Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal最新文献_第6页

Beyond Rational Choice: International Trade Law and the Behavioral Political Economy of Protectionism 超越理性选择:国际贸易法与保护主义的行为政治经济学

Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2019-10-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3466717

Anne van Aaken, J. Kurtz

{"title":"Beyond Rational Choice: International Trade Law and the Behavioral Political Economy of Protectionism","authors":"Anne van Aaken, J. Kurtz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3466717","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3466717","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The classic political economy of trade models state behavior on the international plane by reference to the formation of domestic interests. Voters, interest groups, and politicians are rational actors in this model, pursuing their economic preferences without cognitive or motivational distortions. This article questions the sufficiency of the rational choice model in the formation of contemporary trade policy. Starting from the classic political economy story, this article explores real-world deviations from rationally expected outcomes by drawing on cognitive psychology. Using both theoretical and empirical analysis, we seek to identify key distortions that can better explain voter and politician behavior in the current trade wars. We begin with loss aversion in that individuals have asymmetrical attitudes towards gains and losses. Rising inequality within the rich world amounts to a perceived relative loss particularly for middle-class citizens. Combined with the absolute rise of equality between countries, this can trigger a double loss frame—both as an individual loss and a national loss—that can profoundly shape anti-trade preferences in certain countries. Framing trade as a security threat also invokes powerful hawkish biases. Lastly, the availability bias can be provoked by social media mechanisms making people tend to focus on particular risks and overweight their import.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"3 6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115337677","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 10

Stocks versus Bonds and the Investment Horizon 股票与债券和投资前景

Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2019-09-24 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3458828

H. Levy, Moshe Levy

引用次数: 2

The Chip Strategies Approximately Achieve Efficiency at the Optimal Rate 芯片策略近似地达到了最优效率

Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2019-09-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3479897

Takeshi Kawahara

引用次数: 0

Building Trust: The Costs and Benefits of Gradualism 建立信任:渐进主义的成本与收益

Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2019-09-12 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3324993

Melis Kartal, Wieland Müller, J. Tremewan

引用次数: 5

State-Salient Decision Rules for Choice under Uncertainty 不确定性下选择的状态显著性决策规则

Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2019-09-10 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3451743

S. Lahiri

引用次数: 2

Experimental Evidence: Equilibrium Selection and Cognitive Ability in Infinitely Repeated Transboundary Public Goods Game 实验证据:无限重复跨界公共物品博弈中的均衡选择与认知能力

Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2019-08-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3441159

Tetsuya Kawamura, Tsz Kwan Tse

{"title":"Experimental Evidence: Equilibrium Selection and Cognitive Ability in Infinitely Repeated Transboundary Public Goods Game","authors":"Tetsuya Kawamura, Tsz Kwan Tse","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3441159","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3441159","url":null,"abstract":"We extend public goods game and design transboundary public goods game which players receive more information from the local group, and marginal return per capital (MPCR) is heterogeneous across local groups that high MPCR among local groups and low MPCR among counter groups. We experimentally investigate the relationship between the equilibrium selection and cognitive ability in infinitely repeated transboundary public goods game under the increasing probability of continuations. We also study the relationship between cognitive ability and strategy profile. We use two methods to investigate the types of strategies employed by the subjects: the strategy frequency estimation method and one period ahead strategy method. We find that fully cooperative strategies are mostly lenient and forgiving. We find that subjects with higher cognitive ability tend to be more cooperative, forgiving and lenient when the cooperative strategy is supported as risk dominance. However, we cannot find the same trend among low cognitive ability groups. They behave similarly even the probability of continuations increase. These results show that subjects with high cognitive ability behave according to risk dominance, but not subjects with low cognitive ability.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133216426","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

When Happy People Make Society Unhappy: Emotions Affect Compliance Behavior 当快乐的人使社会不快乐:情绪影响顺从行为

Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2019-07-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3259071

Martin Fochmann, F. Hechtner, E. Kirchler, Peter N. C. Mohr

引用次数: 8

Regulating Under Uncertainty About Rationality: From Decision Theory to Machine Learning and Complexity Theory 理性不确定性下的调控:从决策理论到机器学习和复杂性理论

Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2019-07-11 DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198863175.003.0006

P. Hacker

{"title":"Regulating Under Uncertainty About Rationality: From Decision Theory to Machine Learning and Complexity Theory","authors":"P. Hacker","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198863175.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198863175.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"Theories of choice, and their legal consequences, dramatically differ based on whether they are premised on rational or boundedly rational actors. This chapter describes the interactions between, and the regulatory implications of, three types of uncertainties that the selection of an adequate theory of choice (a more behavioral or a more rational one) is exposed to. First, I suggest that Knightian uncertainty obtains in many regulatory areas concerning the distribution of degrees of rationality between regulatees. In recent years, this has been described as the “knowledge problem” of behavioral law and economics. This chapter argues that the best regulatory response to the knowledge problem is to frame regulation as a problem of decision making under uncertainty. Second, with the rise of machine learning, it is arguably becoming ever more possible to estimate the level of bias, or even entire rationality quotients, of individual regulatees. This may convert uncertainty into risk and opens the potential for, but also the pitfalls of, personalized law. Third, however, even Big Data analytics only offers a snapshot of a distribution of rationality at one moment in time. As recent economic analyses have suggested, however, behavioral heterogeneity can evolve over time in unpredicted ways that may lead to unforeseen consequences, leading to economic complexity. Arguably, this calls for a greater role of standards, as opposed to rules, in regulating environments with dynamic behavioral heterogeneity. Examples discussed in the three types of uncertainty include first-degree price discrimination in the digital economy; usurious lending; and blockchain environments. Across all these examples, the chapter focuses on the normative implications of different types of uncertainty. In the end, theories of choice can help us make normative trade-offs more transparent, but they cannot replace the value judgments, and normative discourses, that guide the balancing of the involved interests.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"188 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131361777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Can Loss Aversion Shed Light on the Deflation Puzzle? 损失厌恶能解释通缩之谜吗?

Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2019-06-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3405160

J. Lye, Ian M. McDonald

引用次数: 6

Overconfident Distribution Channels 过于自信的销售渠道

Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2019-06-01 DOI: 10.1111/POMS.12981

M. Li

引用次数: 46