{"title":"Linkage Politics","authors":"Joshua R. Shifrinson","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190908645.003.0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190908645.003.0013","url":null,"abstract":"Most discussions of cross-domain deterrence focus on variation in the means of coercion, but variation in political ends can be just as consequential. Cross-domain deterrence in the context of linkage politics, in which disparate political interests are tied together to create incentives for favorable outcomes, gives potential adversaries the opportunity to avoid confrontational meeting engagements by playing for time to clarify interests and choosing the means most suited to achieving new goals. A broader diplomatic conception of cross-domain deterrence can also highlight the potential of using financial, institutional, or other nonmilitary actions that render the threat or use of force less attractive. This chapter draws on newly available archival evidence to examine issue linkage politics in the context of changing strategic interests in the case of U.S. efforts to deter Soviet repression in Poland and East Germany at the end of the Cold War. In both cases, U.S. policymakers used diplomatic reassurance and threats of isolation to shape Soviet policy as the United States pressed its new-found political interests in Eastern Europe rather than its traditional preoccupation with military affairs.","PeriodicalId":340825,"journal":{"name":"Cross-Domain Deterrence","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130772704","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Antisatellite Weapons and the Growing Instability of Deterrence","authors":"B. Bahney, Jonathan Pearl, M. Markey","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190908645.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190908645.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"During the Cold War, satellite capabilities reinforced nuclear deterrence because the superpowers relied on them to reinforce second-strike stability for nuclear weapons. Antisatellite technology was deployed, but it was also immature. Today, the broader use of space for conventional power projection, together with more mature target discrimination and antisatellite technology, create strong incentives for both the United States and its adversaries to conduct counter-space operations. The United States’ military power projection is utterly dependent on space assets for command, control, communications, intelligence, and targeting, but satellites are increasingly vulnerable to antisatellite capabilities, including not only direct attacks on satellites but also indirect cyber and electronic warfare interference on satellites, links, and ground-based control infrastructure. Several cross-domain options are available for deterrence both by denial (the threat of effective defense) and by punishment (the threat of retaliation). Unfortunately, the lack of shared norms regarding space warfare has uncertain consequences for escalation dynamics.","PeriodicalId":340825,"journal":{"name":"Cross-Domain Deterrence","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131870647","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Air Power versus Ground Forces","authors":"Phil Haun","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190908645.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190908645.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"Classical deterrence concepts were developed to prevent nuclear war, for obvious reasons, and thus tend to focus on high-stakes crisis bargaining, or “chicken” games, to both threaten and avoid Armageddon. Yet deterrence may operate in many different settings (i.e., different games) and with repeated interactions by the players. Indeed, deterrence is prevalent, if underappreciated, at the operational level of war, even when a state is attacking at the strategic level. Drawing on a number of historical examples, this chapter argues that command of the air over the battlefield is operationally valuable because it deters ground forces from massing and maneuvering, which can benefit either offensive and defensive operations. The degree to which an air force can deter in war depends on various operational factors, including the degree of air superiority achieved over the battlefield, the capability of the air force to locate and target enemy ground forces, the composition of enemy forces, the presence of friendly ground forces, and permissive environmental conditions.","PeriodicalId":340825,"journal":{"name":"Cross-Domain Deterrence","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121184847","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Asymmetric Advantage","authors":"Kelly M. Greenhill","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190908645.003.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190908645.003.0012","url":null,"abstract":"A widely held belief in deterrence theory, first articulated by Thomas Schelling, is that compellence is harder than deterrence. This chapter finds, however, that weak actors have often been able to successfully use coercive engineered migration to compel stronger states to alter their policies. The aims of coercive engineered migration vary tremendously and usually include political, military, and economic goals. Liberal democracies are especially vulnerable to this particular means of coercion, even as they have important advantages in other arenas. This novel example of compellence that relies on a nonmilitary form of cross-domain coercion shows very convincingly that a difference in means in the right context can have a major differential effect on the success or failure of coercion.","PeriodicalId":340825,"journal":{"name":"Cross-Domain Deterrence","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126527311","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Past and Future of Deterrence Theory","authors":"P. Morgan","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190908645.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190908645.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"Renewed interest in deterrence today has been stimulated by the way recent efforts to sustain security and stability in international politics have often been unevenly successful or not successful at all. Efforts to deter, contain, and end conflict—whether terrorism, intrastate ethnic, religious and political fighting, and interstate fighting—have frequently run into difficulty. There is serious disarray in the East-West deterrence relationship once again, after a brief Cold War hiatus, with disturbing possibilities of outright conflict now being openly discussed among analysts and observers. Part of the reason that deterrence is so challenged today is that the very concept of deterrence—including cross-domain deterrence—has become seriously overstretched to apply to far more than it reasonably can, or should.","PeriodicalId":340825,"journal":{"name":"Cross-Domain Deterrence","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133279373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Deterrence in and through Cyberspace","authors":"Jacquelyn G. Schneider","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190908645.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190908645.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"Most of the discussion of cyber deterrence has been plagued by ambiguity and a lack of precedent, and this imprecision has resulted in vague or partially implemented policies. This chapter reviews debates about the definition of cyber operations and cyber deterrence, distinguishing the use of cyberspace to support deterrence in other domains and the deterrence of actions in cyberspace itself. The author finds that uncertainty is a resounding theme in this literature, which poses both challenges and opportunities for cross-domain deterrence. Cyber-enabled military capabilities might both bolster U.S. deterrence policies and incentivize attack. In cyber as well as in space, the United States confronts a difficult paradox of capability and vulnerability.","PeriodicalId":340825,"journal":{"name":"Cross-Domain Deterrence","volume":"74 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128400609","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Beyond Military Deterrence","authors":"Chin-Hao Huang, David C. Kang","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190908645.003.0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190908645.003.0014","url":null,"abstract":"States interact in a multiplicity of domains, and most of them are not military in nature. Situating the security domain alongside economic and social domains of interaction among countries is important for creating a full analysis of a state’s priorities in a particular region, or with any particular other state. Failure to appreciate the nonmilitary dimensions of international relations in Asia in particular can lead one to misdiagnose the prospects of conflict and cooperation, potentially leading to tragic spirals. Data on East Asian defense spending over twenty-five years appears to present a puzzle: by many measures, East Asian military expenditures have declined significantly over the past quarter century. This finding appears starkly at odds with the conventional wisdom that Chinese bellicosity, its expenditure on anti-access/area-denial capabilities, and the United States’ reallocation of forces are increasing tensions in the region. Any policy of cross-domain deterrence that fails to appreciate interactions across the full multiplicity of domains of international intercourse risks courting deterrence failure.","PeriodicalId":340825,"journal":{"name":"Cross-Domain Deterrence","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129808527","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Signaling with Secrets","authors":"B. Green, A. Long","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190908645.003.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190908645.003.0010","url":null,"abstract":"How do you credibly communicate a threat that you cannot reveal? This problem is endemic for modern space and cyberspace capabilities, but the challenge of secrecy constraints in cross-domain deterrence is not a new phenomenon. During the late Cold War, nuclear forces deterred conventional attack, theater nuclear forces deterred strategic nuclear escalation, and conventional threats to nuclear capabilities deterred conventional attack. Some of these capabilities, particularly intelligence collection and electronic datalinks, depended on sensitive tactics and technologies that could not be revealed lest the enemy develop effective countermeasures. Secrecy created uncertainty about the true balance of power, which should have made conflict more likely, according to rationalist theory. This chapter shows, however, that the United States was able to use several mechanisms to communicate its capabilities to the Soviet Union without thoroughly compromising the ability to use them. Leveraging historical evidence from senior Soviet leadership, the chapter argues that U.S. nuclear counterforce strategy, which leveraged clandestine capabilities in many domains, nevertheless was effective in shaping Soviet perceptions and influencing Soviet policy.","PeriodicalId":340825,"journal":{"name":"Cross-Domain Deterrence","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128964179","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cross-Domain Deterrence in American Foreign Policy","authors":"M. Nacht, P. Schuster, Evamaría Uribe","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190908645.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190908645.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter assesses the role of cross-domain deterrence in recent American foreign policy. Cross-domain deterrence is not a new phenomenon, even if our consciousness of it may be. Prominent cases from the Cold War, such as the Korean War and the Cuban Missile Crisis, can be interpreted through the lens of cross-domain deterrence and fruitfully compared with more contemporary cases, such as the Stuxnet attack on Iran. These cases illustrate the variation across domains by the adversary and U.S. responses. Considered together, the United States generally responded to these crises by initially limiting itself to the domain where a crisis started and only later expanding into other domains. The United States has typically been cautious when shifting domains and has tried to escalate in ways that would not produce adversarial retaliation.","PeriodicalId":340825,"journal":{"name":"Cross-Domain Deterrence","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123734378","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Sea Power versus Land Power","authors":"J. Rovner","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190908645.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190908645.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"The concept of cross-domain deterrence can shed new light on one of the most famous wars in the history of international relations. In ancient Greece, Athens enjoyed unquestioned maritime superiority, and Sparta was the dominant land power. Both sides played to their competitive advantage, but they failed to prevent a war. Yet while cross-domain deterrence failed when both sides wanted it to succeed, it also succeeded when both sides wanted it to fail. Neither side was able to engineer a decisive confrontation in its preferred domain that might have forced the other to capitulate, which resulted in a costly, protracted war. This novel interpretation of a classic case challenges popular characterizations of cross-domain strategic dynamics as rapid and unstable; they can also be slow and stabilizing. Similar cross-domain disparities two millennia later in Asia, for example, have the potential to make any conflict between China and the United States longer, more costly, and less decisive than either side perhaps expects.","PeriodicalId":340825,"journal":{"name":"Cross-Domain Deterrence","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126466283","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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