{"title":"Do International Launch Strategies of Pharmaceutical Corporations Respond to Changes in the Regulatory Environment","authors":"N. Varol, Joan Costa-i-Font, A. Mcguire","doi":"10.4337/9781781004241.00022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781781004241.00022","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates how regulation impinges on the launch strategies of international pharmaceutical corporations for new molecules and generics across the main OECD markets during 1960-2008. Comprehensive IMS data is used to analyze the international diffusion of 845 molecules from 14 different anatomic therapeutic categories using non-parametric survival analysis. The paper focuses on two main regulatory changes that reshaped the barriers to entry substantially: the US Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984 and the establishment of the European Medicines Agency (EMA) in 1995. We find that legal transaction costs have a significant impact on timing of launch. Stringent market authorization requirements for new pharmaceutical products in the US after 1962 resulted in a significant US drug lag in the introduction of pharmaceutical innovation vis-a-vis Europe during 1960-1984. However, financial incentives of the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act proved effective in closing this lag. A more streamlined EMA regulatory approval process has reduced barriers to entry in Europe enabling quicker diffusion of pharmaceutical products, yet a marked pattern of delay in adoption of innovation is still evident due to local differences in pricing regulations. New molecule launch strategically takes place first in higher-priced EU markets as a result of threat of arbitrage and price dependency across the member states. Finally, the impact of price controls on the launch timing of pharmaceutical innovation translates to the adoption of imitative pharmaceutical products-hampering access not only to new technologies but also to cost-saving substitute products.","PeriodicalId":359449,"journal":{"name":"LSE Research Online Documents on Economics","volume":"95 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125007070","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Enforcement-proof contracts with moral hazard in precaution: ensuring 'permanence' in carbon sequestration","authors":"I. MacKenzie, M. Ohndorf, C. Palmer","doi":"10.1093/OEP/GPR057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OEP/GPR057","url":null,"abstract":"Opportunistic behaviour due to imperfect contract enforcement is a risk in many economic transactions. In this paper, an enforcement-proof incentive contract is developed in which a buyer demands a guaranteed delivery of a good or service given a productive upfront payment, moral hazard in precaution, and the potential for opportunistic contract breach. Investing in a contract upfront is found to be restricted by moral hazard and opportunistic contract breach. This limits the size of investment up to a specific level even if an infinite scale-up of production were beneficial. A more severe moral hazard problem results in a smaller distortion. The framework is applied and extended to international carbon sequestration contracts. In comparison to alternative liability attributions, the current regime of buyer liability yields inefficiently low levels of investment in carbon sequestration.","PeriodicalId":359449,"journal":{"name":"LSE Research Online Documents on Economics","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125435900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Recent advances in the empirics of organizational economics","authors":"N. Bloom, R. Sadun, J. V. Reenen","doi":"10.1146/ANNUREV.ECONOMICS.050708.143328","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1146/ANNUREV.ECONOMICS.050708.143328","url":null,"abstract":"We present a survey of recent contributions in the empirical organizational economics, focusing on management practices and decentralization. Productivity dispersion between firms and countries has motivated the improved measurement of firm organization across industries and countries. There appears to be substantial variation in management practices and decentralization between countries, but especially within countries. Much of the poorer average management quality in countries like Brazil and India seems due to a “long tail” of poorly managed firms, which barely exist in the US. Many basic economic theories are supported by this new data. Some stylized facts include: (1) competition seems to foster improved management and decentralization; (2) larger firms, skillintensive plants and foreign multinationals appear better managed and are more decentralized; (3) family owned and managed firms appear to have worse management; (4) firms facing an environment of lighter labor market regulations, and more human capital intensive organizations specialize relatively more in “people management”. There is evidence for complementarities between ICT, decentralization and management, but the relationship is complex and identification of the productivity effects of organizational practices remain a challenge for future research.","PeriodicalId":359449,"journal":{"name":"LSE Research Online Documents on Economics","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128003067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Understanding the characteristics of techno-innovation in an era of self-regulated financial services","authors":"Susan V. Scott","doi":"10.1057/9780230283176_7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230283176_7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":359449,"journal":{"name":"LSE Research Online Documents on Economics","volume":"117 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132809244","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The growth of extended 'entry tournaments' and the decline of institutionalised occupational labour markets in Britain","authors":"D. Marsden","doi":"10.1057/9780230307834_4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230307834_4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":359449,"journal":{"name":"LSE Research Online Documents on Economics","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131576681","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Robust maximization of asymptotic growth","authors":"C. Kardaras, Scott Robertson","doi":"10.1214/11-AAP802","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1214/11-AAP802","url":null,"abstract":"This paper addresses the question of how to invest in a robust growth-optimal way in a market where the instantaneous expected return of the underlying process is unknown. The optimal investment strategy is identified using a generalized version of the principal eigenfunction for an elliptic second-order differential operator which depends on the covariance structure of the underlying process used for investing. The robust growth-optimal strategy can also be seen as a limit, as the terminal date goes to infinity, of optimal arbitrages in the terminology of Fernholz and Karatzas.","PeriodicalId":359449,"journal":{"name":"LSE Research Online Documents on Economics","volume":"202 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131612481","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"New approaches to surveying organizations","authors":"N. Bloom, J. V. Reenen","doi":"10.1257/AER.100.2.105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/AER.100.2.105","url":null,"abstract":"The last three decades have witnessed an explosion of theoretical work on the organization of firms (Robert Gibbons and John Roberts forthcoming). In parallel, there has been a massive increase in access to microdata which has revealed huge dispersions in productivity. For example, within narrow industries like cement, oak flooring, and block-ice the total factor productivity of plants at the ninetieth percentile is about twice that of those at the tenth percentile (Lucia Foster, John Haltiwanger, and Chad Syversson 2008). Unfortunately, analyzing to what extent this heterogeneity in productivity is due to management and organizational practices, unmeasured inputs, or other technologies has been held back by a lack of data. National statistical agencies do not usually collect data on the internal organization of companies, nor do firms report this in their accounts. Recently, however, social scientists have been starting to fill this gap by working closely with small numbers of individual firms (e.g., the “Insider Econometrics” approach described in Kathryn Shaw 2009) or covering wide cross-sections of firms (e.g., Nicholas Bloom, Raffaella Sadun, and John Van Reenen 2009). In this paper we describe some of the tools of this research, particularly Bloom and Van Reenen (2007)—henceforth BVR— for measuring management and organizational practices.","PeriodicalId":359449,"journal":{"name":"LSE Research Online Documents on Economics","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131551067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Price pressure in the government bond market","authors":"R. Greenwood, Dimitri Vayanos","doi":"10.1257/AER.100.2.585","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/AER.100.2.585","url":null,"abstract":"What determines the term structure of interest rates? Standard economic theory links the interest rate for maturity T to the willingness of a representative agent to substitute consumption between times 0 and T. The standard model contrasts sharply with a more informal view based on investors’ preferred habitat, proposed by John Culbertson (1957) and Franco Modigliani and Richard Sutch (1966). According to the preferred-habitat view, there are investor clienteles with preferences for specific maturities, and the interest rate for a given maturity is influenced by the demand of the corresponding clientele and the supply of bonds with that maturity. For example, the typical clientele for long-term bonds are pension funds. An increase in their demand would be expected to raise prices of long-term bonds and thus lower long-term interest rates. In short, preferred habitat implies that there is price pressure in the bond market. While the preferred-habitat view has intuitive appeal, it has not entered into the academic mainstream, typically being relegated to a paragraph in MBA-level textbooks. One reason for this is the mixed findings in early empirical studies of the term structure. Specifically, between 1962 and 1964, the US Treasury and Federal Reserve raised the supply of short-term government debt while simultaneously lowering the supply of long-term debt. This program, known as Operation Twist, aimed to raise shortterm interest rates, and so improve the balance of payments, while also lowering long-term rates to stimulate private investment. A number of papers evaluated Operation Twist, and while they reached different conclusions, none found strong evidence that the operation was effective in flattening the term structure (e.g., Modigliani Price Pressure in the Government Bond Market","PeriodicalId":359449,"journal":{"name":"LSE Research Online Documents on Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130379545","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cabinet structure and fiscal policy outcomes","authors":"Joachim Wehner","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1518122","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1518122","url":null,"abstract":"A central explanation of fiscal performance focuses on the structure of the cabinet. However, the partisan context of cabinet decisions remains under-explored, the findings are based on small samples and the variables of interest are often poorly operationalised. Using a new dataset of spending ministers and partisan fragmentation in the cabinets of 58 countries between 1975 and 1998, this study finds a strong positive association between the number of spending ministers and budget deficits and expenditures, as well as weaker evidence that these effects increase with partisan fragmentation.","PeriodicalId":359449,"journal":{"name":"LSE Research Online Documents on Economics","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114618194","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rates of return and alternative measures of capital input: 14 countries and 10 branches, 1971-2005","authors":"N. Oulton, Ana Rincón-Aznar","doi":"10.4337/9780857932105.00019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9780857932105.00019","url":null,"abstract":"We employ the EU KLEMS database to estimate the real rate of return to capital in 14 countries (11 in the EU, three outside the EU) in 10 branches of the market economy plus the market economy as a whole. Our measure of capital is an aggregate over seven types of asset: three ICT assets (computers, communications equipment, and software) and four non-ICT assets (machinery and equipment, nonresidential structures, transport equipment, and other). The real rate of return in the market economy does not vary very much across countries, with the exception of Spain where it is exceptionally high and in Italy where it is exceptionally low. The real rate appears to be trendless in most countries. Within each country however, the rate varies widely across the 10 branches, often being implausibly high or low. We also estimate the growth of capital services by two different methods: ex-post and exante, and the contribution of capital to output growth by three methods: ex-post, ex-ante and hybrid. Our implementation of the ex-ante method uses an estimate of the required rate of return for each country instead of the actual, average rate of return to calculate user costs and also employs the expected growth of asset prices rather than the actual growth. These estimates are derived from exactly the same data as for the ex-post method, ie without any extraneous data being employed. For estimating the contribution of capital to output growth, the ex-ante method uses ex-ante profit as the weight, while both the ex-post and the hybrid method use ex-post profit. We find that the three methods produce very similar results at the market economy level. But differences are much larger at the branch level, particularly between the ex-post and ex-ante methods.","PeriodicalId":359449,"journal":{"name":"LSE Research Online Documents on Economics","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133979589","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}