Taking it Personally

Rosalind Chaplin
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Chapter 4 challenges a common dogma of the literature on forgiveness: that forgiveness is the exclusive prerogative of victims. Attacks on third-party forgiveness generally come in two forms. One form of attack suggests that third-party forgiveness is conceptually incoherent (and so impossible). Another form of attack suggests that it is always morally inappropriate for third parties to forgive. This chapter argues against both of these claims; third-party forgiveness is possible, and in some cases it is morally appropriate for third parties to forgive (or refuse to forgive) wrongdoers for wrongs done to victims. The chapter also proposes an explanation of third-parties’ standing to forgive. Third parties have the standing to forgive when it is appropriate for them to take ‘personally’ wrongs done to victims, and this occurs primarily in the context of close relationships. Thus, while the standing to forgive is not grounded exclusively in having been wronged, the prerogative to forgive is normally limited to victims and their loved ones. Once we recognize the importance of third-party forgiveness in our moral lives and the norms that govern it, we can more easily adjudicate between competing accounts of the nature of forgiveness.
把它个人化
第四章挑战了文献中关于宽恕的普遍教条:宽恕是受害者的专属特权。对第三方宽恕的攻击通常有两种形式。一种形式的攻击认为第三方的宽恕在概念上是不连贯的(因此是不可能的)。另一种形式的攻击表明,第三方的宽恕在道德上总是不合适的。本章反驳了这两种说法;第三方的原谅是可能的,在某些情况下,第三方原谅(或拒绝原谅)对受害者所做的错事在道德上是合适的。本章还对第三方的宽恕地位进行了解释。当第三者认为对受害者所做的“个人”错误是合适的时候,他们有宽恕的立场,这主要发生在亲密关系的背景下。因此,虽然宽恕的立场并不完全建立在被冤枉的基础上,但宽恕的特权通常仅限于受害者及其亲人。一旦我们认识到第三方宽恕在我们的道德生活中的重要性,以及支配它的规范,我们就能更容易地在宽恕本质的不同说法之间做出判断。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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