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The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1最新文献

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Fair Division in Dispute Resolution 争议解决的公平划分
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1 Pub Date : 2019-02-28 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.44
S. Brams
{"title":"Fair Division in Dispute Resolution","authors":"S. Brams","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.44","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.44","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter describes a mechanism, applicable to two-party disputes, for dividing divisible items fairly. The mechanism, called adjusted winner, provides a way to determine which contested items, which may be either goods or issues, each party wins entirely, and which single good or issue must be divided, to satisfy three properties of fair division: envy-freeness, efficiency, and equitability. The mechanism has been applied to disputes ranging from interpersonal to international. This chapter applies it to the dispute between Israel and Egypt that was settled, under the auspices of US President Jimmy Carter, at Camp David in 1978.","PeriodicalId":328044,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123381316","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Empirical Evidence on Rent-Seeking Costs 寻租成本的实证研究
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1 Pub Date : 2019-02-28 DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469733.013.27
Ignacio del Rosal
{"title":"Empirical Evidence on Rent-Seeking Costs","authors":"Ignacio del Rosal","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469733.013.27","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469733.013.27","url":null,"abstract":"The literature on rent seeking has proven to be very fruitful in its theoretical dimension. However, empirical attempts to estimate the effects of rent seeking have shown that the measure of the rent-seeking costs is elusive. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an updated review of the empirical literature that has sought to estimate the social cost of rent seeking. The most relevant papers are classified, analyzed, and then summarized. An important lesson is that the complete dissipation hypothesis should not be assumed without further explanation, as the papers that address this question show that dissipation is far from complete.","PeriodicalId":328044,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127401532","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Altruism and Political Participation 利他主义与政治参与
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1 Pub Date : 2019-02-28 DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469733.013.17
Richard Jankowski
{"title":"Altruism and Political Participation","authors":"Richard Jankowski","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469733.013.17","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469733.013.17","url":null,"abstract":"Democratic government requires the participation of its citizens, but Downs shows that it is not in the self-interest of individuals to vote, or acquire political information. This chapter reviews the theoretical and empirical support for the three explanations for political participation: civic duty, expressive benefit, and altruism. The preponderance of evidence supports the civic duty and altruistic explanations for why people vote. But the civic duty explanation does not readily extend to the acquisition of political information, campaign contributions, or contributions to public interest groups. Additionally, neither civic duty nor expressive identification offers an explanation of why turnout increases in close elections or for strategic voting. Altruism incorporates probabilities in the determination of expected benefits from political participation and hence easily explains these phenomena. The preponderance of evidence, as indicated in this chapter, now favors the altruistic explanation for the different types of political participation.","PeriodicalId":328044,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126685056","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Social Embeddedness and Rational Turnout 社会嵌入性与理性投票率
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1 Pub Date : 2019-02-28 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.18
C. Uhlaner
{"title":"Social Embeddedness and Rational Turnout","authors":"C. Uhlaner","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.18","url":null,"abstract":"Models that embed people in social groups provide solutions to the paradox of voting. This chapter summarizes several approaches that use group identities and loyalties to generate substantial turnout even within rational choice models of participation (whether voting or collective action more broadly). One theoretical move introduces leaders acting instrumentally to mobilize individuals who belong to some group, thereby integrating the individual citizen’s consumption term into an instrumental calculus. Other, complementary, theoretical developments introduce relational goods, which exist only with interaction among specific people, as part of the mobilizing arsenal, or more generally develop relational motivations for collective action. The chapter briefly discusses some empirical findings, notably including experiments that show that shame, pride, and digital social networks increase turnout, and argues that these results provide support for the social embeddedness models.","PeriodicalId":328044,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132770069","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Public Choice and Libertarianism 公共选择和自由意志主义
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1 Pub Date : 2019-02-28 DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469733.013.42
Peter J. Boettke, E. Piano
{"title":"Public Choice and Libertarianism","authors":"Peter J. Boettke, E. Piano","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469733.013.42","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469733.013.42","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter investigates the relationship between public choice and libertarianism. Public choice is a positive enterprise, the application of methodological individualism to the study of political processes and institutions. Libertarianism is a political philosophy that stresses individual liberty from the arbitrary power of the state. This chapter argues that public choice has had a substantial influence in the development of libertarian thought in the second half of the twentieth century. First, public choice theory reaches several conclusions that are consistent with libertarian assumptions about politics. Second, some public choice theorists have also directly contributed to the development of libertarianism in their politico-philosophical writings. In particular, this chapter focuses on the work of James Buchanan, one of the founders of the discipline and a major contributor to the philosophical debates in the 1970s about the proper role of the state in a free society. Finally, the chapter argues that some of the major criticisms of public choice, by both professional economists and libertarian purists, fail to understand the distinction between positive and normative in the writing of public choice theorists.","PeriodicalId":328044,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132245160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Utilitarianism as a Criterion for State Action 功利主义作为国家行为的标准
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1 Pub Date : 2019-02-28 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.39
N. Tideman, Florenz Plassmann
{"title":"Utilitarianism as a Criterion for State Action","authors":"N. Tideman, Florenz Plassmann","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.39","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.39","url":null,"abstract":"As a criterion for state action, utilitarianism faces the difficulty that it permits the expectations of some to be overridden for the benefit of others. Neither Bentham’s felicific calculus nor the related cost-benefit analysis can justify the coercion needed for state action. Social welfare functions, including those that incorporate Rawls’s difference principle, face the same difficulty as utilitarianism. One way of resolving this problem is to move to a constitutional framework of constrained utilitarianism, under which only policies that violate no one’s reasonable expectations are considered. To ensure that no one will have a reasonable basis for objecting, there must be a Tieboutian opportunity for dissenters to form their own polities.","PeriodicalId":328044,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116258974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Institution-Induced Stability Institution-Induced稳定
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1 Pub Date : 2019-02-28 DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469733.013.5
K. Shepsle
{"title":"Institution-Induced Stability","authors":"K. Shepsle","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469733.013.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469733.013.5","url":null,"abstract":"Simple majority rule is badly behaved. This is one of the earliest lessons learned by political scientists in the positive political theory tradition. Discovered and rediscovered by theorists over the centuries (including, famously, the Majorcan Franciscan monk Raymon Llull in the thirteenth century, the Marquis de Condorcet in the eighteenth, the Reverend Charles Dodgson (Lewis Carroll) in the eighteenth, and Duncan Black in the twentieth), the method of majority rule cannot be counted on to produce a rational collective choice. In many circumstances (made precise in the technical literature), it is very likely (a claim also made precise) that whatever choice is produced will suffer the property of not being “best” in the preferences of all majorities: for any candidate alternative, there will always exist another alternative that some majority prefers to it. This chapter suggests that while a collection of preferences often cannot provide a collectively “best” choice, institutional arrangements, which restrict comparisons of alternatives, may allow majority rule to function more smoothly. That is, where equilibrium induced by preferences alone may fail to exist, institutional structure may induce stability.","PeriodicalId":328044,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116749831","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Kantianism and Political Institutions 康德主义与政治制度
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1 Pub Date : 2019-02-28 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.41
G. Brennan, H. Kliemt
{"title":"Kantianism and Political Institutions","authors":"G. Brennan, H. Kliemt","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.41","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.41","url":null,"abstract":"Western political institutions of limited government that embody Kantian ideals of rule of law and interindividual respect (chrono-)logically precede Kantianism in political economy and philosophy. Once both Kantian ideals and institutions exist, they can stabilize each other in equilibrium like the stones of a Roman arc. A traditional public choice or economic approach to politics, though hostile to intrinsic motivation through Kantian ideals, becomes more hospitable to explaining and supporting their institutional realization if it is used to understand how Kantian opinion can guide the allocation of “esteem” in ways that create institutionalized Kantian extrinsic motives or incentives.","PeriodicalId":328044,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1","volume":"123 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123528997","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
The Structure of Contests and the Extent of Dissipation 竞争结构与耗散程度
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1 Pub Date : 2019-02-28 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.25
K. Wärneryd
{"title":"The Structure of Contests and the Extent of Dissipation","authors":"K. Wärneryd","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.25","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.25","url":null,"abstract":"The formal analysis of rent seeking contests has largely concerned itself with models of individual rent seekers competing on their own against everybody else. Yet rent seeking in the real world often takes place between interest groups, who act as collectives in competition with other interest groups, or between lobbyists acting on behalf of interest groups or individuals, or in one of many other more complicated forms. This chapter considers how various contest structures affect aggregate equilibrium efforts or expenditures. Open entry into rent seeking, delegation, rent seeking by groups, and within-group conflict over the spoils of rent seeking could all lead to lower aggregate efforts than individualistic rent seeking. The chapter also notes that self-selection into contests of potential contestants may have the property of maximizing dissipation.","PeriodicalId":328044,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134273896","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Fair Division in Allocating Cabinet Ministries 内阁部门的公平分配
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1 Pub Date : 2019-02-28 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.45
S. Brams
{"title":"Fair Division in Allocating Cabinet Ministries","authors":"S. Brams","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.45","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.45","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter describes a mechanism for allocating cabinet ministries, considered to be indivisible goods, to political parties in a parliamentary government according to the proportion of seats that each party holds in a parliament. It precludes the usual bargaining and horse trading over how many, and which, ministries each party will get by using one of two apportionment schemes that prescribe the order of choice in which parties, based on their size, choose ministries. It was used, in modified form, to allocate ministries to each of the major Catholic and Protestant political parties in Northern Ireland in 1999.","PeriodicalId":328044,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115082339","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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