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Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal最新文献

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Behavioral Home Bias in a Real Market Setting: Evidence from Online Sports Betting 真实市场环境下的行为主场偏见:来自在线体育博彩的证据
Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2021-10-21 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3701247
Angie Andrikogiannopoulou, Filippos Papakonstantinou
{"title":"Behavioral Home Bias in a Real Market Setting: Evidence from Online Sports Betting","authors":"Angie Andrikogiannopoulou, Filippos Papakonstantinou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3701247","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3701247","url":null,"abstract":"We study the home bias using individual-level data from an online sports-betting market. Contrary to other markets where home bias is confounded by institutional and information frictions, our market's experimental-like features enable us to test cleanly whether the psychological drivers of the home bias are strong enough to survive significant welfare costs. We find that individuals exhibit a bias toward home teams, which does not yield superior performance but distorts portfolios, generating welfare costs of similar magnitude as in the stock market. Our findings help solidify the foundation of the behavioral explanation of the home bias in other real markets.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"112 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123838463","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Persuasion by Dimension Reduction 降维说服
Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2021-10-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3946389
S. Malamud, Andreas Schrimpf
{"title":"Persuasion by Dimension Reduction","authors":"S. Malamud, Andreas Schrimpf","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3946389","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3946389","url":null,"abstract":"How should an agent (the sender) observing multi-dimensional data (the state vector) persuade another agent to take the desired action? We show that it is always optimal for the sender to perform a (non-linear) dimension reduction by projecting the state vector onto a lower-dimensional object that we call the \"optimal information manifold.\" We characterize geometric properties of this manifold and link them to the sender's preferences. Optimal policy splits information into \"good\" and \"bad\" components. When the sender's marginal utility is linear, it is always optimal to reveal the full magnitude of good information. In contrast, with concave marginal utility, optimal information design conceals the extreme realizations of good information and only reveals its direction (sign). We illustrate these effects by explicitly solving several multi-dimensional Bayesian persuasion problems.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123664180","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Fear and Promise of the Unknown: How Losses Discourage and Promote Exploration 对未知的恐惧和承诺:损失如何阻碍和促进探索
Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2021-10-12 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3951294
Alycia Chin, D. Hagmann, G. Loewenstein
{"title":"Fear and Promise of the Unknown: How Losses Discourage and Promote Exploration","authors":"Alycia Chin, D. Hagmann, G. Loewenstein","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3951294","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3951294","url":null,"abstract":"Many situations involving search, such as commuters trying out new routes or organizations testing new procedures, can subject the explorer to the potential for subjective losses – situations that are worse than the status quo. How does the potential for experiencing losses during the course of a search affect individuals’ appetite for exploration? In three incentivized studies, we manipulate search outcomes by presenting participants either with a gain-only environment or a gain-loss environment. The gain-loss environment offers identical relative incentives for exploration, but payoffs are shifted down and participants receive an initial endowment to offset the difference. In both conditions, participants engage in a novel search task in which they decide how to explore a one-dimensional environment, receiving payoffs based on their location in each period. Payoffs between neighboring options are correlated, and movement is restricted in each turn to immediately adjacent locations. We predict and find that participants are motivated to avoid losses, which increases exploration when they are incurring losses, but decreases exploration when they face the prospect of losses. We conclude that exploration is driven by hope of anticipated gains, constrained by fear of anticipated losses, and motivated by avoidance of experienced losses.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130693232","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Do Investors Pay Less Attention to Women (Fund Managers)? 投资者是否不太关注女性(基金经理)?
Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2021-10-10 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3926970
P. Rau, Jinhua Wang
{"title":"Do Investors Pay Less Attention to Women (Fund Managers)?","authors":"P. Rau, Jinhua Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3926970","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3926970","url":null,"abstract":"We document a gender-based attention effect in the sensitivity of mutual fund flows to fund performance using individual-level fund data from a fintech platform in China. Investors increase (decrease) flows to funds following positive and strong (negative and weak) prior-month performance. However, although there is no significant difference in the performance of male and female managers, the sensitivity effect significantly weakens if the fund manager is female. The effect persists after controlling for managerial characteristics and fund objectives, as well as individual investor fixed effects. Simply put, investors react less to the performance of female fund managers.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134018537","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Probability Weighting and the Newsvendor Problem: Theory and Evidence 概率加权与报贩问题:理论与证据
Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2021-10-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3937363
Xiao Huang, M. Nagarajan, Shanshan Guo
{"title":"Probability Weighting and the Newsvendor Problem: Theory and Evidence","authors":"Xiao Huang, M. Nagarajan, Shanshan Guo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3937363","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3937363","url":null,"abstract":"Behavioral studies have consistently reported the pull-to-center (PTC) effect observed in laboratory studies of the newsvendor problem. We examine whether this and some other observed effects can be reconciled under the general framework of prospect theory without special assumption on reference point. Specifically, we allow decision makers to value each potential outcome with decision weight rather than the actual probability and further validate through some experiments if the PTC effect is correlated with the shape of the weighting function. The results confirm that the general framework of prospect theory can explain the PTC effect without special assumption on reference point. The only stipulation is a general set of probability weighting functions that that admit underweighting of small probabilities. The proposed model is inclusive, robust, and can explain a number of prominent newsvendor behavioural observations with reasonable benchmark predictions. Our finding suggests that the systematic, suboptimal decisions in behavioural newsvendors could be due to over-focusing on the big picture and neglecting rare events. Accordingly, both academicians and practitioners should revisit the design of decision support systems as well as competitive strategies that involve human decision making against large number of uncertain future outcomes.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"111 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124063304","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Who Values Economist Forecasts? Evidence From Trading in Treasury Markets 谁看重经济学家的预测?来自国债市场交易的证据
Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2021-09-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3483356
Robert James, Elvis Jarnecic, Henry Leung
{"title":"Who Values Economist Forecasts? Evidence From Trading in Treasury Markets","authors":"Robert James, Elvis Jarnecic, Henry Leung","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3483356","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3483356","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract While economic forecasting is ubiquitous within the industry, its role in the trading process has received little attention in the literature. We examine how economist forecasts are related to trading activity in the OTC treasury bond market at the participant level. Consistent with models of heterogeneous opinions, we show that the forecasting economists employing institution places a disproportionately large reliance on the forecast. There is pervasive evidence that this reliance is asymmetric. Only forecasts which imply a fall in future treasury bond prices are associated with an abnormal trading reaction consistent with the forecast. Reference dependence and loss aversion offer one possible explanation for this asymmetric trading response.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123716624","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Differential Treatment and the Winner's Effort in Contests with Incomplete Information 信息不完全竞争中的差别待遇与赢家努力
Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2021-07-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3865781
Cédric Wasser, Mengxi Zhang
{"title":"Differential Treatment and the Winner's Effort in Contests with Incomplete Information","authors":"Cédric Wasser, Mengxi Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3865781","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3865781","url":null,"abstract":"We study the design of all-pay contests when the organizer's objective is to maximize the expected winner's effort and contestants have private information about their valuations for the prize. We identify sufficient conditions for every optimal contest to involve differential treatment of ex ante symmetric contestants. Moreover, we provide a complete characterization of optimal contests when valuations are uniformly distributed. Finally, we demonstrate that when differential treatment is allowed, maximizing the expected winner's effort is different from maximizing the expected highest effort, which can be strictly greater in the optimum.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127475761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Ethics and AI Startups 伦理与人工智能创业
Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2021-07-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3895939
James Bessen, Stephen Michael Impink, Lydia Reichensperger, Robert C. Seamans
{"title":"Ethics and AI Startups","authors":"James Bessen, Stephen Michael Impink, Lydia Reichensperger, Robert C. Seamans","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3895939","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3895939","url":null,"abstract":"Artificial Intelligence (AI) startups use training data as direct inputs in product development. These firms must balance numerous trade-offs between ethical issues and data access without substantive guidance from regulators or existing judicial precedence. We survey these startups to determine what actions they have taken to address these ethical issues and the consequences of those actions. We find that 58% of these startups have established a set of AI principles. Startups with data-sharing relationships with large high-technology firms (i.e., Amazon, Google, Microsoft), that were negatively impacted by privacy regulations, or with prior (non-seed) funding from institutional investors are more likely to establish ethical AI principles. Lastly, startups with data-sharing relationships with large high-technology firms and prior regulatory experience with GDPR are more likely to incur negative business outcomes, like dropping training data or turning down business, to adhere to their ethical AI policies.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"34 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131871723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Communication, Renegotiation and Coordination with Private Values 私人价值观下的沟通、再协商与协调
Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2021-07-29 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3935020
Yuval Heller, Christoph Kuzmics
{"title":"Communication, Renegotiation and Coordination with Private Values","authors":"Yuval Heller, Christoph Kuzmics","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3935020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3935020","url":null,"abstract":"An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and renegotiate. We characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games with pre-play communication in which players have private preferences over the feasible coordinated outcomes. Communication-proof equilibria provide a narrow selection from the large set of qualitatively diverse Bayesian Nash equilibria in such games. Under a communication-proof equilibrium, players never miscoordinate, play their jointly preferred outcome whenever there is one, and communicate only the ordinal part of their preferences. Moreover, such equilibria are robust to changes in players’ beliefs, interim Pareto efficient, and evolutionarily stable.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115798800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Informational Effects in a Competitive Environment: Large-Scale Evidence from Table Tennis 竞争环境中的信息效应:来自乒乓球的大规模证据
Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2021-07-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3891544
Janina Kleinknecht, A. Rieber, Daniel Würtenberger
{"title":"Informational Effects in a Competitive Environment: Large-Scale Evidence from Table Tennis","authors":"Janina Kleinknecht, A. Rieber, Daniel Würtenberger","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3891544","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3891544","url":null,"abstract":"Competitions often serve to identify the most capable individual or increase overall effort in corporations and sports. Whether to provide individuals with (ranking) information in such a context is an intriguing question. We investigate individuals' competitive behavior under different degrees of ex-ante information regarding their competitors’ ability. A natural experiment in table tennis, particularly, the introduction of table tennis rankings in 2010, allows us to study the effect of (standardized) information on individual behavior, based on more than 1.5 million matches for over 34,000 individuals. Our results suggest that favorites benefit most from additional information as their winning probability increases, whereas underdogs are discouraged by such (standardized) information. These findings are stronger for more heterogeneous matches and hold even if players possess private information. Consistently, competition intensity declines after the release of information regarding competitors' ability. Our results imply that corporations should strategically provide information based on their specific aim.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"333 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120952926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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