Distribution-Free Pricing

Hongqiao Chen, Ming Hu, G. Perakis
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引用次数: 21

Abstract

Problem definition: We study a monopolistic robust pricing problem in which the seller does not know the customers’ valuation distribution for a product but knows its mean and variance. Academic/practical relevance: This minimal requirement for information means that the pricing managers only need to be able to answer two questions: How much will your targeted customers pay on average? To measure your confidence in the previous answer, what is the standard deviation of customer valuations? Methodology: We focus on the maximin profit criterion and derive distribution-free upper and lower bounds on the profit function. Results: By maximizing the tight profit lower bound, we obtain the optimal robust price in closed form as well as its distribution-free, worst-case performance bound. We then extend the single-product result to study the robust pure bundle pricing problem where the seller only knows the mean and variance of each product, and we provide easily verifiable, distribution-free, sufficient conditions that guarantee the pure bundle to be more robustly profitable than à la carte (i.e., separate) sales. We further derive a distribution-free, worst-case performance guarantee for a heuristic scheme in which customers choose between buying either a single product or a pure bundle. Moreover, we generalize separate sales and pure bundling to a scheme called clustered bundling that imposes a price for each part (i.e., cluster) of a partition of all products and allows customers to choose one or multiple parts (i.e., clusters), and we provide various algorithms to compute clustered bundling heuristics. In parallel, most of our results hold for the minimax relative regret criterion as well. Managerial implications: The robust price for a single product is in closed form under the maximin profit or minimax relative regret criterion and hence, is easily computable. Its interpretation can be easily explained to pricing managers. We also provide efficient algorithms to compute various mixed bundling heuristics for the multiproduct problem.
传播变为免费定价
问题定义:我们研究了一个垄断的鲁棒定价问题,其中卖方不知道顾客对产品的评价分布,但知道其均值和方差。学术/实践相关性:这种对信息的最低要求意味着定价经理只需要能够回答两个问题:你的目标客户平均会支付多少钱?要衡量你对前一个答案的信心,客户估值的标准差是多少?方法:重点研究利润最大化准则,推导出利润函数的无分布上下界。结果:通过最大化紧利润下界,我们得到了封闭形式的最优稳健价格及其无分配的最坏情况性能下界。然后,我们将单产品的结果推广到卖方只知道每个产品的均值和方差的鲁棒纯束定价问题,并提供了易于验证的、无分布的充分条件,保证纯束比单产品(即单独)销售更鲁棒盈利。我们进一步推导了一个启发式方案的无分布、最坏情况下的性能保证,其中客户在购买单个产品或纯捆绑产品之间进行选择。此外,我们将单独销售和纯捆绑推广到一个称为集群捆绑的方案,该方案为所有产品的一个分区的每个部分(即集群)施加价格,并允许客户选择一个或多个部分(即集群),我们提供了各种算法来计算集群捆绑启发式。同时,我们的大多数结果也适用于极大极小相对后悔准则。管理意义:单个产品的稳健价格在利润最大化或相对后悔最小最大化准则下是封闭形式,因此很容易计算。它的解释很容易向定价经理解释。我们还提供了计算多积问题的各种混合捆绑启发式的有效算法。
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