{"title":"信息不完全竞争中的差别待遇与赢家努力","authors":"Cédric Wasser, Mengxi Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3865781","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We study the design of all-pay contests when the organizer's objective is to maximize the expected winner's effort and contestants have private information about their valuations for the prize. We identify sufficient conditions for every optimal contest to involve differential treatment of ex ante symmetric contestants. Moreover, we provide a complete characterization of optimal contests when valuations are uniformly distributed. Finally, we demonstrate that when differential treatment is allowed, maximizing the expected winner's effort is different from maximizing the expected highest effort, which can be strictly greater in the optimum.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Differential Treatment and the Winner's Effort in Contests with Incomplete Information\",\"authors\":\"Cédric Wasser, Mengxi Zhang\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3865781\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We study the design of all-pay contests when the organizer's objective is to maximize the expected winner's effort and contestants have private information about their valuations for the prize. We identify sufficient conditions for every optimal contest to involve differential treatment of ex ante symmetric contestants. Moreover, we provide a complete characterization of optimal contests when valuations are uniformly distributed. Finally, we demonstrate that when differential treatment is allowed, maximizing the expected winner's effort is different from maximizing the expected highest effort, which can be strictly greater in the optimum.\",\"PeriodicalId\":322168,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal\",\"volume\":\"57 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-07-30\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3865781\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3865781","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Differential Treatment and the Winner's Effort in Contests with Incomplete Information
We study the design of all-pay contests when the organizer's objective is to maximize the expected winner's effort and contestants have private information about their valuations for the prize. We identify sufficient conditions for every optimal contest to involve differential treatment of ex ante symmetric contestants. Moreover, we provide a complete characterization of optimal contests when valuations are uniformly distributed. Finally, we demonstrate that when differential treatment is allowed, maximizing the expected winner's effort is different from maximizing the expected highest effort, which can be strictly greater in the optimum.
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