Getting Out of a Foreign Policy Impasse: The Decolonisation of Angola and Mozambique

On 25 April 1974, a military coup d’état in Portugal, supported by large parts of the population, changed the dynamics of the independence wars in Southern Africa. Almost without bloodshed, the Movimento das Forças Armadas (Armed Forces Movement, MFA), constituted mainly of junior officers, toppled the Estado Novo regime. Although the coup came as a surprise to both the Portuguese leaders and international observers, growing discontent within the military had been evident for some time. At its root were the independence wars in Africa. After more than a decade of war, Portuguese defeat in Guinea-Bissau, whose independence the liberation movement PAIGC had unilaterally declared in September 1973, became increasingly likely. In February 1974, General António de Spínola, former Portuguese commander-in-chief in Guinea-Bissau, published a book in which he called for reforms in Portugal. He also argued that the solution to the wars in Africa had to be political, not military. The book quickly became a bestseller and undermined the position of Prime Minister Marcello Caetano. The junior career officers who comprised the majority of the MFA were motivated mainly by their perceived loss of status after a series of reforms improved the situation of conscripted officers. Yet, their dissent was also an expression of wide-ranging dissatisfaction with the organisational problems of the Portuguese army linked to the extensive troop demands of the African wars.1 Faced with this discontent, the Caetano regime failed to act decisively. There was next to no resistance when the MFA took control of Lisbon on 25 April 1974. General Spínola was chosen to head the Junta of National Salvation that assumed power in Portugal and later became the first provisional president. The secret police and censorship were abolished, political prisoners liberated, the army reorganised and civil governors dismissed. The MFA’s programme was deliberately vague on the question of the future of Portugal’s African colonies, in order to appeal to as great a number of people as possible. Its final version contained no commitment to the principle of selfdetermination. Instead, it argued that a negotiated solution was needed to the