ERN: Pricing (Topic)最新文献_第5页

ERN: Pricing (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-10-26 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.3090002

Hongqiao Chen, Ming Hu, G. Perakis

{"title":"Distribution-Free Pricing","authors":"Hongqiao Chen, Ming Hu, G. Perakis","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3090002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3090002","url":null,"abstract":"Problem definition: We study a monopolistic robust pricing problem in which the seller does not know the customers’ valuation distribution for a product but knows its mean and variance. Academic/practical relevance: This minimal requirement for information means that the pricing managers only need to be able to answer two questions: How much will your targeted customers pay on average? To measure your confidence in the previous answer, what is the standard deviation of customer valuations? Methodology: We focus on the maximin profit criterion and derive distribution-free upper and lower bounds on the profit function. Results: By maximizing the tight profit lower bound, we obtain the optimal robust price in closed form as well as its distribution-free, worst-case performance bound. We then extend the single-product result to study the robust pure bundle pricing problem where the seller only knows the mean and variance of each product, and we provide easily verifiable, distribution-free, sufficient conditions that guarantee the pure bundle to be more robustly profitable than à la carte (i.e., separate) sales. We further derive a distribution-free, worst-case performance guarantee for a heuristic scheme in which customers choose between buying either a single product or a pure bundle. Moreover, we generalize separate sales and pure bundling to a scheme called clustered bundling that imposes a price for each part (i.e., cluster) of a partition of all products and allows customers to choose one or multiple parts (i.e., clusters), and we provide various algorithms to compute clustered bundling heuristics. In parallel, most of our results hold for the minimax relative regret criterion as well. Managerial implications: The robust price for a single product is in closed form under the maximin profit or minimax relative regret criterion and hence, is easily computable. Its interpretation can be easily explained to pricing managers. We also provide efficient algorithms to compute various mixed bundling heuristics for the multiproduct problem.","PeriodicalId":321987,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Pricing (Topic)","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122318734","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 21

Non-Linear Pricing and Conscious Consumption 非线性定价与有意识消费

ERN: Pricing (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-10-08 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3465981

Nadia Burani, A. Mantovani

引用次数: 1

Pricing in Service Systems with Rational Balking and Abandonment of Time-Sensitive Customers 具有时间敏感顾客理性回避和抛弃的服务系统定价

ERN: Pricing (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-10-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3464899

Hossein Abouee Mehrizi, R. Konrad

{"title":"Pricing in Service Systems with Rational Balking and Abandonment of Time-Sensitive Customers","authors":"Hossein Abouee Mehrizi, R. Konrad","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3464899","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3464899","url":null,"abstract":"The current literature on pricing in service systems with time-sensitive customers predominately ignores the rational abandonment of customers with mixed-risk attitudes. The goal of this paper is to address this gap. We consider an unobservable queueing system with a nonlinear waiting cost function, which is concave up to a certain point and then becomes convex, capturing the mixed-risk attitude of customers observed in empirical studies. We assume that customers are sensitive with respect to waiting time (delay) and strategic regarding their balking and abandonment decisions. We characterize the optimal pricing policy that maximizes the service provider's revenue. We show that the pricing policies studied in the literature, including the joint service and cancellation (entrance) fee policy, are suboptimal and cannot induce socially optimal behavior. We demonstrate that while the cancellation fee can regulate a customer's balking strategy, the service fee cannot effectively control a customer's abandonment decision. We then provide conditions under which the joint service and cancellation fee policy is optimal. We finally prove that the service provider should compensate customers for their waiting in order to efficiently control the abandonment of customers. We propose a pricing policy, which includes entrance, service, and wait time (delay) fees, that maximize the provider's revenue. We derive the optimal fees and show that, under the proposed optimal pricing policy, customers pay service and cancellation fees while they are partially compensated for the time spent waiting for service.","PeriodicalId":321987,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Pricing (Topic)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125967336","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Group Hug: Platform Competition with User-Groups 群体拥抱:与用户群体的平台竞争

ERN: Pricing (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-09-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3468410

Sarit Markovich, Y. Yehezkel

引用次数: 1

An Analysis of Allocation Phase Pricing and Clock Round Price Increases in the Canadian 600 MHz Auction 加拿大600 MHz拍卖中分配阶段定价和时钟轮价格上涨分析

ERN: Pricing (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-09-20 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3463933

J. Bono, Allan T. Ingraham, Shreyas Ravi, William K. Schwartz, Christopher Sojourner

{"title":"An Analysis of Allocation Phase Pricing and Clock Round Price Increases in the Canadian 600 MHz Auction","authors":"J. Bono, Allan T. Ingraham, Shreyas Ravi, William K. Schwartz, Christopher Sojourner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3463933","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3463933","url":null,"abstract":"The 600 MHz auction conducted by Innovation, Science, and Economic Development (ISED) in Canada was a Combinatorial Clock Auction (CCA) that used a spectrum set-aside to prevent three large national wireless providers—specifically, Bell, Rogers, and Telus—from winning the entirety of the spectrum at auction. The product space was divided into 16 geographic areas, and seven 2x5 MHz block were available in each area. Within the context of the ISED consultation regarding auction design for the 3500 MHz tender, respondents have commented on certain aspects of the 600 MHz auction design as it relates to the set-aside and to price determination in the 600 MHz auction. The purpose of this paper is to provide interested parties with an accurate understanding of pricing in the Canadian 600 MHz auction of 2019. This paper does not take a position on any proposed design elements of the 3500 MHz auction in Canada. We find that set-aside eligible bidders in the 600 MHz auction did not significantly affect the base prices that Rogers or Telus paid for 600 MHz spectrum. In addition, an examination of clock round bidding behavior shows that open prices did not increase significantly due to bidding from set-aside eligible bidders.","PeriodicalId":321987,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Pricing (Topic)","volume":"76 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121491844","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Determinants of Channel Profitability: Retailers' Control over Product Selections as Contracting Leverage 渠道盈利能力的决定因素:零售商对产品选择的控制作为契约杠杆

ERN: Pricing (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-09-12 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3625706

Sylvia Hristakeva

引用次数: 3

Rethinking the Efficiency of Price Discrimination 重新思考价格歧视的有效性

ERN: Pricing (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-07-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3652696

Patrick Ward

{"title":"Rethinking the Efficiency of Price Discrimination","authors":"Patrick Ward","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3652696","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3652696","url":null,"abstract":"Analysis of efficiency in legal fields from contracts to competition assumes that a consumer’s demand depends on the price the consumer faces, not on the prices a firm charges other customers. This project provides evidence to the contrary. It examines how the phenomenon impacts the analysis of personalized pricing, also known as perfect or first-degree price discrimination. Courts have long considered the practice efficient, and companies increasingly use big data to that end. The paper reports the results of a sequence of experiments on a simple transaction: flatware purchases. When participants learned about a firm’s personalized-pricing mechanism, demand contracted by up to 24.8%. I model a company’s most profitable response to this behavior — namely, keeping consumers in the dark about personalization — and find that the ensuing demand-side inefficiency can dwarf that of uniform monopoly pricing. Because personalized pricing has galvanized an industry of transparency-focused startups, I also model a company’s response when it cannot obscure its pricing mechanism. Its second-best strategy is to sell to a narrow range of high-value customers. Doing so excludes some lower-income or less-interested consumers from the market. This prompts a supply-side inefficiency that can also exceed that of uniform monopoly pricing. Faithfully applying the consumer-welfare approach to these results suggests an expanded paradigm and new types of antitrust harms. Both strategies — opaqueness and exclusion — can lead to violations of the Sherman Act and facilitate showings of harm under the Robinson Patman Act. As such, this project supports policies aimed at the transparency of prices.","PeriodicalId":321987,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Pricing (Topic)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114793516","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Airport Regulation 机场监管

ERN: Pricing (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-07-07 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3488237

Achim I. Czerny

引用次数: 3

Priority Service Pricing with Heterogeneous Customers: Impact of Delay Cost Distribution 异构客户优先服务定价:延迟成本分布的影响

ERN: Pricing (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-05-28 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3084534

P. Cao, Yaolei Wang, Jingui Xie

引用次数: 14

Oil and Pump Prices: Is There Any Asymmetry in the Greek Oil Downstream Sector? 石油和泵价格:希腊石油下游行业是否存在不对称?

ERN: Pricing (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-05-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3444840

Zacharias G. Bragoudakis, Stavros Degiannakis, G. Filis

{"title":"Oil and Pump Prices: Is There Any Asymmetry in the Greek Oil Downstream Sector?","authors":"Zacharias G. Bragoudakis, Stavros Degiannakis, G. Filis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3444840","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3444840","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this study is to assess whether fuel prices in Greece respond asymmetrically to changes in the global oil prices. To do so, we depart from the current practice in the literature that focuses on fuel prices. Rather, we consider the mark-up of both the refineries and retailers. Even more, unlike the bulk of the existing literature, we take into consideration the whole supply chain, i.e. both the refineries and the retail fuel sector. Hence, we first assess whether the refineries’ mark-up responds asymmetrically to the global oil prices and subsequently whether the retailers’ mark-up shows an asymmetric behaviour relatively to changes in the refineries’ fuel prices. Our findings show that the Greek fuel retailers do not change their mark-up behaviour based on changes of the refined fuel price. By contrast, the asymmetric behaviour is evident in the refineries mark-up relatively to changes in the global oil prices, which is then passed through to the retailers and consumers. Finally, we convincingly show that weekly and monthly data mask any such asymmetric relationship. Thus, we maintain that unless the appropriate data frequency, fuel price transformations and the whole supply chain are considered, misleading findings could be revealed.","PeriodicalId":321987,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Pricing (Topic)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114460480","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 13