10.1163/9789004469617_013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004469617_013","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":365347,"journal":{"name":"Switzerland and Sub-Saharan Africa in the Cold War, 1967-1979","volume":"304 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133208833","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}