Defence Studies最新文献

{"title":"The strategic concept and strategic coherence","authors":"M. Webber, Lawrence Chalmer, Martayn Van de Wall, Hazumu Yano","doi":"10.1080/14702436.2022.2082950","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2022.2082950","url":null,"abstract":"Since the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO has returned to “its roots” (Pacuła 2021, 4). That reorientation has, of course, been sharpened further by the 2022 Ukraine crisis. Countering the Russian threat has once again become firmly established as NATO’s modus operandi (Schreer and Alberque 2022). For many commentators, this clarity of purpose is no bad thing. NATO had, so the argument runs, become over-stretched and ineffectual by taking on difficult missions such as that in Afghanistan where success was always ephemeral (Stapleton 2016). Better then, to concentrate on collective defense and deterrence – missions where NATO’s track-record is strong, its political-military assets well-established, and consensus clear (Ringsmose and Rynning 2021). But what, then, of other security issues? The period since 2010 has been characterized as much by “growing transboundary threats and risks” (Reflection Group 2020) as it has by the return of great-power rivalry (to which concerns about China should be added those relating to Russia). This fluidity of issues is reflected in changing public and political opinion. In 2018, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic and the current Ukraine crisis, polling of security specialists in Europe suggested that cyber was the area where European countries “feel most vulnerable” (followed by worries over external interference in domestic politics) (Dennison et al. 2018). In opinion polling commissioned by the NATO Public Diplomacy Division (2021) in 2019–2020, contagious disease was unsurprisingly ranked as the number one concern of NATO publics followed by economic crisis, climate change, inflation and terrorism. Polling conducted in seven European countries (including five NATO allies) in January 2022, meanwhile, indicated increased public concern over Russia, strong support for the Alliance and even “that most Europeans seem ready to defend Ukraine” (Krastev and Leonard 2022). The events of 2022 might have crystallized a strategic meeting of minds on NATO’s principal threat, but a deeper strategic convergence is not necessarily assured. Secondorder priorities continue to differ among NATO allies. A comprehensive assessment of official security and defense positions (considering 87 official documents across 29 EU","PeriodicalId":35155,"journal":{"name":"Defence Studies","volume":"22 1","pages":"564 - 569"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42359696","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"NATO’s strategic concept: responding to Russia and China","authors":"Ernest Herold, O. Schmitt, S. Sloan","doi":"10.1080/14702436.2022.2082949","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2022.2082949","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Both China and Russia have become more assertive strategic actors since NATO last revised its Strategic Concept in 2010. What major strategic decisions do Russia, China, and other major powers face in the next decade? How should these changes be reflected in the next Strategic Concept? We argue that NATO must seriously address challenges from China and Russia through increased commitment, preparedness, and coordination of the conventional forces Allies make available. This may require a more integrated, ready, and responsive command headquarters that should be agreed by Allies with the 2022 Strategic Concept and implemented without delay.","PeriodicalId":35155,"journal":{"name":"Defence Studies","volume":"22 1","pages":"558 - 563"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47521635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"NATO’s position and role in the Indo-Pacific","authors":"E. Kim, Hans-Dieter Lucas, J. Reynolds, Hazumu Yano","doi":"10.1080/14702436.2022.2082956","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2022.2082956","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT NATO can ill-afford to dismiss the security and military implications of China’s increased presence and its relationship with Russia throughout the Euro-Atlantic area and along its periphery. The Alliance’s strategic calculus must include China across all relevant sectors including: security, economics, technology, and elite capture. The strategic concept should acknowledge that the Alliance needs to improve its awareness of China – starting with the psychology of the leadership in Zhongnanhai. There is no uniform vision amongst Chinese leaders vis-à-vis world order but four theories can be used to foster awareness: (1) moral realism, (2) relationalism, (3) symbiotic theory, and (4) Tianxiaism. Understanding the theoretical underpinnings of Chinese worldviews can help leaders of the Alliance mitigate strategic risk throughout the North Atlantic Area. Another way for NATO to reduce risk is to engage other nations in the Indo-Pacific region. The strategic concept should present a realistic approach to partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region that raise awareness, understanding, and trust with the Alliance. The new Strategic Concept should outline how NATO must do work “under-the-hood” to ensure it has a complete picture of China’s influence throughout the Euro-Atlantic area, starting with the creation of a NATO-China Council.","PeriodicalId":35155,"journal":{"name":"Defence Studies","volume":"22 1","pages":"510 - 515"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43960010","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Developing an enduring role for NATO’s fight against terrorism","authors":"Seth Loertscher, Connor Ingleson, A. Fonseca, T. Norlén, Thomas. Renard, A. Gallo, Rob Stephenson","doi":"10.1080/14702436.2022.2082952","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2022.2082952","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT As NATO drafts its next Strategic Concept, it faces a persistent and more diverse threat from terrorism than when the 2010 Strategic Concept was written. In addition, the Alliance faces greater threats from geopolitical competition, leading to its member states shifting resources away from the fight against terrorism. In drafting of the next Strategic Concept, NATO must continue to prioritize the development of an enduring and sustainable approach to maintain its focus on terrorist threats. This essay argues that a sustainable and enduring approach to fighting terrorism requires NATO to adopt three key tasks (1) improving the Alliance’s defensive capabilities, (2) maintaining its ability to respond to crises and (3) focusing on intelligence sharing. In order to ensure this approach is sustainable for the Alliance, NATO must implement these key tasks by focusing on and integrating terrorism within NATO policy and increasing collaboration with allies and multinational partners.","PeriodicalId":35155,"journal":{"name":"Defence Studies","volume":"22 1","pages":"541 - 547"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45539228","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Producer-client paradigms for defense intelligence","authors":"S. Pothoven, Sebastiaan Rietjens, Peter de Werd","doi":"10.1080/14702436.2022.2089658","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2022.2089658","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article examines how specific characteristics of defense intelligence affect the relationship between intelligence producers and their clients in a manner that is different from prevailing conceptualizations commonly found in civilian intelligence organizations. To do so, the paper first addresses some important distinguishing characteristics of defense intelligence. These include the embedded character of defense intelligence agencies in military organizations, specific military cultural traits and the mixture of military and civilian personnel. Based on literature study and desk research, the paper then identifies three producer-client paradigms: I) distance versus closeness, II) the ideal of analytic objectivity, and III) intelligence lays the foundation for decision-making. Confronting these paradigms with the characteristics of defense intelligence, we find that defense intelligence producer-client relations are more multifaceted, layered and networked than commonly explained.","PeriodicalId":35155,"journal":{"name":"Defence Studies","volume":"23 1","pages":"68 - 85"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47880056","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Uncomfortable neighbors: NATO, Russia and the shifting logic of military exercises in the Baltics","authors":"Andris Banka, M. Bussmann","doi":"10.1080/14702436.2022.2089657","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2022.2089657","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT To what ends do allies employ military exercises? In order to further our understanding regarding the logic and utility of military drills, this paper focuses on NATO’s eastern flank. Specifically, with the help of newly compiled data, we tracked two decades of exercises in the Baltic states. Our analysis speaks to the fact that the size, tempo, and character of military training events in this region have manifestly changed. In the early 2000s, military drills were primarily conceived as a mechanism to modernize Baltic armed forces and ensure their adequacy to NATO membership standards. The 2014 Crimea crises, however, dealt a serious blow to the regional order. This event was the primary driver behind a considerable spike in the overall exercise numbers. At the same time, we observe that it was not only a mere quantitative shift that transpired. From parachute drops into remote areas, rehearsals of river crossings to moving of combat power via narrow land corridors, the staging of military exercises after 2014 were overhauled into events that accentuated NATO’s reinforcement capabilities. In this context, military exercises can be seen as a crucial element to credibly signal capacity and resolve within the concept of deterrence by reinforcement.","PeriodicalId":35155,"journal":{"name":"Defence Studies","volume":"23 1","pages":"1 - 24"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46941911","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The impact of austerity: spending cuts, coping strategies and institutional change in the case of French defense policy","authors":"J. Joana, C. Hoeffler","doi":"10.1080/14702436.2022.2080660","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2022.2080660","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT While much scholarship takes austerity-driven spending cuts as evidence of policy change, this paper shifts the focus to interrogate whether these budgetary cuts lead to actual policy change and if so how. Scholarships on institutional change and public policy illuminate how state actors mediate policy change through coping strategies, i.e. strategies by which state actors try to minimize budget decreases’ negative impacts on policy. Taking French Defense Policy as an unlikely case of policy change, we show that state actors have adopted three types of coping strategies to minimize the spending cuts’ impact: compensation, delaying, and re-categorizing acquisition procedures. These coping strategies have however contributed to a process of incremental change, which most of time is non-cumulative and creates additional policy problems. This article contributes to a better understanding of change underway in defense policies, but also more generally to literatures pertaining to austerity and policy change.","PeriodicalId":35155,"journal":{"name":"Defence Studies","volume":"22 1","pages":"448 - 463"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49627352","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Five good reasons for NATO’s pragmatic approach to offensive cyberspace operations","authors":"M. Jensen","doi":"10.1080/14702436.2022.2080661","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2022.2080661","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT For decades, few NATO members, predominantly the US, had the capabilities to conduct offensive cyberspace operations (OCO). Today more than half of NATO’s members have, or are acquiring, offensive cyberspace operations capabilities (OCOC). Historically, NATO’s planning and coordination is based on shared knowledge of the members’ military capabilities, to a degree even their nuclear capabilities. In the cyber domain, the principle has evolved to include allies’ emerging defensive cyber capabilities. NATO’s approach to OCOC, however, deviates radically: NATO’s doctrine merely integrates OCO’s effects, that is, allow members to contribute with OCOs in operations without sharing information with allies on what OCOCs are available or how the OCOs deliver the effects. OCOC’s technical and tactical characteristics incentivize NATO’s members to keep OCOCs secret, also from allies. This results in a dilemma: Either the allies providing OCOC’s effects risk sharing sensitive information on the means, or the allies, who depend on the provided effects, act without sufficient knowledge of the deployed OCOCs to assess their efficacy, legality, or impact on own offensive or defensive cyber operations. NATO’s limited approach to OCOC is a pragmatic mitigation of the dilemma that allows NATO to train and develop doctrine in the field further.","PeriodicalId":35155,"journal":{"name":"Defence Studies","volume":"22 1","pages":"464 - 488"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46644551","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Two perspectives on littoral warfare","authors":"Alfred Bergström, Charlotta Friedner Parrat","doi":"10.1080/14702436.2022.2080659","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2022.2080659","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The world’s littorals is an important theater for all sorts of human interaction. So, also for naval warfare, which increasingly has led defense planners to focus on littoral capabilities rather than on Mahanian high-sea battles. We address the question of what littoral warfare means for different types of states. To that end, we develop a set of opposing ideal-types with regards to each type’s operational environment, aims, methods, and means for littoral warfare. We then use these ideal-types to analyze the naval doctrines of Sweden, the UK, and the US. This comparison generates some interesting results. For blue-water navies, littoral warfare is an additional burden and a high-risk endeavor, since the littoral, which the planning concerns is somebody else’s. For the small coastal state, correspondingly, littoral warfare is the sole purpose of its navy, and it can focus all its resources there as well as on cooperation with its air force and army, which are necessarily nearby. For blue-water navies, the objective of littoral warfare is to defeat the enemy, whereas for the small coastal state, it is deterrence.","PeriodicalId":35155,"journal":{"name":"Defence Studies","volume":"22 1","pages":"433 - 447"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46330598","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Philippines-U.S. Alliance and 21st Century U.S. Grand strategy in the Indo-Pacific region: from the Obama Administration to the Biden Administration","authors":"R. D. de Castro","doi":"10.1080/14702436.2022.2073224","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2022.2073224","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article situates the Philippines-U.S. alliance within the changing U.S. grand strategies from Barrack Obama’s rebalancing to Asia to President Joe Biden’s continuance of the Trump Administration’s strategic competition with China. Upon President Obama’s announcement of the rebalancing policy in 2011, the Philippines already figured prominently in the American security agenda in Asia, particularly with the intensification of the Philippines-China territorial dispute in the South China Sea. In 2016, President Rodrigo Duterte effected a major shift in Philippine foreign policy by distancing the country from the U.S. and gravitating toward China. The Trump Administration, however, saw the Philippines as a crucial ally in its geostrategic competition with China. Consequently, Washington adopted a policy of strategic patience to bring Duterte onside the U.S. rather than pushing him to China’s embrace. This scheme stabilized the two countries’ security relations and ensured the Philippines’ commitment to the U.S. system of bilateral alliances. In conclusion, the article argues that given the Philippines’ close security ties with the U.S. that often clash with China’s strategic interests and close Philippines-China diplomatic/economic relations, it will be difficult and challenging for President Duterte to pursue an independent foreign policy.","PeriodicalId":35155,"journal":{"name":"Defence Studies","volume":"22 1","pages":"414 - 432"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43874536","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}