作为说服的领导

Benjamin E. Hermalin
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引用次数: 0

摘要

说服可以被看作是一种战略设置——一种游戏,在这个游戏中,消息灵通的人(发送者)试图影响消息灵通的人(接收者)所知道的事情。在这种游戏中,因为发送者和接收者的利益并不完全一致,所以会产生紧张感。领导者往往有误导下属的动机。领导者如何与追随者进行可信的沟通最近成为了一个研究课题。本章对这些文献进行了综述和综合。它介绍了发送-接收游戏,并考虑了克服不值得信任的领导者问题的方法。最后,对今后的研究方向进行了展望。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Leadership as Persuasion
Persuasion can be seen as a strategic setting—a game—in which a better-informed individual (a sender) seeks to influence what a less well-informed individual (a receiver) knows. The tension in such a game arises because the interests of sender and receiver are not fully aligned. Leaders often have incentives to mislead their followers. How leaders can communicate credibly to their followers has recently become a topic of study. This chapter surveys and synthesizes that literature. It offers an introduction to sender-receiver games and considers ways in which the problem of an untrustworthy leader may be overcome. At the end the chapter offers some directions for future research.
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