Attempting to Keep a Low Profile: The Revolutions in Somalia and Ethiopia

Abstract

In the mid-1970s, the military regimes that took power in Somalia in 1969 and in Ethiopia in 1974 sought to strengthen their links to the Soviet Union. Subsequently, the Horn of Africa turned into a second trouble spot for Switzerland’s foreign policy on the African continent, after Southern Africa. The 1969 military coup in Somalia had domestic causes. From 1967 onwards, Prime Minister Mohammad Egal had taken a more conciliatory, less aggressive approach to the nationalist goal of adding neighbouring territories inhabited by ethnic Somalis to the Somali state. His attempt to resolve the issue by diplomatic means caused public dissatisfaction and left the army without a raison d’être. During the March 1969 elections, violent clashes erupted between different political parties and there were widespread accusations of corruption. This further undermined confidence in the government. On 15 October 1969, while Prime Minister Egal was on a visit to the US, President Ali Shermarke was shot by one of his police guards. Six days later, the army took power in a bloodless coup. The Supreme Revolutionary Council under General Mohammad Siad Barre arrested government officials, including the returned Egal, suspended the constitution, abolished the Supreme Court, closed parliament, and renamed the state the Somali Democratic Republic. The new regime promised to fight corruption, continue the struggle for the unification of all Somali people, and work for the improvement of economic and social conditions.1 In the months after the coup, Soviet military and economic delegations visited Mogadishu.2 Nevertheless, Soviet involvement in Somalia increased moderately at first. It was only after Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat expelled all Soviet military and technical advisors in July 1972 that Somalia and its ports gained great strate-