{"title":"Simplicity and Complexity in the Nth Nuclear Era","authors":"R. Lehman","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190908645.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190908645.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"Exploring cross-domain deterrence and nuclear deterrence in parallel can be useful. It can also be confusing. As we compare and contrast, we need to keep in mind several questions: What are the domains that matter? What organizations and strategies govern them? What capabilities does each bring to the deterrence calculus? How do they interact? And when and why would conflict in one domain be introduced into the other domains? Comparing, contrasting, and synthesizing these deterrence issues related to nuclear, conventional, unconventional, air and missile defense, electromagnetic, cyber, and space operations is an excellent exercise for promoting new thinking about deterrence in all its dimensions and coming to grips with the fundamental complexity of modern strategic affairs.","PeriodicalId":340825,"journal":{"name":"Cross-Domain Deterrence","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123663053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"International Law and the Common Knowledge Requirements of Cross-Domain Deterrence","authors":"J. D. Morrow","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190908645.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190908645.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"The complexity of cross-domain deterrence is a major barrier to establishing coordinated expectations about violations and consequences. For a system of cross-domain deterrence to work, actors must understand what actions will trigger a response, what the response is likely to be, and how willing the respondent is to act. Any such system is likely to be less robust than Cold War nuclear deterrence because of the number of domains involved, constraints on revealing secret capabilities or even the identity of the challenger, and a propensity for provocations that fall below the established threshold of response. This chapter recommends using an analogy to the law of war rather than to nuclear deterrence to understand the possibilities of setting up a workable regime of cross-domain deterrence, even as the author is pessimistic about the ability of any collective regime to adequately manage the complexity of cross-domain deterrence.","PeriodicalId":340825,"journal":{"name":"Cross-Domain Deterrence","volume":"78 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129643098","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Extended Deterrence and Assurance in Multiple Domains","authors":"Rupal N. Mehta","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190908645.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190908645.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"Cross-domain deterrence must contend not only with the technological complexity of modern military power but also with the political complexity of alliance relationships. The proliferation of domains might affect commitments to allies. This chapter draws on the precedent of the U.S. nuclear triad and the underappreciated relationship between platform diversity and the credibility of commitments. As it turns out, the advent of intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles inadvertently undermined U.S. deterrence commitments in East Asia and Western Europe. This chapter argues that the plethora of capabilities emerging in the twenty-first century will enable allies and adversaries alike to engage in risky behavior while undermining the United States’ willingness to intervene overseas. The chapter concludes with implications for U.S. polity and that of its alliance partners, as well as predictions about the general evolution of extended deterrence strategies in an increasingly cross-domain system.","PeriodicalId":340825,"journal":{"name":"Cross-Domain Deterrence","volume":"131 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128633462","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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