{"title":"The Dark Side of Personality: Anti-Sociality Increases Strategic Game Play","authors":"J. Engelmann, B. Schmid, J. Chumbley, E. Fehr","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3110560","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3110560","url":null,"abstract":"We assess the role of anti-social personality traits in explaining heterogeneity in commonly observed social preferences. We identified a personality profile that clearly reflects anti-social personality characteristics, with high positive loadings on Machiavellianism and high negative loadings on empathy, trustworthiness and agreeableness. Anti-sociality predicts decision strategies in a manner that is consistent with its name: significantly lower levels of trust and decreased trustworthiness. To identify the strategic nature of anti-social behavior in changing environments, we assessed the moderating role of personality on investor trust and trustee reciprocity in the presence relative to the absence of the investor’s option to punish. Our results show that only the anti-social personality profile is associated with specific payoff maximizing strategy shifts induced by these environmental changes: when punishment was not available to investors, we observe significantly lower levels of investor trust and trustee reciprocity, while there is a significant increase in both behaviors when punishment was available. These effects were specific for anti-sociality, as no other personality factor was associated with such a strong adjustment of decision strategies in the presence of punishment. These results demonstrate that anti-social personality characteristics are associated with strategic behavioral shifts aimed at maximizing the extraction of resources from their counterparts. The reliability of the strategic effects of anti-social personality during trust, reciprocity and punishment strongly supports the notion that self-projection underlies anti-social decision-making.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115898804","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Ethics of Intracorporate Behavioral Ethics","authors":"Todd Haugh","doi":"10.15779/Z38TD9N731","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38TD9N731","url":null,"abstract":"This Essay provides the first analysis of “behavioral ethics nudging,” the use of choice architecture by companies to influence the ethical decision making of their employees. This practice represents the cutting edge of corporate compliance because it seemingly offers an evidence-based, cost-effective way for companies to reduce the risk of respondeat superior liability. Yet the promise of behavioral ethics nudging masks a certain unease, because this type of behavioral compliance tool necessarily harnesses the dual thinking system of employees, often without their knowledge. Drawing on extensive behavioral science research, the Essay evaluates behavioral ethics nudging from an empirical and normative lens, calling both the efficacy and ethicality of the practice into question. The Essay concludes by providing a simple evaluative framework for companies intent on using behavioral ethics nudging as a compliance strategy.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"88 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115680807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Equilibrium Selection and Strategy: Experimental Evidence from an Infinitely Repeated Transboundary Public Goods Game","authors":"Tetsuya Kawamura, Tsz Kwan Tse","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3186046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3186046","url":null,"abstract":"We design a transboundary public goods (TPG) game, in which participants have simultaneous interaction within and between groups. We design the TPG game under an infinitely repeated situation in order to explore the types of strategies that participants employ in infinitely repeated games. We theoretically identify a condition in which the grim-trigger strategy is supported as a strategy minimizing strategic risk in the TPG game. We experimentally investigate the types of strategies by eliciting all possible one-period-ahead strategy choices using the strategy method. We replicate the history of the game by simulation and classify the strategies using the affinity propagation clustering method. We find that the frequency of strategies in cooperative clusters is higher in the treatment with high continuation probability than that with low continuation probability. We find that participants employ strategies minimizing strategic risk in an infinitely repeated TPG game.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"140 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122944142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Choice Architectures","authors":"R. Hockett","doi":"10.31228/osf.io/tb698","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31228/osf.io/tb698","url":null,"abstract":"This brief symposium contribution takes stock of the 'behavioralist turn' in classical decision theory, finding in its systematic endogenizing of preferences a close cousin to efforts to situate the 'unsituated self' of classical liberal justice theory. It finds that this turn has not only enriched theory, but has also assisted policy by sidestepping once deep divides between self-styled 'liberals' and 'welfarists' - much as advertised by distinguished contributors to the field including Sunstein and Thaler. The piece concludes by suggesting further, more 'macro'-oriented adjustments to choice architectures that likewise can 'nudge' welfare-enhancing choices without outright coercing them. In particular, it describes government 'market actor' roles that I have proposed elsewhere to solve a great variety of what I call the recursive collective action problems that plague financial markets and macro-economies. Because these problems are endemic to decentralized markets, harm literally everyone, and cannot be solved by anyone acting individually, modulating individual incentives through collective market action need not count as 'coercive' at all.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128547099","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Goal Bracketing and Self-Control","authors":"Alice Hsiaw","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2864575","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2864575","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the role of goal bracketing to attenuate time inconsistency. When setting non-binding goals in multi-stage project, an agent must also decide how and when to evaluate himself against such goals. In particular, he can bracket broadly by setting an aggregate goal for the entire project, or narrowly by setting incremental goals for individual stages. In the presence of loss aversion and uncertainty over outcomes, this decision involves a trade-off between motivation and comparative disutility due to ex-ante uncertainty. Narrow goal bracketing can be used as an instrument to counteract the self-control problem, while broad goal bracketing can itself generate apparently erroneous behavior such as the sunk cost fallacy. The sequential nature of decision-making introduces a differential reaction to outcome uncertainty based on its timing, which determines the optimal bracketing choice.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117053129","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A. Abotsi, Gershon Yawo Dake, Richard Abankwa Agyepong
{"title":"Factors Influencing Risk Management Decision of Small and Medium Scale Enterprises in Ghana","authors":"A. Abotsi, Gershon Yawo Dake, Richard Abankwa Agyepong","doi":"10.5709/CE.1897-9254.153","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5709/CE.1897-9254.153","url":null,"abstract":"This research seeks to study the factors that enhance or preclude owners of SMEs in Ghana in making risk management decisions. The study was conducted with managers of SMEs in four regions in Ghana. The researchers adopted a quantitative approach and employed STATA 10 and SPSS version 20 in the analysis. Stratified and simple random sampling techniques were used to select the sample units. The probit model was used in the analysis of data. A total of 447 SMEs were sampled for the study, with at least 111 from each of the selected regions. The probit results show that the demographic factors indicate a positive influence on the likelihood that managers will take risk management decisions. All of the business related demographic factors are significant at various levels and positive, except for risk-loving. The economically related factors, such as the estimated amount at risk, the estimated cost of risk management and the estimated total monthly income after tax all have a positive influence on risk management decision making. However, government and tax policies are perceived to negatively influence risk management decisions by managers. We recommend that institutions working closely with SMEs acquire the expertise to train the managers of SMEs on risk management practices.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127266130","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Can Personality Type Explain Heterogeneity in Probability Distortions?","authors":"C. M. Capra, Bing Jiang, J. Engelmann, G. Berns","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2038687","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2038687","url":null,"abstract":"There are two regularities we have learned from experimental studies of choice under risk. The first is that the majority of people weigh objective probabilities non-linearly. The second regularity, although less commonly acknowledged, is that there is a large amount of heterogeneity in how people distort probabilities. Despite of this, little effort has been made to identify the source of heterogeneity. In this paper, we explore the possibility that personality type is linked to probability distortions. Using validated psychological questionnaires, we clustered participants into distinct personality types: motivated, impulsive, and affective. We found that the motivated viewed gambling more attractive, whereas the impulsive were the most capable of discriminating non-extreme probabilities. Our results suggest that the observed heterogeneity in probability distortions may be explained by personality profiles, which can be elicited though standard psychological questionnaires.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124582933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Minimax: Portfolio Choice Based on Pessimistic Decision Making","authors":"S. Schaarschmidt, Peter Schanbacher","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2078861","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2078861","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a fund allocation strategy for a highly risk-averse investor based on pessimistic decision making to construct portfolios of four major asset classes. Using US data (indexes of stocks, bonds, real estate, and commodities) from January 1990 to December 2010, we \u001cfind that the proposed Minimax strategy performs well out-of-sample with respect to standard risk measures. Its performance is better than common alternative trading strategies such as \u001cfixed weights, minimum variance, or mean-variance methods. Portfolio weights are stable across time, resulting in lower turnover than any mean-variance related strategy. Finally, we fi\u001cnd that optimal portfolios are widely diversifi\u001ced across all asset classes. This study suggests that the proposed Minimax strategy is implementable in portfolio management, especially for large institutional investors.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128928764","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Cary A. Deck, Jungmin Lee, Javier Reyes, Christopher C. Rosen
{"title":"Measuring Risk Attitudes Controlling for Personality Traits","authors":"Cary A. Deck, Jungmin Lee, Javier Reyes, Christopher C. Rosen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1148521","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1148521","url":null,"abstract":"This study measures risk attitudes using two paid experiments: the Holt and Laury (2002) procedure and a variation of the game show Deal or No Deal. The participants also completed a series of personality questionnaires developed in the psychology literature including the risk domains of Weber, Blais, and Betz (2002). As in previous studies risk attitudes vary within subjects across elicitation methods. However, this variation can be partially explained by individual personality traits. Specifically, subjects behave as though the Holt and Laury task is an investment decision while the Deal or No Deal task is a gambling decision.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"132 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124265176","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Credibility Consequences of Managers' Decisions to Provide Warnings About Unexpected Earnings","authors":"Molly Mercer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.311100","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.311100","url":null,"abstract":"This study provides a theoretical framework and experimental evidence on how managers' disclosure decisions affect their credibility with investors. Further, I examine whether investors' judgments of management credibility are based on different factors in the short- and longer-term. My results show that in the short-term, management disclosure decisions regarding negative news have larger effects on perceived management credibility than disclosure decisions regarding positive news. Specifically, managers who warn investors about unexpected negative news are rewarded with greater credibility increases than managers who warn about unexpected positive news, and managers who fail to warn about unexpected negative news are penalized with greater credibility decreases than managers who fail to warn about unexpected positive news. The results also show that these short-term credibility effects do not persist over time. In the longer-term, managers who report positive earnings news are rated as having higher credibility than managers who report negative earnings news, regardless of their disclosure decisions.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126522774","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}