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Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 9最新文献

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Fitting Love and Reasons for Loving 合适的爱和爱的理由
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 9 Pub Date : 2019-10-24 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198846253.003.0006
Christopher Howard
{"title":"Fitting Love and Reasons for Loving","authors":"Christopher Howard","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198846253.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198846253.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"The “quality view” claims that what makes love fitting are the lovable qualities of the beloved. Although natural, this view seems to face a battery of embarrassing difficulties. It predicts, for example, that if someone is more lovable than your beloved, then it’s fitting for you to love that person more than, or instead of, your beloved (the problem of trading up); and that if your beloved loses his lovable qualities, it would no longer be fitting to love him (the problem of inconstancy). Chapter 6 offers a new defense of the quality view. It argues that, by supplementing the view with a plausible pluralism about normative reasons for love, quality theorists can easily answer all of the problems that putatively plague them.","PeriodicalId":354456,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 9","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130100046","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
From Duty for the Right Reasons 出于正当理由的责任
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 9 Pub Date : 2019-10-24 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198846253.003.0009
T. Toppinen
{"title":"From Duty for the Right Reasons","authors":"T. Toppinen","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198846253.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198846253.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"An action has moral worth when it’s a morally right action and when it is motivated in such a way that its being right is not accidental. When an action is, in this way, non-accidentally right, the agent is morally praiseworthy for doing the right thing. According to the Right Reasons View, an agent performs an action with moral worth, or is praiseworthy for doing the right thing, roughly to the extent that she does the right thing for reasons that make it right to act in this way (e.g., Arpaly, Markovits). According to another kind of view, actions with moral worth spring from the ‘motive of duty,’ or are based on the agent’s justified belief or knowledge that she ought to act in the relevant way (e.g., Sliwa, Johnson King). These are both attractive ideas. But given certain plausible assumptions, these ideas are in tension with each other. Chapter 9 suggests that the extent to which this is so depends on how the nature of moral thought is to be understood, and that certain forms of expressivism—relational expressivism, in particular—allow the pursuit of a reconciliatory approach.","PeriodicalId":354456,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 9","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122095190","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Agent-Relative Prerogatives and Suboptimal Beneficence 代理相对特权与次优善行
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 9 Pub Date : 2019-10-24 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198846253.003.0011
R. Bader
{"title":"Agent-Relative Prerogatives and Suboptimal Beneficence","authors":"R. Bader","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198846253.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198846253.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"The first part of Chapter 11 uses considerations of sequential choice to argue that suboptimal beneficence is impermissible. The second part shows how the prohibition on suboptimal beneficence follows from an agent-relative theory that understands permissible actions in terms of a dominance principle defined over both the agent-relative and the agent-neutral ordering. This theory incorporates agent-relative prerogatives that ensure that agents are not required to do what is impartially best, yet rules out suboptimal beneficence. The third part shows that the prohibition on suboptimal beneficence is in tension with dynamic consistency, since it leads to violations of expansion consistency condition BETA. If an agent makes use of myopic choice principles (which are purely forward-looking) or sophisticated choice principles (that make use of backwards induction), then there can be cases in which he can, by means of a sequence of permissible choices, bring about an outcome that is deemed to be impermissible from the outset. This problem is addressed by developing global choice principles that ensure dynamic consistency.","PeriodicalId":354456,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 9","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123075064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
On the Virtue of Taking Oneself Lightly 论轻看自己的美德
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 9 Pub Date : 2019-10-24 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198846253.003.0008
Macalester Bell
{"title":"On the Virtue of Taking Oneself Lightly","authors":"Macalester Bell","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198846253.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198846253.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"While the attitude of not taking oneself too seriously is widely praised in everyday life, philosophers have devoted very little attention to it, and Chapter 8 offers a general account of the virtue of taking oneself lightly. A proper understanding of the virtue raises some deep questions about the nature of respect and the value of psychological coherence. While some will object that taking oneself lightly is to fail to respect oneself, and others will object that a person who takes herself lightly is alienated from herself, these objections can be answered. The chapter closes with a discussion of why taking oneself lightly should be considered a virtue even under conditions of serious injustice and oppression.","PeriodicalId":354456,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 9","volume":"284 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131607730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Taking it Personally 把它个人化
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 9 Pub Date : 2019-10-24 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198846253.003.0004
Rosalind Chaplin
{"title":"Taking it Personally","authors":"Rosalind Chaplin","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198846253.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198846253.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"Chapter 4 challenges a common dogma of the literature on forgiveness: that forgiveness is the exclusive prerogative of victims. Attacks on third-party forgiveness generally come in two forms. One form of attack suggests that third-party forgiveness is conceptually incoherent (and so impossible). Another form of attack suggests that it is always morally inappropriate for third parties to forgive. This chapter argues against both of these claims; third-party forgiveness is possible, and in some cases it is morally appropriate for third parties to forgive (or refuse to forgive) wrongdoers for wrongs done to victims. The chapter also proposes an explanation of third-parties’ standing to forgive. Third parties have the standing to forgive when it is appropriate for them to take ‘personally’ wrongs done to victims, and this occurs primarily in the context of close relationships. Thus, while the standing to forgive is not grounded exclusively in having been wronged, the prerogative to forgive is normally limited to victims and their loved ones. Once we recognize the importance of third-party forgiveness in our moral lives and the norms that govern it, we can more easily adjudicate between competing accounts of the nature of forgiveness.","PeriodicalId":354456,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 9","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116401923","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
From Teleosemantics to Normative Ethics 从目的论到规范伦理学
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 9 Pub Date : 2019-10-24 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198846253.003.0013
J. Ross
{"title":"From Teleosemantics to Normative Ethics","authors":"J. Ross","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198846253.003.0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198846253.003.0013","url":null,"abstract":"The morally wrong actions, it seems, are the actions that are worthy of moral disapproval. Hence, one way to approach normative ethics is to ask the following question: Toward what kinds of action is moral disapproval fitting or correct? Chapter 13 argues that we can answer this question by adopting a teleosemantic framework. The chapter proceeds in three stages. It begins by proposing and defending a teleological theory of the contents of attitudes in general. The account proposed implies that the content of an attitude depends on its functional role. Accordingly, the second part of the paper defends an account of the functional role of moral disapproval. Then the third part combines the results of the first two parts in order to determine the content, and hence the correctness conditions, of moral disapproval. The chapter concludes with some remarks about the normative implications of the resulting view. In particular, it argues for a form of moral relativism.","PeriodicalId":354456,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 9","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133637625","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Well-Being, the Self, and Radical Change 幸福、自我和彻底的改变
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 9 Pub Date : 2019-10-24 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198846253.003.0012
J. Hawkins
{"title":"Well-Being, the Self, and Radical Change","authors":"J. Hawkins","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198846253.003.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198846253.003.0012","url":null,"abstract":"Chapter 12 explores radical personal change and its relationship to well-being, welfare, or prudential value. Many theorists of welfare are committed to what is here called the future-based reasons view (FBR), which holds (1) that the best prudential choice in a situation is determined by which possible future has the greatest net welfare value for the subject and (2) what determines facts about future welfare are facts about the subject and the world at that future time. Although some cases of radical change are intuitively prudentially good, many cases of really radical change are not. Yet FBR has trouble explaining this. Many people instinctively reach for the notion of identity to solve this problem—arguing that really radical change cannot be good because it alters who someone is. Yet, as the chapter argues, there are reasons to doubt that appeals to identity are appropriate. The chapter ends with the suggestion that prudential facts may explain why and when retaining identity matters, rather than the other way around, and points to a possible way forward for a theorist of welfare committed to FBR.","PeriodicalId":354456,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 9","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131812062","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
“But I Voted for Him for Other Reasons!” “但我投票给他是有其他原因的!”
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 9 Pub Date : 2019-10-24 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198846253.003.0007
A. Liberman
{"title":"“But I Voted for Him for Other Reasons!”","authors":"A. Liberman","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198846253.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198846253.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"Many people presume that you can permissibly support the good features of a symbol, person, activity, or work of art while simultaneously denouncing its bad features. Chapter 7 refines and assesses this commonsense (but undertheorized) moral justification for supporting problematic people, projects, and political symbols, and proposes an analogue of the Doctrine of Double Effect called the Doctrine of Double Endorsement (DDN). DDN proposes that when certain conditions are met, it is morally permissible to directly endorse some object in virtue of its positive properties while standing against its negative properties, even though it would be morally impermissible to directly endorse those negative properties themselves. These conditions include separability (the good and bad features must not be inextricably linked), proportionality (the positive value of the good features must be significantly greater than the negative value of the bad features), and constrained choice (there must not be other things that the agent could endorse instead that share the same positive features but are not saddled with the negative ones). The chapter applies these constraints to a number of practical issues, including (among others) voting for morally troubling candidates, supporting Confederate monuments, and consuming sexist art.","PeriodicalId":354456,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 9","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121063647","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The Normative Structure of Request 请求的规范结构
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 9 Pub Date : 2019-10-24 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198846253.003.0002
Michael Gläser
{"title":"The Normative Structure of Request","authors":"Michael Gläser","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198846253.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198846253.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"Joseph Raz holds that, whereas a commander in issuing her command intends to impose an obligation on the commandee, a requester in making her request purports to create a pro tanto reason for the requestee through her act of request. Chapter 2 uses a series of examples to develop a set of “formal constraints on the concept of request” and then uses these constraints to argue that Raz’s account of request does justice to neither the relation between requester and requestee nor to that between a requester and her own request. The chapter then marshals elements from Kant’s ethics and Elizabeth Anscombe’s work on testimony in order to articulate an alternative conception of the normative structure of request, one according to which request should be understood in terms of a principle obligating requester and requestee to jointly harmonize their ends.","PeriodicalId":354456,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 9","volume":"2 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126785257","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Persons as Things 人即物
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 9 Pub Date : 2019-10-24 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198846253.003.0005
M. Schroeder
{"title":"Persons as Things","authors":"M. Schroeder","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198846253.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198846253.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"Persons are things. We are biological creatures, things of flesh and blood, whose behavior is governed by the same principles that govern the behavior of any other social mammals, plus or minus the complications that come from the recursive possibilities of access to natural language. That much is fact. But to be treated as a thing amounts to a deep insult. To be treated as a thing is to be minimized, rather than engaged with, predicted and controlled rather than reasoned with, written off as the product of our environment rather than appreciated for our unique contributions. Chapter 5 explores what it means to be treated as a thing in a morally problematic way, and argues that the answer must be tempered by the fact that persons are also a kind of thing.","PeriodicalId":354456,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 9","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134473479","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
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