Antisatellite Weapons and the Growing Instability of Deterrence

B. Bahney, Jonathan Pearl, M. Markey
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引用次数: 5

Abstract

During the Cold War, satellite capabilities reinforced nuclear deterrence because the superpowers relied on them to reinforce second-strike stability for nuclear weapons. Antisatellite technology was deployed, but it was also immature. Today, the broader use of space for conventional power projection, together with more mature target discrimination and antisatellite technology, create strong incentives for both the United States and its adversaries to conduct counter-space operations. The United States’ military power projection is utterly dependent on space assets for command, control, communications, intelligence, and targeting, but satellites are increasingly vulnerable to antisatellite capabilities, including not only direct attacks on satellites but also indirect cyber and electronic warfare interference on satellites, links, and ground-based control infrastructure. Several cross-domain options are available for deterrence both by denial (the threat of effective defense) and by punishment (the threat of retaliation). Unfortunately, the lack of shared norms regarding space warfare has uncertain consequences for escalation dynamics.
反卫星武器和日益不稳定的威慑
冷战期间,卫星能力加强了核威慑,因为超级大国依靠它们来加强核武器的二次打击稳定性。部署了反卫星技术,但也不成熟。如今,太空在常规力量投射方面的广泛应用,以及更成熟的目标识别和反卫星技术,为美国及其对手开展反太空行动创造了强大的动力。美国的军事力量投送完全依赖于太空资产进行指挥、控制、通信、情报和瞄准,但卫星越来越容易受到反卫星能力的攻击,不仅包括对卫星的直接攻击,还包括对卫星、链路和地面控制基础设施的间接网络和电子战干扰。通过拒绝(有效防御的威胁)和惩罚(报复的威胁),可以使用几种跨域选项来进行威慑。不幸的是,缺乏关于太空战的共同规范对升级动态产生了不确定的后果。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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