Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal最新文献

{"title":"Growth, Industrial Externality, Prospect Dynamics, and Well-Being on Markets","authors":"Emmanuel Chauvet","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3226452","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3226452","url":null,"abstract":"Functions or 'functionings' enable to give a structure to any economic activity whether they are used to describe a good or a service that is exchanged on a market or they constitute the capability of an agent to provide the labor market with specific work and skills. That structure encompasses the basic law of supply and demand and the conditions of growth within a transaction and of the inflation control. Functional requirements can be followed from the design of a product to the delivery of a solution to a customer needs with different levels of externalities while value is created integrating organizational and technical constraints whereas a budget is allocated to the various entities of the firm involved in the production. Entering the market through that structure leads to designing basic equations of its dynamics and to finding canonical solutions out of particular equilibria. This approach enables to tackle behavioral foundations of Prospect Theory within a generalization of its probability weighting function turned into an operator which applies to Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic societies as well as to the poorest ones. The nature of reality and well-being appears then as closely related to the relative satisfaction reached on the market, as it can be conceived by an agent, according to business cycles. This reality being the result of the complementary systems that govern human mind as structured by rational psychologists.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121622492","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Consumer Theory with Misperceived Tastes","authors":"Geoffroy de Clippel, Kareen Rozen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3223654","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3223654","url":null,"abstract":"Incorporating bounded rationality into the classic consumer theory setting, we study the testable implications of a consumer who may have trouble consistently assessing her subjective tastes. Our model of e-Rationalizability, which bounds the consumer’s misperception of her marginal rates of substitution, may arise from various choice heuristics. It also offers a natural, preference-based measure of departure from rationality that is more demanding than Afriat’s measure.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"51 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114126856","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"An Uncertainty Management Perspective on Long-Run Impacts of Adversity: The Influence of Childhood Socioeconomic Status on Risk, Time, and Social Preferences","authors":"Dorsa Amir, Matthew R. Jordan, David G. Rand","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3037019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3037019","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract While there has been a recent increase in focus on the role of early life socioeconomic status (SES) on preferences and decision-making, there is still debate surrounding the proper theoretical framework for understanding such effects. Some have argued that early life SES can fundamentally shift time preferences per se, such that those from low SES backgrounds favor current rewards over future rewards. Others have argued that, while early life SES has lasting effects on behavior, such effects are only observable in the presence of salient cues to mortality. Here, we propose an alternative framework that centers on environmental uncertainty. In this uncertainty management framework, early life deprivation promotes the development of strategies that minimize the downside costs of uncertainty across domains. We argue that this focus on managing uncertainty results in greater risk-aversion, present-orientation, and prosociality. Furthermore, these effects need not be dependent on salient cues to mortality. Across four large samples of participants (total N = 4714), we find that childhood deprivation uniquely predicts greater risk-aversion (both incentivized and hypothetical) and greater prosociality in economic games. Childhood deprivation also predicts greater present-orientation, but not above-and beyond current SES. We further find that mortality cues are not necessary to elicit these differences. Our results support an uncertainty management perspective on the effects of childhood SES on risk, time, and social preferences.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124304233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Greenspan's Synthesis of the 'Keynes-Knight' Approach and the Ramsey-De Finetti-Savage Approach in Decision Making: A Continuum Exists Between Situations of No Knowledge and Complete Knowledge","authors":"M. E. Brady","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3213783","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3213783","url":null,"abstract":"The differences between Knight’s approach in Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (1921) and Keynes’s logical theory of probability approach in the A Treatise on Probability (1921), on the one hand, and the Ramsey-Savage-de Finetti Subjective or Bayesian approach, on the other hand, are based on the question of whether it is always possible or not to estimate a probability with a precise, exact, numerical value. Keynes and Knight argued that it is not always possible to provide a precise numerical answer to the question, “What is the probability of this outcome relative to this evidence?”, while Ramsey, de Finetti and Savage argued that it was always possible. de Finetti and Savage added a qualification regarding their views on numerical probability only in the case involving the initial conditions at the beginning of a probability assessment. Due to a lack of enough evidence in the beginning stage of a probability assessment, an imprecise estimate of probability could result. However, as time went on, more additional, sufficient evidence would result that would always lead to a precise probability estimate. Much important evidence would be missing or vague or Ambiguous (Daniel Ellsberg’s term). Keynes and Knight argued that that there would be many cases of what Keynes called indeterminate probability estimates, where additional evidence would not be sufficient to lead to a precise probability by the time a decision had to be made. It is impossible to postpone many financial, economic, and business decisions until more, relevant information has accumulated that would lead to the convergence of a imprecise probability to a precise probability at some point in the future. Thus, it is the relative strength of the evidence that determines if a numerically precise probability can be assigned. The mathematical laws of the probability calculus assume that the available evidence used is relevant and complete before a probability calculation takes place. This is a situation of strong evidence. On the other hand, if evidence is missing or not available, one is dealing with a situation of weak evidence. Greenspan cuts through the logical, epistemological, and philosophical analysis made by Keynes and Knight to arrive at a simple and direct definition of uncertainty that entails the work of Keynes and Knight.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125336337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Effect of Feedback Content and Timing on Self-Other Gap in Risk-Taking","authors":"N. Lee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3207681","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3207681","url":null,"abstract":"Previous experiments on delegated decision making find seemingly contradictory results: some experiments find that people take greater risks when they decide for others than for themselves, while other experiments find the opposite. My experiment reconciles the mixed results by showing that the self-other gap in risk taking behavior depends on the content and the timing of feedback. In a choice between two binary lotteries, subjects either learn the outcome of only the chosen lottery or the outcome for both the chosen and the unchosen lottery. Feedback is provided immediately after each decision or after a sequence of ten decisions. When subjects receive an immediate feedback on the outcome of both the chosen and the unchosen options, they make a risky shift. That is, subjects take greater risks for others than for themselves. If I alter either the timing or the content of feedback, the risky shift disappears. If I alter both the timing and the content of feedback so that the feedback is given at the end, only on the outcome of the chosen option, a risky shift is found again.I present a theoretical model and analyze how subjects? risk taking behavior evolves as they make more decisions.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"75 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115336166","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Managing Perishable Inventory Systems with Multiple Demand Classes","authors":"Hossein Abouee Mehrizi, Opher Baron, O. Berman, David Chen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3191819","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3191819","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we study a multi-period stochastic perishable inventory system with multiple demand classes that require products of different ages. The firm orders the product with a positive leadtime and sells it to multiple demand classes, each only accepting products with remaining lifetime longer than a threshold. In each period, after demand realization, the firm decides how to allocate the on-hand inventory to different demand classes with different backorder or lost-sale cost. At the end of each period, the firm can dispose inventory of any age. We formulate this problem as a Markov decision process and characterize the optimal ordering, allocation, and disposal policies. When unfulfilled demand is backlogged, we show that the optimal order quantity is decreasing in the inventory levels and is more sensitive to the inventory level of fresher products, the optimal allocation policy is a sequential rationing policy, and the optimal disposal policy is characterized by a set of thresholds. For the lost-sale case, we show that the optimal allocation and disposal policies have the same structure but the optimal ordering policy may be different. Based on the structure of the optimal policy, we develop an efficient heuristic that is at most 4% away from the optimal cost in our numerical examples. Using numerical studies, we show that the ordering and allocation policies are close to optimal even if the firm cannot intentionally dispose products. Moreover, ignoring the difference between demand classes and using a simple allocation policy (e.g., FIFO) can significantly increase the total cost. We examine how the firm can improve the control of perishable items and show that the benefit of decreasing the leadtime is more significant than that of increasing the lifetime of the products or that of decreasing the acceptance threshold of the demand. The analysis is extended to systems with age dependent disposal cost and stochastic supply.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130985087","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Poverty Identity and Preference for Challenge: Evidence from the U.S. and India","authors":"S. Banker, Syon P. Bhanot, A. Deshpande","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3152592","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3152592","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract One’s personal identity can play an important role in decision-making. We propose that a key identity that shapes behavior among poor populations is conceptualizing oneself as financially insecure, which we term “poverty identity.” Two experiments suggest that this identity can influence one’s propensity to engage in challenging tasks. We first demonstrate in a lab experiment with students that making financial insecurity temporarily salient can reduce preference for challenging tasks. Subsequently, in a lab-in-field experiment conducted in Dharavi, a slum in Mumbai, India, we show that a verbal self-affirmation intervention involving simple, one-on-one conversations with each individual can counteract the effects of persistent identity salience for the poor by fostering greater preference for more challenging labor tasks. We suggest that the persistence of scarcity can make poverty a continually salient characteristic by which the truly impoverished define who they are. Further, we outline an identity-based theoretical framework that explains behavior among people who temporarily feel poor but also suggests that similar perturbations in identity salience may have a negligible impact on behavior among the very poor. These findings have important implications for models of identity and policy design aimed at improving well-being for disadvantaged populations.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124110570","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Cardinal Representations of Information","authors":"Jeffrey Mensch","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3148954","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3148954","url":null,"abstract":"In the spirit of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947), this paper provides an axiomatic representation of information. Under the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms, along with an additional continuity, indifference to randomization, and a Blackwell informativeness axiom, I show that any ordering over information can be essentially uniquely represented as, equivalently: (a) a strictly increasing cost of information acquisition; (b) for a given prior, the expected utility from a decision problem; (c) for a given prior, an additive posterior-separable measure of uncertainty; and (d) a separable cost of signals. I discuss the implications of the results for the rational inattention literature.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115773544","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Decision Making Under Uncertainty and the Two-Envelope Paradox","authors":"Joseph Tzur, Arie Jacobi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3141049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3141049","url":null,"abstract":"If one faces a decision under uncertainty where the expected payoffs are undefined, then the fact that for some partition of the event space a specific strategy is optimal does not necessarily imply that it is an optimal strategy over whole event space. The current literature does not explain what exactly happens if one adopts that strategy repeatedly for an arbitrarily large number of times. The article provides an insight into this issue using the context of the two-envelope-paradox. If one adopts the strategy to always switch envelopes, then the average gain may be, with the same probability, a large gain or an absolute large loss. This is because for any large sample of the repeated decision-making scenario, the distribution of the maximum of the absolute gain from switching is such that, with high probability, it is unique; its effect on the average gain is massive and it is either positive or negative. In addition, we show that a strategy to switch envelopes if the amount in the first envelope does not exceed some threshold is preferred to a strategy of “no switch”, and the optimal threshold is a solution to a St-Petersburg type problem.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127704097","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Artificial Intelligence Ethik (Artificial Intelligence Ethics)","authors":"Julia M. Puaschunder","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3137926","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3137926","url":null,"abstract":"German Abstract: Zeitgenoessische Theorien und Studien der Oekonomie sind behavioral. Behavioral Economics hat neo-klassische Oekonomie in den letzten beiden Jahrzehnten revolutioniert. Seither haben zwei Oekonomie Nobelpreise dieses wachsende Feld gekroent und eine weite Bandbreite an psychologischen, oekonomischen und soziologischen Labor- und Feldexperiment menschliches Entscheidungsverhalten von rationalen Modellen abweichend gefunden. Standard-Neo-klassische Profitmaximierungsaxiome versagen haeufig reales Verhalten vorherzusagen. Menschen verwenden eher Heuristiken in ihren alltaeglichen Entscheidungen. Diese mentale Hilfen erlauben es uns, mit einer komplexen Welt fertigzuwerden, lassen uns gleichzeitig aber auch gebiased und fehlerhaft erscheinen. Die darauf folgende Weiterentwicklung von Behavioral Insights wendet Behavioral Economics auf den oeffentlichen Sektor und Internationale Entwicklung an. Behaviorale Oekonom/Innen stubsen und winken dabei Staatsbuerger/Innen dazu, bessere Entscheidungen fuer sich selbst und die Allgemeinheit zu treffen. Viele rationale Koordinierungen folgten auf der ganzen Welt und in unterschiedlichsten Domainen, wie beispielsweise Organspendeverhalten, Gesundheit, Reichtum und Zeitmanagement, um nur einige zu nennen. Der folgende Artikel beschreibt behaviorale Aspekte oekonomischer Analysen und interkulturelle Differenzen von behavioralen Schulen, um kritische Fragen anhand von klassischen Behavioral Economics Beispielen interdisziplinaer zu beleuchten. Daraufhin werden aktuellste Fragen der behavioraler Oekonomie behandelt. Welches Marktstabilisierungspotenzial steckt in Behavioral Finance? Welche Ethikmandate sollten Behavioral Economists folgen? Koennten Big Data getriebene Resultate kritische Privatsphaere-Probleme mit sich bringen? Im zukuenftigen Zeitalter von Artificial Intelligence, sollten Algorithmen menschliches Entscheidungsverhalten wahrheitsgetreu nachahmen oder sollten wir nach artifizieller Rationalitaet streben? Wo sind die Grenzen der Anwendung von Behavioral Insights? Fuehrt nudging im Zuge vom Libertarian Paternalismus automatisch zu einem sozialen Gefaelle in die, die nudgen, gegenueber denen, die genudged werden? Dieser Artikel wirft damit kritische Fragen zur Ethik in Artificial Intelligence an der Speerspitze von Behavioralism und Behavioraler Oekonomischer Analysen in zirkulaerem, gedanken-stimulierendem Sokratischen Fragen auf. Ethik in Artificial Intelligence, fuer die sich diese Arbeit einsetzt. \u0000English Abstract: Contemporary theories and studies of economics have turned behavioral. Behavioral Economics revolutionized mainstream neo-classical economics in the past two decades. Since then two Nobel Prizes in Economics have crowned this growing field as a wide range of psychological, economic and sociological laboratory and field experiments proved human beings deviating from rational choices and standard neo-classical profit maximization axioms often failed to explain how human act","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127992422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}