The strategic concept and strategic coherence

Since the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO has returned to “its roots” (Pacuła 2021, 4). That reorientation has, of course, been sharpened further by the 2022 Ukraine crisis. Countering the Russian threat has once again become firmly established as NATO’s modus operandi (Schreer and Alberque 2022). For many commentators, this clarity of purpose is no bad thing. NATO had, so the argument runs, become over-stretched and ineffectual by taking on difficult missions such as that in Afghanistan where success was always ephemeral (Stapleton 2016). Better then, to concentrate on collective defense and deterrence – missions where NATO’s track-record is strong, its political-military assets well-established, and consensus clear (Ringsmose and Rynning 2021). But what, then, of other security issues? The period since 2010 has been characterized as much by “growing transboundary threats and risks” (Reflection Group 2020) as it has by the return of great-power rivalry (to which concerns about China should be added those relating to Russia). This fluidity of issues is reflected in changing public and political opinion. In 2018, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic and the current Ukraine crisis, polling of security specialists in Europe suggested that cyber was the area where European countries “feel most vulnerable” (followed by worries over external interference in domestic politics) (Dennison et al. 2018). In opinion polling commissioned by the NATO Public Diplomacy Division (2021) in 2019–2020, contagious disease was unsurprisingly ranked as the number one concern of NATO publics followed by economic crisis, climate change, inflation and terrorism. Polling conducted in seven European countries (including five NATO allies) in January 2022, meanwhile, indicated increased public concern over Russia, strong support for the Alliance and even “that most Europeans seem ready to defend Ukraine” (Krastev and Leonard 2022). The events of 2022 might have crystallized a strategic meeting of minds on NATO’s principal threat, but a deeper strategic convergence is not necessarily assured. Secondorder priorities continue to differ among NATO allies. A comprehensive assessment of official security and defense positions (considering 87 official documents across 29 EU