寻租

A. Hillman, N. Long
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引用次数: 1

摘要

可竞争的利益或租金对于公共财政和公共政策的研究至关重要。租金是通过预算支出和税收的决定来分配的。公共政策通过对竞争、国际贸易、环境、对外援助等方面的监管决策来创造和分配租金。在政府之外也可以找到可竞争的租金,例如在学术界,或者在为配偶举行竞赛时。当用于争夺租金的资源和主动性本来可以用于生产时,就会造成社会损失。缺乏数据和成功的寻租者否认寻租的发生是直接衡量社会损失的障碍。因此,竞赛模型被用来推断社会损失的大小。这些模型显示了可以使用租金的可观察值来近似用于争夺租金的资源的一般不可观察值的条件。一般竞争模型描述的是个体寻求个人利益时的社会损失。当群体争夺集体利益时(这是民主国家的特征),社会损失就会减少。对寻租重要性的看法会受到意识形态的影响。政府寻求社会福利最大化,这与为特权利益而分配的可竞争租金的政治创造是不一致的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Rent Seeking
Contestable benefits or rents are of primary importance for the study of public finance and public policy. Rents are assigned through decisions about budgetary spending and taxation. Public policy creates and assigns rents through decisions about regulation of competition, international trade, the environment, foreign aid, and more. Contestable rents are also found outside of government, for example in academia, or when contests take place for mates. There is a social loss when resources and initiative used in contesting rents could have been used productively. Lack of data and denial by successful rent seekers that rent seeking took place are obstacles to direct measurement of social loss. Contest models are therefore used to infer magnitudes of social loss. The models show conditions under which the observable value of a rent can be used to approximate the generally unobservable value of resources used in contesting the rent. The generic contest model describes social losses when individuals seek a personal benefit. Social losses are diminished when, as is characteristic of democracies, groups contest collective benefits. Views on the importance of rent seeking can be influenced by ideology. Government as seeking to maximize social welfare is inconsistent with political creation of contestable rents that are assigned for privileged benefit.
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