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Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 9最新文献

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Discretionary Moral Duties 自由裁量的道德义务
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 9 Pub Date : 2019-10-24 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198846253.003.0003
R. Wallace
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引用次数: 1
Deontological Decision Theory and the Grounds of Subjective Permissibility 义务论决策理论与主观允许的依据
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 9 Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198846253.003.0010
Seth Lazar
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引用次数: 2
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