Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal最新文献

{"title":"Keeping Up With the Joneses: Economic Impacts of Overconfidence in Micro-Entrepreneurs","authors":"J. Seither","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3825971","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3825971","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper investigates the effects of incorrect beliefs over relative firm performance on micro-firm outputs through a randomized field experiment in Mozambique. At baseline, 76% of firm owners in the bottom of the distribution are overconfident about their firm's performance. The estimates reveal that correcting these beliefs through a simple, easily scalable information experiment closes the performance gap between treated firms in the bottom of the distribution at baseline and average and top firms by almost 43%. Moreover, the treatment increases the time a firm owner allocates to her business, improves strategic cooperation with the most important business partners, and affects the pricing strategy of treated firm owners. My results suggest that incorrect beliefs about relative performance are a binding constraint to firm growth that have large implications for managerial behavior and firm outcomes.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130236586","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Investor Learning in Crowdfunded Supply Chain Finance Markets","authors":"Zhijin Zhou, Shengsheng Xiao, Yi-Chun Ho, Yong Tan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3136240","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3136240","url":null,"abstract":"Problem definition: Crowdfunded Supply Chain Finance (SCF) is an innovative Fintech service that transforms financial flows, allowing individual investors to serve as funders under the SCF paradigm. As required by crowdfunded SCF platforms, the unique presence of loan guarantors in the financing process alters how fundraisers and investors interact, which gives rise to investor learning. Academic/practical relevance: Understanding how such learning behavior impacts investors’ decision-making leads to actionable recommendations for platform managers who desire to encourage investor participation as well as for capital seekers who wish to stimulate fundraising performance. Methodology: We develop a Bayesian learning model, wherein we conceptualize individual perception of guarantor reliability as a subjective attitude underlying the perceived risk of a loan listing. Given that a guarantor may be involved in multiple loans in this unique market, we consider that individuals can learn about a guarantor’s true reliability and dynamically update their perception as they receive more repayments, or lack thereof, over time. We model investor behavior as two separate yet interdependent outcomes: (1) the incidence decision of whether to invest and (2) the amount decision of how much to invest. Results: Our estimation results confirm the existence of investor learning: an individual’s incidence decision and amount decision are both driven by her perception of guarantor reliability. In addition, we observe that this latent perception has different moderating effects on investor responses to listing attributes, such as interest rate and loan duration. Managerial implications: Our counterfactual simulations generate useful implications. For platform managers, enabling investor learning from correlated investment experience can help mitigate adverse selection and improve overall market efficiency. For supply chain members, optimizing the structure of loan listings could accelerate investor learning, which in turn can help simulate fundraising performance as a desirable outcome of reputation building.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"175 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132969244","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Negishi Approach to Recursive Contracts","authors":"G. Bloise, Paolo Siconolfi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3848097","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3848097","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we argue that a large class of recursive contracts can be studied by means of the conventional Negishi method. A planner is responsible for prescribing current actions along with a distribution of future utility values to all agents, so as to maximize their weighted sum of utilities. Under convexity, the method yields the exact efficient frontier. Otherwise, the implementation requires contracts be contingent on publicly observable random signals uncorrelated to fundamentals. We also provide operational first‐order conditions for the characterization of efficient contracts. Finally, we compare extensively our approach with the dual method established in the literature.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"166 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115447141","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Study on Human Behavioural Aspects on Individual Financial Decisions in Indian Context","authors":"Dr. Arti Chandani, V. Ratnalikar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3753021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3753021","url":null,"abstract":"The study of behavioral finance is still in its infancy stage. The academic fraternity has only recently accepted behavioural finance as a feasible paradigm to explain how financial participants make decisions and, in turn, how these decisions affect financial markets. Indians are among the largest demographic sections in the world, and there is some evidence – anecdotal, theoretical, and empirical – that Indians suffer from cognitive biases on a different level than people of other cultures. By studying behavioral finance in India, we can, therefore, add to our understanding of the topics. This study aims to investigate the behavioural aspects influencing the individual financial decision making amongst Indians across various age groups, income sources, gender and native regions / domiciles. The objective and the scope of this project is to study two important theories in behavioural finance in Indian Context viz. prospects theory and mental accounting theory. Sample characteristics were checked using SPSS 20 and STATA 15. Multi-stage stratified sampling was used to collect a sample of 223 respondents. It was found that there are two important factors /biases of prospect theory namely- loss aversion and regret aversion besides mental budgeting bias of mental accounting, which affect the financial decision making of Indians and investments and these are important to be understood not only by the retail investors but also by the companies, which offer various investment instruments.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"82 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130555147","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Inference from Biased Polls","authors":"Andy Brownback, Nathaniel Burke, Tristan Gagnon-Bartsch","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3695115","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3695115","url":null,"abstract":"Poll respondents often attempt to present a positive image by overstating virtuous behaviors. We examine whether people account for this \"socially desirable responding\" (SDR) when drawing inferences from poll data. In an experiment, we incentivize \"predictors\" to guess others' choice behaviors for actions with varying social desirability. To aid their guesses, predictors observe random subsamples of either (i) actual choice behavior or (ii) hypothetical claims from unincentivized polls. Predictors show reasonable skepticism towards hypothetical claims, which exhibit predictable SDR. However, their skepticism is not appropriately tailored to the direction or magnitude of SDR. This under-correction for SDR occurs even though subjects can accurately predict which behaviors are most prone to SDR when explicitly asked.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114762014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Lab Experiment on Knowledge Hierarchy Formation","authors":"H. Duncanson, M. Sanders","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3728107","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3728107","url":null,"abstract":"The way in which hierarchies form and are sustained has been little studied in the lab, yet is vital to our understanding of the real world formation of organisations and firms. We specify a simple model of hierarchy formation in which participants can share tasks within an organisation at a cost. We then proceed to conduct a lab experiment in which this cost is exogenously varied.We find that participants are sensitive to the incentives to form (or not to form) groups, but exhibit a strong preference for togetherness. Moreover, participants are strongly discouraged from trying to join groups if they have been (exogenously) rejected in the past, suggesting that disappointment is a factor in their decision-making.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115647592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Asymptotic Optimality of Base-Stock Policies for Perishable Inventory Systems","authors":"Jinzhi Bu, Xiting Gong, X. Chao","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3724966","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3724966","url":null,"abstract":"We consider periodic review perishable inventory systems with a fixed product lifetime. Unsatisfied demand can be either lost or backlogged. The objective is to minimize the long-run average holding, penalty, and outdating cost. The optimal policy for these systems is notoriously complex and computationally intractable because of the curse of dimensionality. Hence, various heuristic replenishment policies are proposed in the literature, including the base-stock policy, which raises the total inventory level to a constant in each review period. Whereas various studies show near-optimal numerical performances of base-stock policies in the classic system with zero replenishment lead time and a first-in-first-out issuance policy, the results on their theoretical performances are very limited. In this paper, we first focus on this classic system and show that a simple base-stock policy is asymptotically optimal when any one of the product lifetime, demand population size, unit penalty cost, and unit outdating cost becomes large; moreover, its optimality gap converges to zero exponentially fast in the first two parameters. We then study two important extensions. For a system under a last-in-first-out or even an arbitrary issuance policy, we prove that a simple base-stock policy is asymptotically optimal with large product lifetime, large unit penalty costs, and large unit outdating costs, and for a backlogging system with positive lead times, we prove that our results continue to hold with large product lifetime, large demand population sizes, and large unit outdating costs. Finally, we provide a numerical study to demonstrate the performances of base-stock policies in these systems. This paper was accepted by Victor Martinez de Albéniz, operations management.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122898943","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Belief Formation Under Signal Correlation","authors":"Tanjim Hossain, R. Okui","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3218152","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3218152","url":null,"abstract":"Using a set of incentivized laboratory experiments, we characterize how people form beliefs about a random variable based on independent and correlated signals. First, we theoretically show that, while pure correlation neglect always leads to overvaluing of correlated signals, that may not happen if people also exhibit overprecision perceiving signals to be more precise than they actually are. Our experimental results reveal that, while subjects do overvalue moderately or strongly correlated signals, they undervalue weakly correlated signals, suggesting concurrent presence of correlation neglect and overprecision. Estimated parameters of our model suggest that subjects show a nearly complete level of correlation neglect and also suffer from a high level of overprecision. Additionally, we find that subjects do not fully benefit from wisdom of the crowd-they undervalue aggregated information about othersi¯ actions in favor of their private information. This is consistent with models of overprecision where people do not properly incorporate the variance reducing power of averages.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"166 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127579021","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Weighted and Restricted Deegan-Packel Power Indices","authors":"A. Khmelnitskaya, Michela Chessa","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3713983","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3713983","url":null,"abstract":"In the paper we introduce weighted and restricted versions of the Deegan-Packel power index. We show that the classical Deegan-Packel index, which was proposed as an alternative to the Shapley-Shubik index, in fact coincides with the Shapley value of some specific game determined by the set of minimal winning coalitions, and therefore, it has close affinities with the Shapley-Shubik index. We investigate monotonicity properties of the weighted Deegan-Packel index and introduce easy to check conditions under which it is monotonic with respect to the players' weights. An axiomatic characterization of the weighted Deegan-Packel index is provided. The computations done for three real-life examples from realm of politics demonstrate clearly the coincidence of our theoretical predictions with the reality.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122440791","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"When Choices are Mistakes","authors":"Kirby Nielsen, John Rehbeck","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3481381","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3481381","url":null,"abstract":"Using a laboratory experiment, we identify whether decision makers consider it a mistake to violate canonical choice axioms. To do this, we incentivize subjects to report which of several axioms they want their decisions to satisfy. Then, subjects make lottery choices which might conflict with their stated axiom preferences. We give them the opportunity to re-evaluate their decisions when lotteries conflict with desired axioms. We find that a majority of individuals want to follow the canonical axioms and revise their lottery choices to be consistent with them. We interpret this to mean that many axiom violations we observed were mistakes.","PeriodicalId":322168,"journal":{"name":"Human Behavior & Game Theory eJournal","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125700437","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}