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Descriptive Norms and Gender Diversity: Reactance from Men 描述规范与性别多样性:来自男性的抗拒
Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2019-02-09 DOI: 10.30636/JBPA.21.51
Maliheh Paryavi, I. Bohnet, Alexandra van Geen
{"title":"Descriptive Norms and Gender Diversity: Reactance from Men","authors":"Maliheh Paryavi, I. Bohnet, Alexandra van Geen","doi":"10.30636/JBPA.21.51","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30636/JBPA.21.51","url":null,"abstract":"Descriptive norms provide social information on others’ typical behaviors and have been shown to lead to prescriptive outcomes by “nudging” individuals towards norm compliance in numerous settings. This paper examines whether descriptive norms lead to prescriptive outcomes in the gender domain. We examine whether such social information can influence the gender distribution of candidates selected by employers in a hiring context.  We conduct a series of laboratory experiments where ‘employers’ decide how many male and female ‘employees’ they want to hire for male- and female-typed tasks and examine whether employers are more likely to hire more of one gender when informed that others have done so as well. In this set-up descriptive norms do not have prescriptive effects. In fact, descriptive norms do not affect female employers’ hiring decisions at all and lead to norm reactance and backlash from male employers when informed that others have hired more women.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114951332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
Towards Optimal Treaties for Transboundary Watercourse Management 迈向跨界水道管理的最佳条约
Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2019-02-08 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3330935
A. Rieu-Clarke, Rafael E. Macatangay
{"title":"Towards Optimal Treaties for Transboundary Watercourse Management","authors":"A. Rieu-Clarke, Rafael E. Macatangay","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3330935","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3330935","url":null,"abstract":"It is typical for riparians sharing a transboundary watercourse to make interdependent decisions on the allocation of limitedly available water for competing uses, such as hydroelectric power generation or agriculture. Realising this, riparians may agree to enact a treaty for the joint determination and management of their water allocations. The risk of inadequate or excessive allocations stems from a poorly designed or implemented treaty, yet is hardly addressed systematically in the debate on treaty formation or execution. Our objective in this paper is to propose a modelling framework for optimising the establishment or operation of transboundary watercourse treaties. First, using a calibrated mixed complementarity problem, we characterise the optimal allocations based on the economic welfare for each of the riparians under an “infinite” or unconstrained amount of water. Then, using game theory, we explore the strategic implications of alternative allocations under a “finite” or constrained amount of water. If, under the set of constrained allocations, cooperation does not Pareto dominate defection, there is no incentive to write a treaty. As a potential solution to the impasse, we calculate the fair transfers required to transform the game in such a manner that cooperation is not only a dominant strategy Nash equilibrium, but also Pareto-superior. We draw lessons for the rational design or implementation of transboundary watercourse treaties, including the use of money damages or non-money inducements to enhance the prospects of compliance.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123026399","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The Use of Conditional Orders and the Disposition Effect in Stock Market 股票市场条件指令的使用与处置效应
Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2019-01-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3317390
Grace Lepone, G. Tian
{"title":"The Use of Conditional Orders and the Disposition Effect in Stock Market","authors":"Grace Lepone, G. Tian","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3317390","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3317390","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the impact of conditional order usage on the disposition effect. Taking advantage of proprietary Australian stock brokerage data, we employ the propensity score method to create a control group. This methodology enables us to isolate the impact of conditional orders from other confounding factors that influence the disposition effect, which remains unsolved in existing empirical research. Our study adds to existing disposition effect studies robust empirical evidence of conditional orders’ causal effect. We find that conditional orders reduce the disposition effect by both increasing the sale of losers and decreasing the sale of winners. This study also complements the literature with realised and paper return differences between conditional order users and non-users. At the same time, we document that disposition effect, while can be significantly reduced, cannot be eliminated completely with known strategies. Our finding sheds more light on existing theories that have been used to explain the disposition effect, and provides support to the prospect theory.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128949246","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
New Evidence on the Portfolio Balance Approach to Currency Returns 货币收益的投资组合平衡方法的新证据
Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2019-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3346757
Nevin Cavusoglu, Michael D. Goldberg, Josh R. Stillwagon
{"title":"New Evidence on the Portfolio Balance Approach to Currency Returns","authors":"Nevin Cavusoglu, Michael D. Goldberg, Josh R. Stillwagon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3346757","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3346757","url":null,"abstract":"This paper re-examines the empirical performance of the portfolio balance approach to currency returns. It considers the implications of two alternative specifications of preferences: one based on expected utility theory and the other on prospect theory. It also uses survey data to estimate models of ex-ante rather than ex-post returns. The empirical analysis relies on the co-integrated VAR framework, which is well suited for testing competing models and dealing with unit roots. Like earlier studies, we find little support for the expected utility theory model. By contrast, the prospect theory model`s predictions are largely borne out in the data, including those about sign reversals. We find the strongest support for a hybrid model that incorporates the risk factors of both portfolio balance specifications.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130469884","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Bilişsel Önyargı ve Hevristik Bağlamında Finansın İnsani Boyutu Olarak 'Davranışsal Finans': Bir Literatür İncelemesi ve Derleme Çalışması (Behavioral Finance as a Human Dimension of Finance in the Context of Cognitive Bias and Heuristics: A Literature Review and Compilation Study)
Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2018-12-24 DOI: 10.35235/uicd.462794
Bilgehan Tekin
{"title":"Bilişsel Önyargı ve Hevristik Bağlamında Finansın İnsani Boyutu Olarak 'Davranışsal Finans': Bir Literatür İncelemesi ve Derleme Çalışması (Behavioral Finance as a Human Dimension of Finance in the Context of Cognitive Bias and Heuristics: A Literature Review and Compilation Study)","authors":"Bilgehan Tekin","doi":"10.35235/uicd.462794","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35235/uicd.462794","url":null,"abstract":"Geleneksel finans teorisinin iki temel varsayimi soz konusudur. Bunlar, bireylerin rasyonel olduklari ve beklenen fayda teorisinin varsayimlarina uygun olarak faydalarini maksimize etme amaci tasidiklaridir. Ilk kez Savage (1954) tarafindan yapilan calisma ile gundeme gelmis olan belirsizlik altinda rasyonel karar verme, bireylerin olaylarin gerceklesme olasiliklarini tahmin etmesini ve bu sonuclari degerlendirme araclarini uyumlu hale getirmesini gerektirmektedir. Bununla birlikte geleneksel teorilerde goruldugu gibi sonuclari acisindan ciddi olumsuzluklara neden olabilecek turden tahminleri yurutme ve karar alma surecleri saf matematiksel modellemelere indirgenemeyecek kadar onemli bir meseledir. Bu noktada insan dogasinin da hesaba katilmasi gerekmektedir. Psikoloji alanindaki calismalar sonucu ortaya konmus onyargilar ve standartlarin disina cikan tercihler davranissal finans alani tarafindan yatirimci davranislarina uygulamistir. Tam rasyonellikten sapmanin ornegi ise Simon (1957) tarafindan sinirli rasyonellik onermesi ile ortaya konmustur. Sinirli rasyonellik, bazi bilissel engellerin veya bilgi toplama maliyetlerinin, karar vericilerinin tam olarak en uygun kararlari vermesini onledigini varsayar. Fiziksel ve sosyal dunya tahminlenemeyecek kadar karmasik unsurlar barindirdigindan gelecekle ilgili ve belirsizlik iceren kararlari almak daha fazla zorlasmaktadir. Bu nedenle bireyler genellikle alacaklari kararlari caba gostermeden ve kolaylikla almanin yollarini arama egilimi gosterirler. Hevristik ve onyargi yaklasimina gore insanlar olasilik degerlendirmeleri yaparken hatali degerlendirmelere acik bilissel kisayollar kullanilar. Bu calismada davranissal finans disiplini, bilissel onyargilar ve hevristikler baglaminda ele alinmis ve konu ile ilgili yapilan calismalar uzerinde durulmustur. Bu calisma bir literatur incelemesi ve derleme calismasi mahiyetindedir.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129767261","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
The Shapley Value, Proper Shapley Value, and Sharing Rules for Cooperative Ventures 合作企业的Shapley价值、适当Shapley价值与共享规则
Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2018-11-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3285856
R. van den Brink, R. Levínský, M. Zelený
{"title":"The Shapley Value, Proper Shapley Value, and Sharing Rules for Cooperative Ventures","authors":"R. van den Brink, R. Levínský, M. Zelený","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3285856","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3285856","url":null,"abstract":"Moulin (1987) studies the equal and proportional sharing rule for a special class of cooperative games that he calls joint venture games. Proportionality is an important principle in allocation problems. Besides some special cases, it is not obvious how proportionality should be applied in cooperative TU-games. Such special cases, where proportionality is obvious, are inessential games and cooperative joint venture games. In this paper, we discuss an explicit axiom that shows that proper Shapley values can be seen as an appropriate way to express proportionality in value allocation in cooperative TU-games. We characterize positive proper Shapley values by affine invariance and an axiom that requires proportional allocation according to the individual singleton worths in generalized joint venture games. As a counterpart, we show that affine invariance and an axiom that requires equal allocation of the surplus in generalized joint venture games, characterize the positive part of the Shapley value among the single-valued solutions.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128915190","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Positive Versus Negative Incentives for Loan Repayment in Microfinance: A Game Theory Approach 小额信贷贷款偿还的积极与消极激励:一个博弈论方法
Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2018-11-14 DOI: 10.1111/rode.12563
Thomas Brihaye, Julie De Pril, M. Labie, A. Périlleux
{"title":"Positive Versus Negative Incentives for Loan Repayment in Microfinance: A Game Theory Approach","authors":"Thomas Brihaye, Julie De Pril, M. Labie, A. Périlleux","doi":"10.1111/rode.12563","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rode.12563","url":null,"abstract":"In most of the methodologies used so far by microfinance institutions, negative incentives are predominant, which can contrast with these institutions’ social mission. This paper investigates whether the microfinance industry could benefit from using more positive incentives. The main results of our game model are twofold. First, (positive or negative) incentives increase “on‐time” repayments. Second, the client is more likely to repay her loan with the encouragement of a bonus scheme rather than under the pressure of a sanction, regardless of the amount. This paper therefore argues for the increased use of positive incentives in the industry.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126760762","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
From Forward to Spot Prices: Producers, Retailers and Loss Averse Consumers in Electricity Markets 从远期价格到现货价格:电力市场中的生产者、零售商和厌恶损失的消费者
Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2018-10-18 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3269228
Valeria Di Cosmo, Elisa Trujillo-Baute
{"title":"From Forward to Spot Prices: Producers, Retailers and Loss Averse Consumers in Electricity Markets","authors":"Valeria Di Cosmo, Elisa Trujillo-Baute","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3269228","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3269228","url":null,"abstract":"The benefits of smoothing demand peaks in the electricity market has been widely recognised. European countries such as Spain and some of the Scandinavian countries have recently given to the consumers the possibility to face the spot prices instead of having a fixed tariffs determined by retailers. This paper develops a theoretical model to study the relations between risk averse consumers, retailers and producers, both in the spot and in the forward markets when consumers are able to choose between fixed tariffs and the wholesale prices. The model is calibrated on a real market case - Spain - where since 2014 spot tariffs were introduced beside the flat tariffs for household consumers. Finally, simulations of agents behavior and markets performance, depending on consumers risk aversion and the number of producers, are used to analyse the implications from the model. Our results show that the quantities the retailers and the producers trade in the forward market are positively related with the loss aversion of consumers. The quantities bought by the retailers in the forward market are negatively related with the skewness of the spot prices. On the contrary, quantity sold forward by producers are positively related with the skewness of the spot prices (high probability of getting high prices increase the forward sale) and with the total market demand. In the spot market, the degree of loss aversion of consumers determine the quantity the retailers buy in the spot market but does not have a direct effect on the spot prices.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114450519","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 41
NFL Betting Biases, Profitable Strategies, and the Wisdom of the Crowd NFL博彩偏见，盈利策略和人群的智慧
Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2018-08-26 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3289715
Corey A. Shank
{"title":"NFL Betting Biases, Profitable Strategies, and the Wisdom of the Crowd","authors":"Corey A. Shank","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3289715","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3289715","url":null,"abstract":"This paper finds that betting biases in the NFL market go beyond preferring to bet on the favorite team and the over. The results show that as more bettors place wagers, the percentage of wagers on the favorite team increases. Additionally, bettors have a preference to bet against the line movement to receive better betting odds in the point spread market. Moreover, bettors prefer betting on the favorite when the away team has lost recent games and on the over when the home team has been covering the over in recent games. Furthermore, bettors have a nonlinear preference in the point spread betting, as they are less likely to wager on the favorite when the spread is small or large. Finally, economically profitable strategies are put forth based upon the percentage of bettors betting on the favorite or over by using a contrarian strategy when 50% to 60% of bettors place the same wager. These results have important implications as they can be used by the sportsbook to create betting lines to maximize profit.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"254 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123439740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
On the γ-Core of Asymmetric Aggregative Games 论非对称聚集博弈的γ核
Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2018-08-11 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3230135
G. Stamatopoulos
{"title":"On the γ-Core of Asymmetric Aggregative Games","authors":"G. Stamatopoulos","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3230135","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3230135","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the core of cooperative games generated by asymmetric aggregative normal-form games, i.e., games where the payoff of each player depends on his strategy and the sum of the strategies of all players. We assume that each coalition calculates its worth presuming that the outside players stand alone and select individually optimal strategies (Chander & Tulkens 1997). We show that under some mild monotonicity assumptions on payoffs, the resulting cooperative game is balanced, i.e. it has a non-empty gamma-core. Our paper thus offers an existence result for a core notion that is considered quite often in the theory and applications of cooperative games with externalities.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"297 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121319513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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