{"title":"康德主义与政治制度","authors":"G. Brennan, H. Kliemt","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.41","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Western political institutions of limited government that embody Kantian ideals of rule of law and interindividual respect (chrono-)logically precede Kantianism in political economy and philosophy. Once both Kantian ideals and institutions exist, they can stabilize each other in equilibrium like the stones of a Roman arc. A traditional public choice or economic approach to politics, though hostile to intrinsic motivation through Kantian ideals, becomes more hospitable to explaining and supporting their institutional realization if it is used to understand how Kantian opinion can guide the allocation of “esteem” in ways that create institutionalized Kantian extrinsic motives or incentives.","PeriodicalId":328044,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1","volume":"123 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"6","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Kantianism and Political Institutions\",\"authors\":\"G. Brennan, H. Kliemt\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.41\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Western political institutions of limited government that embody Kantian ideals of rule of law and interindividual respect (chrono-)logically precede Kantianism in political economy and philosophy. Once both Kantian ideals and institutions exist, they can stabilize each other in equilibrium like the stones of a Roman arc. A traditional public choice or economic approach to politics, though hostile to intrinsic motivation through Kantian ideals, becomes more hospitable to explaining and supporting their institutional realization if it is used to understand how Kantian opinion can guide the allocation of “esteem” in ways that create institutionalized Kantian extrinsic motives or incentives.\",\"PeriodicalId\":328044,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1\",\"volume\":\"123 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-02-28\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"6\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.41\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.41","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Western political institutions of limited government that embody Kantian ideals of rule of law and interindividual respect (chrono-)logically precede Kantianism in political economy and philosophy. Once both Kantian ideals and institutions exist, they can stabilize each other in equilibrium like the stones of a Roman arc. A traditional public choice or economic approach to politics, though hostile to intrinsic motivation through Kantian ideals, becomes more hospitable to explaining and supporting their institutional realization if it is used to understand how Kantian opinion can guide the allocation of “esteem” in ways that create institutionalized Kantian extrinsic motives or incentives.