发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Aggregation of Information by Binary Voting Rules 基于二元投票规则的信息聚合
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1 Pub Date : 2019-02-28 DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469733.013.7
S. Nitzan, Jacob Paroush
{"title":"Aggregation of Information by Binary Voting Rules","authors":"S. Nitzan, Jacob Paroush","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469733.013.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469733.013.7","url":null,"abstract":"A group of individuals faces the choice of an alternative out of a set of alternatives. Each member of the group holds an opinion regarding the most suitable (best) alternative for which he or she votes. In this setting, the individual votes are based on their decisional competencies, which hinge on the information to which they are exposed and on their ability to make use of that information. The main question is how to translate the group members’ voting profile to a single collective choice. This chapter studies different aspects of this question in the context of binary voting where the group faces only two alternatives. The selection of an appropriate aggregation rule is a central issue in the fields of social choice, public choice, voting theory, and collective decision making. Since the votes are based on the individual competencies, the applied aggregation rule should take into account not only the voting profile but also the competency profile. In fact, it should also take into consideration any other relevant environmental information such as the asymmetry between the feasible alternatives, the dependence between individual votes, decision-making costs, and the available past record of the voters’ decisions. The chapter focuses on the clarification of the relationship between the performance of binary aggregation rules and the relevant variables and parameters. This has direct normative implications regarding the desirable mode of collective decision making and, in particular, regarding the desirable aggregation rule and the size and the composition of the decision-making body.","PeriodicalId":328044,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1","volume":"430 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132907272","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Spatial Social Choice 空间社会选择
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1 Pub Date : 2019-02-28 DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469733.013.11
N. Schofield
{"title":"Spatial Social Choice","authors":"N. Schofield","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469733.013.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469733.013.11","url":null,"abstract":"A key concept of social choice is the idea of the Condorcet point or core. For example, consider a voting game with four participants so any three will win. If voters have Euclidean preferences, then the point at the center will be unbeaten. Earlier spatial models of social choice focused on deterministic voter choice. However, it is clear that voter choice is intrinsically stochastic. This chapter employs a stochastic model based on multinomial logit to examine whether parties in electoral competition tend to converge toward the electoral center or respond to activist pressure to adopt more polarized policies. The chapter discusses experimental results of the idea of the core explores empirical analyses of elections in Israel and the United States.","PeriodicalId":328044,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117244578","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The Study of Strategic Voting 策略性投票研究
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1 Pub Date : 2019-02-28 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.14
A. Blais, Arianna Degan
{"title":"The Study of Strategic Voting","authors":"A. Blais, Arianna Degan","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.14","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter stresses the necessity of distinguishing between a strategic vote and a strategic voter. The sincere voter always casts a sincere vote, while the strategic voter casts a sincere or strategic vote depending on the context and the voting rule. This leads to two definitions of strategic voting: a broad one, where a strategic vote is one that is partly based on expectations about the outcome of the election, and a narrow one, where a strategic vote also entails not voting sincerely. The chapter then reviews three types of empirical research that differ with respect to the type of data used: the observation of electoral outcomes, survey data, and lab experiments. That literature has confirmed that indeed some voters cast a strategic vote, though many studies have found most votes to be sincere. That research has also shown that there is some degree of strategic voting under all kinds of voting rules; that, contrary to conventional wisdom, there is as much strategic voting under proportional representation as under plurality rule; and that the propensity to vote strategically depends very much on the type of information that is available.","PeriodicalId":328044,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1","volume":"111 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124787715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Stochastic Process Models of Preference Change 偏好变化的随机过程模型
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1 Pub Date : 2019-02-28 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.34
Michel Regenwetter, Yung-Fong Hsu
{"title":"Stochastic Process Models of Preference Change","authors":"Michel Regenwetter, Yung-Fong Hsu","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.34","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.34","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter gives an informal summary of a research program aiming to develop and test stochastic process models of preference change. What does it take to develop a formally precise and descriptively valid model of persuasion? Any such model should specify formally concise definitions of hypothetical constructs such as preferences or attitudes. The chapter reviews weak order and semiorder models of preferences that are grounded in decision theory. Such a model should also spell out how hypothetical constructs relate to observable behavior, such as feeling thermometer ratings. The chapter reviews response processes that, in some cases, accommodate within and across respondent heterogeneity in overt behavior. The model should furthermore specify formally what it means to change one’s preference over time and how that change relates to the persuasive environment. The chapter treats preference change as a continuous time stochastic process on a graph of preference states. The most innovative feature of the approach is to model the (perceived) persuasive environment itself also as a hypothetical construct that is not directly/objectively observable by the researcher. Last but not least, the chapter discusses how to accommodate partisan differences, how to incorporate respondents with immutable preferences, and the possibility that respondents may tune in and out of a persuasive campaign. The emphasis of the chapter lies in explaining key conceptual ideas grounded in decision theory and mathematical psychology.","PeriodicalId":328044,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116347148","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Leadership as Persuasion 作为说服的领导
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1 Pub Date : 2019-02-28 DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469733.013.35
Benjamin E. Hermalin
{"title":"Leadership as Persuasion","authors":"Benjamin E. Hermalin","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469733.013.35","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469733.013.35","url":null,"abstract":"Persuasion can be seen as a strategic setting—a game—in which a better-informed individual (a sender) seeks to influence what a less well-informed individual (a receiver) knows. The tension in such a game arises because the interests of sender and receiver are not fully aligned. Leaders often have incentives to mislead their followers. How leaders can communicate credibly to their followers has recently become a topic of study. This chapter surveys and synthesizes that literature. It offers an introduction to sender-receiver games and considers ways in which the problem of an untrustworthy leader may be overcome. At the end the chapter offers some directions for future research.","PeriodicalId":328044,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132340245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Voting Power 投票权
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1 Pub Date : 2019-02-11 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.6
S. Napel
{"title":"Voting Power","authors":"S. Napel","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.6","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter investigates ways to quantify how institutional rules, such as different voting weight arrangements in councils or two-tier voting systems, allocate influence on outcomes among the collective decision makers. After basic concepts of the common binary voting framework have been laid out, several indices of voting power are introduced with their key properties and probabilistic interpretations. Techniques for the computation of these indices, limit results for large voting bodies, and the problem of designing rules with desirable power implications are discussed. The chapter also points out possibilities to analyze the distribution of influence in scenarios richer than just binary voting.","PeriodicalId":328044,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1","volume":"188 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127592358","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Corruption 腐败
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1 Pub Date : 2019-02-11 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.30
Toke S. Aidt
{"title":"Corruption","authors":"Toke S. Aidt","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.30","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.30","url":null,"abstract":"Corruption, understood as a special means by which private agents may seek to pursue their interest in competition for preferential treatment by government officials or politicians and where the “means” are valued by the recipient, is viewed by most social scientists as a major obstacle to economic, political, and social development and a source of inefficiency. This chapter presents a framework and taxonomy for the study of corruption. Within this framework, corruption is conceptualized as a particular instance of the more general social phenomena we call influence-seeking activities. The chapter provides an overview of theoretical models of corruption, summarizes cross-country evidence on the causes and consequences of corruption, and evaluates the recent literature on laboratory, field, and quasi-natural experiments.","PeriodicalId":328044,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1","volume":"2014 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127589302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Manipulation 操纵
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1 Pub Date : 2019-02-11 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.46
C. Plott
{"title":"Manipulation","authors":"C. Plott","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.46","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.46","url":null,"abstract":"Systematic opportunities for manipulation emerge as a by-product of the structure of all group decision processes. Theory suggests that no process is immune. The study of manipulation provides principles and insights about how parts of complex decision systems work together and how changes in one part can have broad impact. Thus, manipulation strategies are derived from many features of voting processes. Public choice theory highlights relationships among group choice, rules, and individual decisions. The theory is a source of surprises and paradoxes that suggests tools for manipulation of group choices. This chapter catalogs many of the surprises that harbor potential sources of manipulation in the hope that a deeper understanding of manipulation will produce better systems.","PeriodicalId":328044,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124893220","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Rational Choice and Politics 理性选择与政治
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1 Pub Date : 2019-02-11 DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469733.013.1
Roger D. Congleton
{"title":"Rational Choice and Politics","authors":"Roger D. Congleton","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469733.013.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469733.013.1","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter introduces readers to the methodology and research of public choice. The chapter is divided into two parts. The first discusses the methodology of the public choice research program, explaining the logic behind the rational choice principle and the development of rational choice models. There is much about politics that can be understood as the direct consequence of purposeful behavior, from public policies and electoral outcomes to institutional design and evolution. The second half of the chapter provides a short overview of the core results and puzzles explored by the public choice research program. These can roughly be divided into the theories of elections, interest group politics, and constitutional political economy. In addition, there are a variety of results from empirical tests of those theories and positive and normative methodological issues. Although a good deal of specialization has emerged in the past half century of public choice research, the various specialties continue to use the rational choice principle as their point of departure, as well as the models and findings of early public choice research.","PeriodicalId":328044,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121165568","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Rent Seeking 寻租
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1 Pub Date : 2019-02-11 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.24
A. Hillman, N. Long
{"title":"Rent Seeking","authors":"A. Hillman, N. Long","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.24","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.24","url":null,"abstract":"Contestable benefits or rents are of primary importance for the study of public finance and public policy. Rents are assigned through decisions about budgetary spending and taxation. Public policy creates and assigns rents through decisions about regulation of competition, international trade, the environment, foreign aid, and more. Contestable rents are also found outside of government, for example in academia, or when contests take place for mates. There is a social loss when resources and initiative used in contesting rents could have been used productively. Lack of data and denial by successful rent seekers that rent seeking took place are obstacles to direct measurement of social loss. Contest models are therefore used to infer magnitudes of social loss. The models show conditions under which the observable value of a rent can be used to approximate the generally unobservable value of resources used in contesting the rent. The generic contest model describes social losses when individuals seek a personal benefit. Social losses are diminished when, as is characteristic of democracies, groups contest collective benefits. Views on the importance of rent seeking can be influenced by ideology. Government as seeking to maximize social welfare is inconsistent with political creation of contestable rents that are assigned for privileged benefit.","PeriodicalId":328044,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131189531","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
首页 上一页 下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信