发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Supreme Values, Totalitarianism, and Terrorism 至上价值观、极权主义和恐怖主义
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1 Pub Date : 2019-02-28 DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469733.013.43
P. Bernholz
{"title":"Supreme Values, Totalitarianism, and Terrorism","authors":"P. Bernholz","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469733.013.43","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469733.013.43","url":null,"abstract":"Totalitarian regimes and terrorist groups striving to create them are characterized by ideologies with lexicographic preference orderings. This means that they demand that their followers sacrifice everything, if required, including the lives of others and of themselves to reach the aims postulated. More than twenty such regimes have existed, from the Mongolian and Aztec Empires among the first, to much later Nazi Germany and the Communist Soviet Union, and in recent years to the rule of the Taliban in Afghanistan and ISIS in Syria and Iraq. This means that the respective ideologies are usually very different, but that all follow a lexicographic preference order. This chapter studies the development, success, and demise of such regimes, which usually persecute, torture, and even kill nonbelievers, and often are engaged in bloody wars of expansion with many victims. This is also the case concerning their secularly or religiously based aims, which, moreover, characteristically control their behavior concerning the lifestyle of their populations, the arts, and their culture. Totalitarian regimes that have reached their aims are called mature ideocracies. They are characterized by the fact that the whole population has accepted (or at least pretends to accept) the ruling ideology.","PeriodicalId":328044,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1","volume":"633 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116479079","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Social Contract versus Invisible Hand 社会契约vs无形之手
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1 Pub Date : 2019-02-28 DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469733.013.38
V. Vanberg
{"title":"Social Contract versus Invisible Hand","authors":"V. Vanberg","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469733.013.38","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469733.013.38","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this chapter is to take a closer look at the relation between the invisible hand paradigm that is at the heart of economists’ theoretical outlook at markets and its “visible hand” counterpart, the social contract paradigm as a theory of government. It is argued that in its generalized interpretation as an individualistic model of organized collective action the social contract paradigm consistently complements the invisible hand paradigm as an individualistic theory of spontaneous social order. What Hayek has referred to as “the two kinds of order,” spontaneous order and corporate order, can thus be accounted for within one coherent individualistic theoretical framework.","PeriodicalId":328044,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123987837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Information Cues and Rational Ignorance 信息线索与理性无知
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1 Pub Date : 2019-02-28 DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469733.013.19
S. Bowler, Stephen P. Nicholson
{"title":"Information Cues and Rational Ignorance","authors":"S. Bowler, Stephen P. Nicholson","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469733.013.19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469733.013.19","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter addresses the role of cue taking by citizens. Cue taking is a way to answer the question: can democracy work when most of the public is rationally ignorant? The cue-taking literature gives a resounding “yes” as an answer to this question. This chapter elaborates upon the reasons for this answer and the conditions under which it holds. There are, however, reasons to be cautious in being too optimistic about this answer. While cue-taking behavior is both present and helpful, it is not infallible. The chapter also notes the times when cue-taking behavior does not really allow one to say that it is a panacea so far as democratic decision making is concerned.","PeriodicalId":328044,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1","volume":"420 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122946545","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
From Paired Comparisons and Cycles to Arrow’s Theorem 从配对比较和循环到阿罗定理
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1 Pub Date : 2019-02-28 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.4
D. Saari
{"title":"From Paired Comparisons and Cycles to Arrow’s Theorem","authors":"D. Saari","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.4","url":null,"abstract":"What makes paired comparisons so easy to accept is that they arise everywhere, and an appealing aspect of this approach is that it directly compares the merits of two opponents. However, paired comparisons can generate a wide array of difficulties that can lead to what appear to be paradoxes. Preference aggregation based solely on pairwise comparisons is at the heart of Arrow’s theorem. This chapter indicates that the Arrow impossibility result is a special case of a more generic type of problem involving parts and whole, and it offers an interpretation of it that shows that it does not have the implications for democratic theory that it is commonly assumed to have.","PeriodicalId":328044,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127417611","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Political Economy of Rent Creation and Rent Extraction 地租创造与地租榨取的政治经济学
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1 Pub Date : 2019-02-28 DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469733.013.26
Roger D. Congleton
{"title":"The Political Economy of Rent Creation and Rent Extraction","authors":"Roger D. Congleton","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469733.013.26","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469733.013.26","url":null,"abstract":"Rent Creation, Rent Extraction, and Rent Seeking are closely related concepts whose relationships are often misunderstood. For example, neither rent extraction nor rent seeking are possible until rents are created. Both rent extraction and rent seeking thus begin with the creation of rents. If one begins with the Hobbesian perspective on anarchy, all rents are ultimately the creation of government policies. Civil law determines what it means to own something, which includes an owner’s claims on the rents associated with his or her property and private activities. One in place, civil law also allows the possibility that rents can be created through private actions. Public policy may alter those claims through changes in use and rent-extraction rights associated with ownership. Such policies may create new rents or redistribute existing rents. In doing so, such policies induce rent-seeking efforts (or not) depending on the policies adopted and the manner in which rents are distributed. The welfare gains and losses associated with the various procedures for rent creation, rent seeking, and rent extraction imply that prohibitions against many, but not all, forms of rent extraction are warranted.","PeriodicalId":328044,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125079818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
Interest Groups and Regulatory Capture 利益集团和监管俘获
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1 Pub Date : 2019-02-28 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.29
W. Shughart, D. Thomas
{"title":"Interest Groups and Regulatory Capture","authors":"W. Shughart, D. Thomas","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.29","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.29","url":null,"abstract":"Economic orthodoxy before 1971 suggested that regulatory intervention could improve on market outcomes in cases of market power, negative spillover effects, or asymmetric information. That orthodoxy was overturned in 1971 with the publication of George Stigler’s “Theory of Economic Regulation,” which concludes that regulatory agencies are vulnerable to capture by special interest groups who shape regulatory outcomes in ways that benefit the regulated industry itself at consumers’ expense. Many empirical studies have since then confirmed Stigler’s theoretical insights. This chapter summarizes the major theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature on economic regulation, provides an overview of the various groups that can capture the regulatory process, and summarizes more recent contributions highlighting regulation’s regressive effects and the “revolving door” between regulatory agencies and regulated firms.","PeriodicalId":328044,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114671912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Spatial Voting Models of Party Competition in Two Dimensions 二维政党竞争的空间投票模型
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1 Pub Date : 2019-02-28 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.10
James Adams
{"title":"Spatial Voting Models of Party Competition in Two Dimensions","authors":"James Adams","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.10","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter broadly surveys spatial voting models of party competition in two dimensions, where, in Western democracies, the first dimension is typically the left-right dimension pertaining to policy debates over income redistribution and government intervention in the economy. The second dimension may encompass policy debates over issues that cross-cut the left-right economic dimension, or it may encompass universally valued “valence” dimensions of party evaluation such as parties’ images for competence, integrity, and leadership ability. The chapter reviews models with office-seeking and policy-seeking parties. It also surveys both the theoretical and the empirical literatures on these topics.","PeriodicalId":328044,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116983043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Primaries, Conventions, and Other Methods for Nominating Candidates 提名候选人的初选、大会和其他方法
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1 Pub Date : 2019-02-28 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.21
Gilles Serra
{"title":"Primaries, Conventions, and Other Methods for Nominating Candidates","authors":"Gilles Serra","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.21","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.21","url":null,"abstract":"The way political parties select their candidates should be considered a fundamental topic in political science. In spite of being profoundly consequential in several regards, candidate selection methods were understudied for a long time in the academic literature. A renewed awareness of the implications of different nomination rules, along with an increased use of primary elections around the world, has accelerated this research in the last two decades. This chapter reviews the main areas of inquiry regarding candidate selection as reflected in contemporary research. It surveys the most recent literature asking four broad questions about candidate selection methods: What types are there? What consequences do they have? What are their origins? What questions can be formulated for future research? The chapter aims to convey that research on candidate selection is important, growing, and full of open questions.","PeriodicalId":328044,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1","volume":"65 3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131612516","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Public Choice and Social Democracy 公共选择与社会民主
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1 Pub Date : 2019-02-28 DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469733.013.36
Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard
{"title":"Public Choice and Social Democracy","authors":"Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469733.013.36","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469733.013.36","url":null,"abstract":"Since World War I, “social democracy” has been one of the most influential political ideas. It refers to a partisan political movement, an ideological orientation, and a set of political institutions. Common denominators are the extension of democracy to socioeconomic spheres and an expansion of government activities beyond those of merely providing national security, law and order, and a narrow set of public goods. However, such a program would seem problematic given a number of insights offered by public choice theory: All forms of majority decisions are sensitive to even small changes in the procedures and are likely to produce outcomes not preferred by a majority. Majority decisions also risk producing Pareto-inferior outcomes, especially when costs can be imposed on others. And the fewer constitutional limits on government activities there are, the larger the extent of rent seeking with associated welfare losses is likely to be. Together these points are significant challenges to a program that wants to extend majority decision to new spheres while simultaneously promising prosperity for all.","PeriodicalId":328044,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127027874","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Choosing among Governments 在政府间进行选择
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1 Pub Date : 2019-02-28 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.2
A. Hamlin
{"title":"Choosing among Governments","authors":"A. Hamlin","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.2","url":null,"abstract":"While public choice theory is generally skeptical about government, challenging the assumptions that often underpin arguments for government or for governmental action in particular circumstances, it is also generally supportive of a particular form of government: constitutionally limited democracy. Public choice theory emphasizes choice and agreement in relation to constitutional government at several levels: the choice of government over anarchy, the choice of constitutional arrangements and rules, the choice of particular government administrations under democracy, and the choice of policy by governments acting within the constitution. This chapter sketches out these various levels discussing the relevant sense of “choice” at each level and identifying the key procedural and substantive issues involved in democratic constitutional design.","PeriodicalId":328044,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1","volume":"91 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126047048","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
首页 上一页 下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信